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Chapter 1
Introduction
The ongoing integration of the world economy has not stopped at the real
sectors, but has also taken place in the financial sector, where both the cross-
border provision of financial services as well as the globalization of banks are
on the rise.
Though no way a new phenomenon1, the internationalisation and multi-
nationalisation of the banking industry has picked up steam (again) in recent
years, with the real new feature being the unprecedented scale of foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) in the banking sector.
This trend was aided by world-wide financial liberalization and deregula-
tion for the banking sector, an increased globalisation of the real sector and
technological advances reducing information costs in international financial
services activities (e.g. Soussa (2004)[121].
In some countries, primarily in Latin America and the former transition
economies in Central and Eastern Europe, foreign direct investment in the
banking sector has gone so far as foreign bank subsidiaries now being the
dominant market players in these countries, cumulatively holding market
shares of close to or more than 50% in many countries in these regions (see
the following table).
1Jones (1990)[87] traces multinational banking back to the Middle Ages, when Italian
bankers established branches in foreign countries to assist in international banking service.
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                                  Table 1.1: Foreign Bank Control (% of assets)
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In general financial sector FDI to emerging market economies increased
sharply from 6 $billion in the period 1990-1996 to nearly 50 $billion from
1997 to 2000 (numbers as in BIS report[63]). At the same time an increasing
number of large cross-border merger and acquisition deals has taken place in
the banking industry in OECD countries. In Europe, for example, the top 10
Cross-border M&A deals in banking alone amounted to an investment volume
of 101.4 $billion from 1995 to 2006 (source: The Economist (2006)[127]), with
the largest intra-European bank merger to date having been the acquisition
of HypoVereinsbank AG group (GER) by Uni Credit Group (IT) at a value
of 22.3 $billion.
Amid this surge both new political concerns and scientific questions have
arisen. From a normative perspective, governments are in need of answers
concerning the effects of foreign bank entry on the economy, while banks are
in need of best practices to shape their international expansion strategies.
Taking a positive perspective, economic science has to come up with expla-
nations concerning politics towards multinational banking (e.g. legal entry
barriers) and the observed patterns of international expansion by multina-
tional banks.
The banking sector is widely perceived to be one of the main important
”‘strategic”’ sectors in an economy, due to its role in providing capital to
2
all other sectors in the economy. Unsurprisingly then, the increasing glob-
alisation of banking has invoked both fears and hopes among governments
concerning the effects of foreign bank entry into their local markets. Whereas
there is general hope in emerging market economies, that such entry might
help in accessing international capital sources and aid in the efficiency de-
velopment of the domestic banking sector, fears have arisen about potential
negative effects of foreign bank entry on the survival probability of domestic
banking institutions, potentially harmful ”‘overconsolidation”’ of the sector
and entry effects on loan provisioning for informationally opaque market seg-
ments, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises.
Besides scientific interest in the latter direct economic policy-relevant
issues, questions on why, when and how banks go abroad are of major interest,
especially because entry motives and strategies might shape foreign bank
entry effects on the host economy. For example, as will be discussed in the
literature overview in this thesis, it is observed, that foreign bank entry via
the set-up of a new physical structure (Greenfield Investment) has different
effects than entry via the acquisition of a local incumbent bank (M&A). Also,
effects of such entry might depend on which banking segment the entrant
foreign bank focuses on in the host country market.
In this thesis, besides trying to give both an overview as well as a prac-
titioners view on the general issues of multinational banking, I focus on
theoretically exploring three questions, concerning banks’ reasoning for in-
ternational expansion due to follow your customer-considerations, the opti-
mal entry mode into foreign markets and how consolidation via M&A in the
banking sector might affect credit supply for the most likely victims of such
a development, small and medium-sized enterprises.
Chapter 2 of this thesis starts out with first giving a short literature
overview about six basic questions that arise in the context of multinational
banking, namely
1. What are the motives of banks for expanding internationally?
2. Which banks become multinational players?
3. Which markets attract multinational banks?
4. How do entry and market strategies of multinational banks look like?
5. How successful are multinational banks operating in foreign markets?
6. What are the effects of multinational bank entry on the host country?
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Additionally a case study of a bank highly successful in its international
expansion, Bank Austria Creditanstalt, studying its penetration into the
Central and Eastern European region, is conducted. Based on first-hand in-
formation from a Bank Austria practitioner, I derive a number of insights for
a general discussion about the international expansion strategy of multina-
tional banks. Generally, the study shows how strongly various dimensions of
international expansion strategy are intertwined and how such strategies are
shaped by ex ante characteristics of the bank and its background. Also, the
findings shed some further light on the importance of the follow your cus-
tomer motive in banks’ decisions to go abroad, as well as efficient strategies
in identifying host market characteristics underlying the location decision of
multinational banks.
Chapter 3 tries to answer the question of whether firms in general should
enter a host market via the establishment of a completely new structure
(Greenfield Investment) or via the acquisition of a domestic incumbent. I
theoretically discuss this question in a setting of sequential entry and find,
that one reason for the dominance of Greenfield Investment concerning the
number of occurrences might be its strategic advantageous effect of deterring
potential further entry into the market. While the theory adds to the general
literature on entry modes in foreign direct investment, the results are valid for
the banking industry, too. Extensions of the model are proposed to discuss
entry modes in industries with limited local takeover possibilities and strong
country-specific learning-by-doing effects, of which the latter might further
help in understanding entry mode choice in specific banking segments such
as retail banking.
Chapter 4 discusses the decision of bank entry into foreign markets under
the follow your customer-motive. This motive is among the most discussed
reasons for banks to go abroad, however no formal theory had been brought
forward to my knowledge. In a setup of a double moral hazard problem
within a real sector firm I discuss its home bank’s incentive to follow the firm
abroad to provide financing for a host country subsidiary to be set up. I find
that the decision of a bank whether to provided its client with financing from
its home base, via actually establishing a physical presence abroad or not at
all, depends on client, bank and host country characteristics, namely the
relative magnitude of the two moral hazard problems the parent firm faces
in interaction with its foreign subsidiary manager, the general efficiency of the
bank in the liquidation of project assets and the factor endowment or stage
of development of the firm’s FDI host country. These single characteristics
are found to not influence the banks behaviour uniquely, but rather interact
with each other to shape the respective banks service provisioning strategy.
In chapter 5 I propose a general theory on how active consolidation (via
4
M&A) in the banking sector might affect the credit supply for small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Though set up as a general theory for the
banking sector, the model also applies to changes in the industrial organi-
zation in banking markets induced by the entry of foreign banks. I study
this topic by modelling capital allocation decisions within banks, formally
introducing relationship lending considerations. Restricting the analysis to
banks’ incentives to lend to SMEs, the model yields the result that consol-
idation in the form of at least one existing bank becoming part of a larger
organisational structure leads to a potential reduction of credit supply to a
fraction of SMEs in the market. Additionally, I give a smaller literature re-
view on why banks might want to grow larger and how consolidation affects
credit supply to SMEs empirically.
I finally conclude this thesis by summarizing my findings and discussing
potential future trends that will shape the further evolution of multinational
banking.
5
Chapter 2
Multinational Banking - A
Literature survey and the case
of Bank Austria in Central and
Eastern Europe
2.1 Overview
The purpose of the following chapter is to discuss the main findings of em-
pirical literature on multinational banks as well as to discuss entry motives
and entry strategies by the example of the most important foreign players in
Central and Eastern Europe, namely Austrian Bank Austria Creditanstalt.
For the literature review I will focus on the following questions surround-
ing multinational banking.
1. What are the motives of banks for becoming multinational or generally
acting in foreign markets?
2. Which banks become international/multinational players?
3. Which markets attract multinational banks?
4. How do the entry and market strategies of multinational banks look
like?
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5. How successful are multinational banks operating in foreign markets?
6. What are the effects of multinational bank entry on the host country?
Of course, at least part of these questions are intertwined with each other.
For example, the motives of banks should critically hinge on what kinds of
banks they are, which again also determines whether they become interna-
tional players. Of course, especially taking into account the literature on
vertical versus horizontal FDI, the geographic pattern should also differ in
the entry motives. Entry motives also will play a role in how the respective
multinational bank will setup their entry and market strategy.
One striking point, is that the effect of multinational bank entry should
very much depend on the entry motives. For example, if a foreign bank
enters a host country market to provide services that are neither available
from foreign banks nor close substitutes to the service provided by the latter,
the effect of foreign bank entry on the domestic banking sector might be
negligible.
I proceed with a case study of Austrian banks’ entry in Central and East-
ern Europe to shed some further light on these issues. Among the findings
are that home country push factors play a strong role in banks going abroad,
that the availability of follow your customer-strategies significantly supports
international expansion and that the choice of entry mode is strongly con-
nected with the respective market strategy of banks. The latter point also
is a reminder that banks are financial conglomerates, potentially offering a
wide variety of services, therefore treating banks as a homogenous group in
a general discussion of multinationalization strategies might be misleading.
2.2 Multinational banking - what do we know?
In the following I want to give a small, by no means complete, review on the
literature about multinational banking.
2.2.1 Entry motives of multinational banks
Broadly speaking, there are two main strands of motives on why banks enter
foreign markets. The one I will not discuss in detail here are managerial
motives. Obviously, entering a foreign market is usually connected with firm
growth. Empire-building tendencies of bank managers might therefore be
a simple reasoning why banks want to enter foreign markets, especially if
growth possibilities are restricted in the home country e.g. due to anti-trust
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considerations. A large literature deals with the empire-building tendencies
of managers and the underlying motives such as status, power, compensa-
tion and prestige of managers of large firms (see e.g. Baumol (1959)[10],
Williamson (1974)[131] and Jensen (1986)[85]). An additional managerial
motive for expanding into foreign markets is (potentially inefficient) risk di-
versification (e.g. Berger et al.(2000)[12]) to prevent cases of bank liquidation
leading to job loss.
The other strand of motives, which I want to discuss in more detail, can
be subsumed under ”‘profit-maximization motives”’. One can further differ
between the motive to expand business in general and the motive to expand
in a specific business segment/geographic market.
Concerning motives for general expansion, economies of scale and scope in
various dimensions might play a role. Besides the generally discussed revenue
and cost economies of scale and scope, another focus in the analysis of the
banking industry is on risk diversification economies of scale and scope.
The empirical evidence on the former is mixed as is discussed in more
detail later in of this thesis. However, practitioners strongly support the
view that such economies of scale and scope exist in international expansion.
For example, Spanish bank managers active in the expansion into the Latin
American market perceive a wide variety of such economies e.g. due to the
possibility to develop relatively homogeneous financial products or centralize
back office and transaction processes (Guillen and Tschoegl (1999)[74]. The
majority of studies on this topic also might suffer from old data. Due to tech-
nological advances and changing market possibilities, such economies might
be available to a higher degree today. The evolution of internet banking, the
arrival of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and the beginning specializa-
tion of banks along the value chain have most probably increased available
economies of scale (The Economist (2006)[127]). At the same time bank size
and diversification might be an important requirement to be able to place
”‘strategic bets on future markets such as China without putting the whole
bank at risk”’(The Economist (2006), page 4[127]).
The other two well-discussed potential profit-enhancement motives for
entering a foreign market are to win new customers in this country (market-
seeking foreign direct investment) or to keep existing domestic customers and
enhance business volume with them (follow your customer-strategy).
The former is the most obvious and generally acknowledged motive for
entry into a foreign market. However, special to the multinational banking
literature, there had been an ongoing debate about whether a foreign bank is
actually capable of successfully entering local retail and commercial banking
markets (e.g. Nolle and Seth (1996)[108]). More recent literature, as well
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as the overwhelming experience, suggest that at least some foreign banks in
some host markets are able to penetrate local markets on a sufficient scale
(e.g. Berger et al.(2000)[12]).
Compared to the discussion of FDI in other industries, the follow your
customer motive plays a much larger role in the multinational banking lit-
erature. From a firm perspective this follow your customer behaviour seems
to have been of large importance for a long time now, as, e.g. in the survey
by Pastre (1981)[111] 52% of U.S. multinational firms reported to use one of
their domestic banks for operations in foreign jurisdictions1.
The follow your customer motive includes both offensive and defensive
strategic traits. For one, a domestic bank might engage in stand-alone non-
profitable follow your customer-FDI, to secure the respective client’s home
market business with the bank and keep them from switching to another bank
providing global service network capabilities. This so-called defensive expan-
sion approach has been mentioned by e.g. Grubel (1977)[73] or Williams
(1997)[130]. However, following its customer also might be profitable for
the respective bank per se, as the latter is able to broaden the volume of
business conducted with the respective firm, taking over additional trade
financing and local cash management services for this firm. Also, the geo-
graphical expansion of the bank’s network might attract additional customer
from its home country looking for such ”‘global capabilities”’2.
Another profit motive for international expansion of banks seems to have
become less of an issue, but has been a big reason for the big wave of inter-
national expansion of U.S. banks in the 1960s and 70s, namely the search for
cheap sources of refinancing for home market financing activities. This need
arose through ”‘Regulation Q”’ enacted by the Glass-Steagall act in 1933
in the United States, which did put a limit on the interest rates that banks
could pay on deposits in the United States, therefore leading to a shortage
in capital supply for the banks’ loan business. The response was to enter
especially European markets on a large scale to use European deposits to
refinance U.S. bank financing activities (e.g. Huertas (1990)[80]).
1Further empirical evidence is discussed at the beginning of chapter 3 of this thesis.
2Huertas (1990)[80] e.g. cites Frank Vanderlip, former CEO of Citibank on the banks
expansion into Latin America: ”‘ .. I hope to get a very considerable return by offering
facilities that other banks cannot offer to exporters, and thus attract their accounts to
Citibank”’.
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2.2.2 Which banks become multinational? Firm and
home country characteristics
Just like in the general literature on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the
issue of which institution-specific characteristics influence a banks multina-
tionalization decision has started to garner interest just recently.
This newly arising question is strongly linked with the recent advances
in trade and FDI theory incorporating the fact that firms are heterogeneous,
e.g. in the papers by Melitz (2003)[99] and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004)[56].
The main proposition of these papers is, that only sufficiently productive
(efficient) firms supply foreign markets. This group can the be further split
into relatively less productive firms which will serve foreign markets via ex-
porting, whereas the most efficient/productive firms will establish a physical
presence in foreign markets conducting Foreign Direct Investment.
A similar, and maybe even stronger, view is existent in the multinational
banking literature. As local banks should have inherent advantages over for-
eign banks in the market, due to intimate knowledge about e.g. borrowers’
risks or retail customers’ specific preferences, a successful entry by a foreign
bank should only be feasible, if the latter has sufficient advantages in other
bank characteristics to offset the incumbents’ informational advantages (e.g.
Grubel (1977)[73] or Berger et al.(2000)[12]). Examples for such multina-
tional bank advantages that could be leveraged on a foreign market could
be managerial skill, enhanced risk management and IT systems (e.g. Berger
et al.(2000)[12]) or the ability to refinance in the capital market or home
deposit market at lower costs.
The empirical literature on efficiency characteristics is surprisingly scarce
to date. Focarelli and Pozzolo in two studies (Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001)[61]
and Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003)[62]) indeed find, that the more efficient3 a
bank, the more likely this institution will run branches and/or subsidiaries
in foreign countries. Also, Buch and Lipponer (2004)[29], studying a sample
of German banks, discover that more profitable banks 4 are more active
3Measured as return on assets in these studies.
4Indeed profitability in their study setup is a good proxy for general bank efficiency, as
the authors control for different business portfolios of the banks as well as for bank size.
Whereas the former therefore controls for profit differences arising from concentrating on
different segments of the banking industry, the latter ensures that profitability is not only
a measure of economies of scale, but rather for underlying X-efficiency of the respective
bank.
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internationally, both in the sense that they undertake more foreign direct
investment as well as generate more revenue from international business in
general. However, the authors do not analyze how differing profitability
affects the choice of serving foreign markets predominantly via FDI or cross-
border provision of services.
Bank size per se might be an advantage for banks in their pursuit of inter-
national expansion as well, as large size and scope might enable institutions
to bear larger risks as well as get cheaper refinancing rates at the capital
market, due to potential economies of risk diversification5. A number of
studies indeed find size to have a positive influence on the degree of multina-
tional activity of a bank (e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001)[61],Focarelli and
Pozzolo (2003)[62], Buch and Lipponer (2004)[29] and Tschoegl (2003)[126]).
The latter study even finds that, for the US market, it is predominantly the
largest bank from the respective home country, that is most active in the
host market. One reasoning might be, that these respective banks are most
limited in their further domestic growth due to anti-trust regulations.
However, Curry, Fung and Harper (2003)[42] mention that the causality
between the degree of multinationalization and the size of a bank remains a
bit unclear, as bank size might be influenced by the fact that the respective
institution is involved internationally and not vice versa.
Furthermore the two studies by Focarrelli and Pozzolo[61],[62] show evi-
dence, that the product focus of banks is a further determinant of the global
scope of its operations. To be precise investment banks, or banks that gen-
erate a high share of their total revenue from non-interest income in general,
are found to be more globalized than traditional loan-processing banks.
Finally, Buch and Lipponer (2004)[29] also show, that previous inter-
national experience increases the probability of a bank to enter a foreign
market6.
Incentives and capabilities of banks to become multinational are most
probably endogenous, depending on the characteristics of markets the bank
has been operating in, specifically its home market.
The financial development of the home country, the degree of bank sector
competition in the bank’s main market, as well as regulatory conditions in
this home market are deemed by the literature to have an influence in both
developing the capabilities of banks to become multinational as well as their
incentive to do so (e.g. Berger et al.(2000)[12], Aliber (1984)[3] and Curry,
5From this perspective, size is an efficiency factor, determining available economies of
scale and maybe scope.
6This finding is also backed by information found in conducting the below case study.
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Fung and Harper (2003)[42]). Theoretically a large market should bread
tendentially larger banks or enable access to larger deposit volumes. Indeed
Brealey and Kaplanis (1996)[26] and Fisher and Molyneux (1996)[59] find a
positive influence of home country size on the multinational activity of banks.
Also strong bank sector competition in the host country should lead to
pressure to become more efficient, while also restricting the possibility to
make abnormal profits, giving incentives and enhancing capabilities to ex-
pand into other (less competitive) markets.
Home market saturation is seen among the main reasons banks start to
look abroad. Guillen and Tschoegl (1999)[74], conducting interviews with
Spanish bank managers, discovered, that the Latin American expansion by
Spanish banks was mainly pursued due to a very saturated Spanish home
banking market featuring strong margin pressure and restricted growth op-
portunities.
Additionally a well-developed capital market might give home banks an
opportunity for cheaper or more fitting refinancing options. The role of
home market financial market conditions for general foreign direct investment
has been discussed by Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002)[88], who find that
the reduction in Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the 1990s could be
explained by the Japanese banking crisis, which constrained Japanese firms’
ability to find sufficient financing for FDI activity.
The role of regulation on incentives to go abroad has already been partly
discussed in the motives for US banks to go abroad (”‘Regulation Q”’). Spe-
cific to the U.S., another regulatory restriction for domestic growth might
have played a large role in these banks’ decision to grow abroad. Precisely,
until the Riegle-Neal act in 1994, US banks faced severe restrictions on entry
into multiple US states, making large-scale interstate banking infeasible[12].
So geographic expansion for U.S. banks was mostly only feasible outside of
the U.S..
As mentioned before, another reason for international expansion might be
anti-trust considerations for large domestic banks, which might make further
inorganic (via acquisition) growth in the home market legally infeasible (e.g.
Tschoegl (2003)[126]).
2.2.3 Which markets attract multinational banks?
One area of research on multinational banking, that has already been ex-
plored to a relatively large degree by economic literature, is the location
choice of multinational banks.
The characteristics of an attractive host country can be sorted into two
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main categories, stand-alone and bilateral host-home country characteristics.
Multiple dimensions of stand-alone characteristics of host country markets
can be distinguished.
Macroeconomic conditions
The macroeconomic conditions attracting banking foreign direct invest-
ment are very much alike these attracting FDI in general.
Numerous studies find a positive influence on banking sector FDI of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita, e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo
(2003)[62], Brealey and Kaplanis (1996)[26], Sabi (1987)[116], Buch and Lip-
poner (2004)[29] and Buch and de Long (2004)[28], which is to be expected
from the theoretical literature on horizontal foreign direct investment, e.g.
Markusen and Venables (2000)[98]. Generally, all else equal, a higher GDP
should equal a larger demand for any kind of product. Besides similar rea-
soning, higher GDP per capita might be associated with a higher demand
for sophisticated, high-margin banking services, such as asset management.
Inflation is found to reduce the attractiveness of the market by Focarelli
and Pozzolo (2003)[62], however Buch and Lipponer 2004)[29] do not find a
significant impact of inflation7.
Country risk, as measured by an Index from Euromoney, is found to have
a negative influence on international bank activity in a respective country,
be it cross-border lending or bank foreign direct investment, in the study by
Buch and Lipponer[29].
Bank sector and regulation characteristics
One unanimous result across the empirical literature is that countries har-
bouring financial centers (e.g. New York, London, Tokyo) attract a larger
volume of bank sector FDI (see e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003)[62] and
Buch and de Long (2004)[28]. This easily can be rationalized by a type
forward and backward linkages in the banking industry, as banks buy in-
vestment banking products for their portfolios from other banks as well as
sell such products to other banks. Proximity of respective banks’ investment
banking divisions supports these transactions with heavy information and
trust requirements.
Concerning bank sector regulation, studies find, that the harsher activity
restrictions for multinational banks and the stricter banking regulation in
general, the less bank FDI the respective country will attract (e.g. Focarelli
7However, Buch and Lipponer argue that positive (higher nominal returns) and negative
(higher instability) effects might cancel each other out.
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and Pozzolo (2003)[62], Berger et al.(2000)[12], Buch and de Long (2004)[28]
and Curry, Fung and Harper (2003)[42]). However, this result does not seem
to hold for less developed countries (e.g. Sabi (1987)[116]).
Other profit-influencing factors determining whether banks enter the mar-
ket are the size of the banking market (+) (Sabi (1987)[116] the level of con-
centration in the host banking market (-) (Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003)[62]),
and the cost efficiency of incumbent banks (-) (Berger et al.(2000)[12]). These
influence factors obviously shape the expected profitability of market entry
through determining the market volume and the degree of competition in the
respective market.
Bilateral home-host country characteristics
Screening the empirical literature, bilateral country characteristics seem
to play a large role in multinational banks’ location decisions, just as the
general theory on Foreign Direct Investment predicts (e.g. Markusen and
Venables (2000)[98]).
Looking at the broad picture one clearly sees strong bilateral patterns
in multinational banking, as found by Soussa (2004)[121]. For example, as
discussed in the case study below, Austrian banks abroad are almost exclu-
sively active in the former transition economies, with 93% of Austrian banks’
FDI stock concentrated in five countries (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Croatia, Poland and Bulgaria). Also, Spanish banks’ multinational activity
is predominantly restricted to Latin America, with a share of 94% of total
outward bank FDI stock in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Colombia.
Similar strict bilateral geographic patterns are found for banks from Belgium
and Italy (strong focus on CEE countries).
From a host country perspective, for example, Spanish banks account for
65% and 58% of total bank foreign assets in Argentina and Brazil, respec-
tively, while e.g. Austrian banks’ foreign asset share in the Czech Republic
is 39%.
A closer, regression analysis-based look on bilateral home-host country
characteristics shows, that the amount of bilateral trade and real sector for-
eign direct investment positively influences the volume of bank sector FDI
into the host country (see e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003)[62], Buch and Lip-
poner (2004)[29], Brealey and Kaplanis (1996)[26] and Fisher and Molyneux
(1996)[59] and Sabi (1987)[116]). This result is consistent with the idea, that
follow your customer-motives play an important role in multinational banks’
location choice.
Additionally common language, low distance and a common legal system
are found to positively influence bilateral bank sector FDI in some studies(e.g.
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Buch and de Long (2004)[28]), however the impact is partly statistically
insignificant in other studies (e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003)[62] and Buch
(1999)[27])8.
Looking at how the Latin American and Eastern European markets shape
up concerning the source of inward bank FDI, especially in the Latin Amer-
ican case, language and cultural factors do seem to play a role, as the dom-
inance of Spanish banks among multinational banks in these countries is
blatant. Such a cultural factor is also often mentioned as the reason for the
market leadership of Austrian banks in Eastern Europe, as countries such as
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia used to be part of the Austrian
Habsburg empire for a long period of time in history.
2.2.4 How do the entry and market strategies of multi-
national banks look like?
Having discussed empirical results on why, which bank, stemming from which
country, enters where, the focus of discussion shifts to the existing literature
on how a bank enters a foreign market.
When deciding upon how to become actively involved in a foreign market,
a bank has two intertwined organizational dimensions to decide on. For one,
the bank has to choose the degree of market involvement (Curry, Fung and
Harper (2003)[42]) it wants to reach. A low level of involvement is achieved
by establishing correspondent banking (cross-border services with the help
of a correspondent incumbent bank in the host country) or by opening a rep-
resentative office or agency. Common to these forms are restricted activities,
with the bank not enabled to engage in deposit taking or direct lending9 in
the host country. In contrast, via establishing branches or subsidiaries, for-
eign banks are able to ”‘conduct the full range of banking activities”’(Curry,
Fung and Harper (2003)[42]). The difference between branch and subsidiary
organizations is, that the former type is not a legally independent organiza-
tional structure, whereas the latter is.
Ball and Tschoegl (1982)[6] find that the main determinant of organiza-
8In Focarelli and Pozzolo (2003) distance, as expected, influences foreign bank activ-
ity negatively and significantly. However, a common language enters insignificantly and
ambiguously in the probability of a foreign bank operating either a branch or even a
subsidiary in the respective host country.
9Agencies might be allowed to engage in commercial lending, but not in other loans or
deposit taking.
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tional choice in the above dimension is a bank’s experience in the respective
host market as well as its general experience in foreign banking markets.
The former suggests, that markets are entered in a step-by-step approach
starting with low degrees of involvement (e.g. representative office) with the
bank in the following growing its local structure up to possibly establishing
a subsidiary in the market.
Concerning branches and lower-level physical engagement forms, these
will usually be set up via Greenfield Investment.
The second dimension of organizational mode of entry concerns the setup
of a subsidiary in a host market. Entering via the establishment of a sub-
sidiary can be achieved either by setting up a completely new organizational
structure in the market (Greenfield Investment) or via the acquisition of a
local incumbent bank.
Very few empirical studies to date deal with the determinants of entry
modes of multinational banks.
According to de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006)[44], establishing Green-
field subsidiaries might be the entry mode of choice, if the parent bank wants
to exercise a high degree of control over the foreign structure. The authors
show evidence for this claim, finding that Greenfield subsidiaries are more
closely integrated within the parent organization operationally, having access
to the parent banks’ internal markets for capital and management resources.
In contrast, subsidiaries stemming from the acquisition of local incumbent
institutions enter the multinational bank group with an existing personnel
and capital (deposits and loans) portfolio, and are found to be less integrated
into the parent organizations’ internal markets, and also might need restruc-
turing such as to fit into the group’s organization and product portfolio. On
a positive side, the promptly available deposits of an acquired bank may en-
able the foreign bank to grow its local loan business faster due to available
local refinancing10. The need for access to the multinational bank group’s
internal capital market might therefore also be less pronounced.
A disadvantage of entry via M&A proposed in the literature especially ap-
plies to entry into non-OECD countries. Whereas acquired banks come with
a portfolio of potentially non-performing loans, a Greenfield subsidiary can
start off local business without such baggage[35]. This might be an impor-
tant factor, especially when entering countries, that have experienced a loan
crisis lately or harbour a majority of inefficient banks, also lacking the trans-
parency for multinational entrants to determine their level of engagement in
bad loans11.
10see Curry, Fung and Harper (2003)[42]
11Indeed, in the case study about Bank Austria Creditanstalt in this chapter, the prac-
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An important determinant of the entry mode for multinational banks
should also be the respective bank’s segmental strategic focus in the respec-
tive host market. Due to the problems of acquiring soft information about
loan risks, ”‘greenfield banks have an incentive to focus on the most trans-
parent clientele”’(Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006)[76]). The two authors, for
banks entering Central and Eastern European banking markets, show indi-
cation, that Greenfield banks on average charge lower interest rates on their
loans than acquired subsidiary banks, which indicates that the former con-
centrate on low risk, informationally non-opaque clients, as this customer seg-
ment should experience more bank competition, and therefore lower interest
margins available, according to theory (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004)[48]).
As the informational advantage of entry via acquisition versus via Green-
field investment hinges on the fact of potential customers being informa-
tionally opaque, one might be able to argue, that we should ceteris paribus
observe acquisition to be the dominant mode of entry in countries with in-
sufficient information-providing institutions and a relatively large volume of
informationally opaque potential customers. However these markets might
also be those featuring incumbent banks with a high share of non-performing
loans, which (partially) offsets the advantage of entering via M&A.
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006)[76] also decompose foreign subsidiaries’
and domestic banks’ profits. A look at their descriptive statistics yields, that
tendentially foreign banks, that enter the foreign markets via acquisition,
show higher net interest margins and higher return on assets than foreign
banks entering via Greenfield Investment . This suggests that banks enter via
acquisition, if they are large, profit efficient and generate a high proportion
of their profits from the traditional banking activity of lending and deposit-
taking.
Some special political developments in countries also play a large role in
the entry mode decision of foreign banks. The main example are the tran-
sition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where entry via acquisition
of incumbent domestic banks was supported by the large bank privatization
wave in the 1990s, providing available targets for sometimes relatively low,
political prices (ECB (2004)[8]. The above study also claims, that one of
the reasons for entering via M&A in these countries was, that the foreign
entrants main line of business in this region was retail and commercial bank-
ing, operations that require local market knowledge. The authors however
especially caption the importance of the privatization programme ‘All in all,
titioner mentioned uncertainty about the degree of exposure to bad loans of potential local
target banks as a significant barrier to entry via acquisition in Central and Eastern Europe
in the 1990s.
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the most relevant consideration in the investment strategy of foreign banks
in the accession countries has been to take advantage of the opportunities
provided by privatisation programmes in order to develop a wide and visible
presence in the host markets within a short period of time12.
The latter part stresses another crucial advantage of acquisition over
Greenfield Investment, namely entry by acquisition enabling foreign banks
to serve the market on a large scale fast, reducing the time needed to ramp
up business volume to significant levels. For example, a lack of brand name
recognition for an obscure foreign bank trying to enter the retail banking
market via a completely new structure, should lead to slow business growth,
as reputation has to be slowly built up. The argument might however not
hold true for multinational bank icons such as Citibank entering markets har-
bouring incumbent banks with a collective negative reputation, for example
stemming from a recent national banking crisis.
A general empirical literature on entry modes into foreign markets yields
some additional insights, that might also apply to the banking sector.
Hennart and Park (1993)[77], looking at the entry mode decision of
Japanese multinational firms into the United States, match firm and industry
characteristics with entry mode choice. Results that may also apply to bank-
ing are, that the level of concentration in the respective market positively
influences the propensity to enter via Greenfield Investment. Concerning
product strategy, the more similar products of parent and subsidiary, the
more attractive the entry mode of Greenfield Investment compared to ac-
quisition seems to be. However, this might be due to differing motives for
acquisition and Greenfield Investment. In difference to the latter, the former
might be motivated by trying to add technological knowledge or diversify a
firm’s business portfolio.
More to the point of a general organizational discussion, the above authors
also find that Greenfield Investment is chosen if operations in the host market
are of small volume. This points back to the discussion about agencies and
branches versus subsidiaries, where the former operations are feasible for low
levels of activity in the host market and can most easily and cheaply be
achieved by setting up this small structure from scratch.
Andersson and Svensson (1994)[4], for a sample of Swedish multinational
firms, come up with evidence, that older firms with strong organizational
skill13 tend to enter foreign markets via acquisition of local incumbents,
whereas the role of firm size in the decision whether to enter via Greenfield
investment or acquisition is unclear. Concerning host country characteristics,
12(ECB (2004), page 2)[8]
13The authors use the number of existing affiliates as a proxy for organizational skill.
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the authors find that acquisition is the preferred mode of entry for developed
countries, as the probability of entering that way positively and significantly
depends on GDP per capita.
Another dimension of entry strategy is concerned with which segment a
bank wants to serve in the respective host market. Tschoegl (2003)[126] dis-
cusses an interesting example how such a decision is, besides obvious market
characteristics, shaped by institutional/regulatory market conditions. Swiss
banks and Deutsche Bank were reluctant to get into retail business in the
United States because of fears they might run into problems with U.S. bank-
ing regulation agencies as an universal bank, as they already were heavily
involved in the securities market in the United States14.
2.2.5 How successful are multinational banks operat-
ing in foreign markets?
Having discussed what shapes the structure of multinational banking, I now
take a look at what literature has to say about the success of international
expansion of multinational banks. The following literature gives insights into
how the relative efficiency of banks in foreign markets look like.
Results by Claessens et al.(2001)[34] suggest, that the relative perfor-
mance of multinational banks compared to local banks in foreign markets is
to some degree host country specific. The authors, using a large sample of
7,900 bank observations from 80 countries, find evidence that foreign banks
are more profitable15 than domestic banks in developing countries16. How-
ever, this finding is turned upside-down for developed countries. The latter
result has been seen as puzzling, as from a Bertrand competition-point of
view there should then be no scope for profitable multinational bank entry
into these developed countries17.
14The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited universal banking structures and was only repealed
in 1993.
15The authors discuss interest margins, tax payments and general profitability as vari-
ables for profit-efficiency of banks.
16This result is replicated by a number of other empirical studies e.g. Bonin, Hasan and
Wachtel (2005)[25] and Majnoni, Shankar, Varheggyi (2003)[96].
17However, this need not be a real puzzle. As the banking industry can be divided into
multiple heterogeneous service segments, one could argue that multinational bank entry
into developed countries is mostly restricted to segments of the industry, where profitability
19
Berger et al.(2000)[12] use a more advanced estimation strategy deriv-
ing banks’ X-efficiency from a standard banking cost function18 and further
break down the analysis to country levels within developed countries. They
focus on five countries, France, Germany, Spain, UK and the United States.
The authors generally confirm the result by Claessens et al.(2001)[34], that
domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks in developed countries,
with the notable exception being Spain.
Decomposition into profit and cost efficiency gives a hint on where this
profit differences between domestic and foreign banks stem from. In all of
the analyzed countries the average domestic bank shows significantly higher
profit efficiency than the average foreign bank. However, in Spain, this is
more than offset by a lower cost efficiency of domestic banks. Cost efficiency
in the U.S. is also lower for domestic banks (2,9% higher costs), however
this is vastly lower than the profit efficiency advantage for these domestic
institutions (25,1% higher profits). Therefore the authors argue, that the
cost disadvantage might not be due to inefficiency but rather ”‘these high
expenses more likely reflect efforts to produce a quality or variety of financial
services that generate substantially greater revenues”’19.
One interesting result concerns home country effects in the discussion of
relative efficiency. Though, as laid out, foreign institutions are on average
less efficient than domestic banks in most developed countries, this result
does not hold for multinational banks from the U.S.. Indeed, Berger et
al.(2000)[12] observe, that U.S. banks are more efficient than domestic banks
in France, Germany and Spain, the only exception to this pattern being the
UK. It therefore seems that U.S. banks are so overwhelmingly more efficient
in general, that they are able to even outperform domestic banks in their
own backyards in most countries.
is lower. Domestic banks might voluntarily leave these segments to foreign players, instead
growing their business in other fields of banking. Also, the empirical literature partly
suffers from the problem, that the majority of multinational banks entered foreign markets
rather recently. Therefore, these banks might predominantly be in a phase of pursuing
aggressive growth strategies in respective foreign markets, asking for low interest spreads
and providing services at low prices to attract away customers from incumbents.
18The specified cost function uses four variable outputs (consumer loans, business loans,
real estate loans and securities), one fixed output (off-balance-sheet activity), two fixed
inputs (physical capital, financial equity capital) and three variable inputs (purchased
funds, core deposits and labor). This setup therefore at least partially controls for different
business portfolios/strategies of the respective banks.
19Berger et al.(2000), page 57
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Concerning developing countries, Green, Murinde and Nikolov (2004)[71],
exploring economies of scale and scope achieved by domestic and foreign
banks in selected Central and Eastern European countries from 1995-1999,
find selective counter-evidence on whether foreign banks are generally more
efficient than domestic banks in lesser developed countries. The authors do
not find significant differences in scale and scope efficiency between domestic
and foreign banks in the analyzed region. However, their results should be
handled with care, as due to the nature of the transition markets, foreign
banks had just recently entered the market prior to the observation period,
probably still in the process of reaching their efficient scale and scope in
respective markets.
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006)[76] study the relative efficiency of for-
eign banks in Central and Eastern Europe in the period 1993-2004. Using
BankScope data they measure profitability via return on assets (ROA). They
find that the mode of entry plays an important role in the relative efficiency
of foreign banks. Whereas foreign bank subsidiaries resulting from the acqui-
sition of domestic incumbents do not significantly differ from other domestic
banks concerning profitability, foreign subsidiaries established via Greenfield
Investment are significantly more profitable than domestic banks20. How-
ever, decomposition of the profitability variable, shows that this difference
in profits might not be due to inefficiency but rather due to different strate-
gies and business segments. Greenfield banks seem to focus on low-cost, low
risk business segments, which do yield lower risk and service premia, but
these premia seem to be too low in transition economies for the risk born via
non-performing loans and high overhead costs21.
The two authors also discover, that Greenfield foreign banks show sig-
nificantly lower deposit-to-asset rates than either ”‘takeover foreign banks”’
or domestic banks (60% versus 79/76%). Whether this is by choice, as the
former banks want to refinance via other sources, or by their ineptitude to
raise sufficient volumes of deposits, e.g. due to a missing large scale branch
network, is at first sight debatable. A lack of access to local deposits in gen-
eral might be one of the reasons for the relatively poor performance of foreign
banks in developed markets. DeYoung and Nolle (1996)[51] find that foreign
banks in the US work under an inefficient input mix, predominantly having
to rely on refinancing via purchased funds, whereas local banks use domes-
tically raised deposits to a much higher degree. For the US, this even seems
20”‘Greenfield foreign banks”’ show a mean return on asset ratio of 1.45, whereas do-
mestic and ”‘Takeover foreign banks”’ show mean ROA of 0.86 and 0.87 respectively.
21High overhead costs might stem from focusing on loan projects that require a personal
gathering of information about the respective client.
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to hold true for ”‘takeover foreign banks”’. Peek et al.(1999)[86] find that
foreign banks in the US tend to acquire targets that show an above-average
reliance on purchased funds, resulting in a low deposit-to-asset ratio.
2.2.6 What are the effects of multinational bank entry
on the host country?
From a political point of view, the main question concerning multinational
banking is, which effects the entry of foreign banks into respective markets
has on economic conditions. With banks still being one of the main providers
of finance to the real sector, questions about the entry effects on domestic
banks’ performance and loan supply are heavily discussed.
The effects of multinational bank entry depend on the respective entrants’
(relative) efficiency, the product/segment strategy they implement and what
kind of entry mode they choose.
One commonly accepted effect of entry into any oligopolistic market is,
that market power of incumbents diminishes and market volumes increase, if
the entrant is sufficiently efficient to put competitive pressure on the incum-
bents. Due to competitive pressure, incumbents additionally might or might
not be incentivised to operate more efficiently, either by bank managers being
pushed to operate the structure more efficiently, or by increasing/decreasing
the need/incentive for incumbents to invest in efficiency-enhancing new tech-
nologies and practices.
These effects should theoretically be costly for the domestic banking sec-
tor up front, but should at first sight improve loan market conditions for
borrowers.
Systematically, the potential effects of bank entry can be decomposed
into the direct market effect via the introduction of an additional (Greenfield
Investment) or at least the efficient restructuring of an existing local bank (ac-
quisition), an indirect effect induced by domestic incumbents adapting their
strategies in this case, and some direct spillovers of banks technology and
institutional requirements on domestic banks’ and domestic regulatory/legal
institutions.
An increasing theoretical literature has provided both a basis for further
(and ex post explanation for existing) empirical analysis.
Concerning the effect of entry on domestic banking sector efficiency,
Lehner and Schnitzer (2006)[93] in a setup of competition in horizontally
differentiated products, discuss the direct effects of increased competition
and direct spillovers in screening technology on the efficiency of the domestic
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banking sector, where the two direct effects have the negative side-effect of
reducing incumbent banks’ incentives to invest in screening themselves. Dif-
fering between effects from entry via Greenfield Investment and acquisition,
the authors find, that for the case of weakly competitive market (high product
differentiation) tendentially entry via acquisition is relatively harmful in less
developed countries, whereas it is less harmful in developed countries. For
the case of low product differentiation Greenfield Investment is the welfare
maximizing mode of entry in all kinds of countries.
The effect of foreign bank entry on incumbent banks’ lending practices
is theoretically analyzed by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004)[48], who de-
velop a model capturing information asymmetries in loan markets. One of
their main results is that entry by an ”‘uninformed”’ outsider (multinational
bank) should lead to incumbent banks shifting their loan portfolio towards
more informationally-opaque borrowers, due to increased competition in the
segment of non-opaque potential clients. From a general perspective this
could be seen as a beneficial indirect effect of entry, if the opaque segment
had previously been inefficiently loan-constrained by incumbent banks.
Claeys and Hainz (2006)[35], building on the above setup, develop a model
to discuss differing effects of foreign bank entry via Greenfield and acquisition
on bank lending rates in the respective host market. They find that foreign
bank entry reduces required lending rates by incumbent domestic banks,
more so if the majority of entry is via Greenfield Investment.
Proceeding to test their hypothesis empirically, Claeys and Hainz (2006)[35]
indeed find, that a higher foreign bank share in loans reduces average lending
rates in the respective market. Also they show evidence, that ”‘Greenfield
foreign banks”’ charge higher lending rates than ”‘takeover foreign banks”’.
Concerning differing competition effects of entry via Greenfield or acquisi-
tion, the former is observed to reduce average domestic bank lending rates
significantly more than the latter.
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006)[76] also discuss the differing effect of dif-
ferent entry modes on domestic banks’ performance. They discover that, no
matter the entry mode, a higher market share of foreign banking increases
costs for domestic banks. The authors note that this might seem to be coun-
terintuitive at first sight, as one would expect higher competition to lead to
higher cost efficiency, however they argue that this cost increase might be
short-term, due to domestic banks’ arising need for investing into competitive
risk, IT and management systems. In contrast to a high share of ”‘takeover
foreign banks”’, a large market share of ”‘Greenfield foreign banks”’ addi-
tionally decreases domestic banks’ non-interest income but also their loan
loss provision volume. In total, however, the effects seem to balance out each
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other, as domestic banks’ profits seem to be unaffected by the foreign banks’
market share in the respective market.
Other empirical studies find that entry of foreign banks reduces the prof-
itability of domestic banks. Additionally to the result from Claeys and Hainz
(2006)[35] e.g. Claessens et al.(2001) [34] find that this reduction in prof-
itability is mainly due to reduced net interest margins, a hint that the effect
on profitability indeed works through a reduction in market power of incum-
bent banks in the provision of loans and/or deposit taking.
The latter authors finding can also be perfectly related to the miss-
ing ”‘foreign bank market share-effect”’ found by Havrylchyk and Jurzyk
(2006)[76]. Indeed Claessens et al.(2001)[34] find that the market share of
foreign banks is not an important determinant of domestic banks profitabil-
ity, but rather only the number of foreign banks has the expected negative
significant effect, suggesting that the threat of foreign banks taking market
shares away already induces domestic banks to reduce net interest spreads,
allowing them to keep domestic bank market shares at a high level.
Another accommodating result is found by Levine (2003)[94], who uses
a unique data set on cases of regulatory institutions denying foreign bank
entry in 47 developed and less-developed countries to analyze the relation-
ship between political entry restrictions for foreign banks and bank interest
margins in a respective country. The author shows evidence, that the more
restrictive entry regulation for foreign banks in a country, the higher the net
interest margins for banks in the market. Foreign bank entry also is found to
be special, as restricting domestic bank entry does not alter operating banks
net interest margins. The results further confirm the hint from Claessens
et al.(2001)[34] that the contestability of a respective host market primarily
determines the competitive behaviour of operating banks, not the actually
incurring amount of entry into the market. It seems that the existence of
multinational banks threatening to enter a market already disciplines incum-
bent banks.
One important point of note concerning the effects of foreign bank entry
is, that such entry from a global view went hand in hand with a consolidation
of the international banking industry. The chapter on bank sector consolida-
tion in this thesis discusses the effects of general consolidation in the banking
industry in detail. In that chapter the potential effect of multinational bank
entry on the availability of loans to a specific segment of the market, infor-
mationally opaque small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), is discussed
in detail.
Generally, foreign bank presence is found to increase access to loans, at
least for larger and transparent firms in emerging market economies (see e.g.
Mian (2006)[100], Giannetti and Ongena (2005)[66], Clarke et al.(2001)[37]).
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Concerning informationally opaque smaller firms, e.g. Mian (2006)[100] how-
ever finds that
‘greater cultural and geographical distance between a foreign bank’s head-
quarters and local branches leads it to further avoid lending to ”information-
ally difficult” yet fundamentally sound firms requiring relational contract-
ing”’
suggesting that the beneficial effect of foreign bank entry might not extend
to this segment of the market. This results is independent of bank size, bank
risk preferences or legal institutions in the home country. This biased lending
strategy effect of distance also is identified to be large enough to completely
exclude some types of borrowers in the economy from foreign bank finance.
Concerning the increased availability of bank financing for at least a
fraction of borrowers in the host market through MNB entry, it at first
sight seems as this is simply due to an underlying capital transfer into the
host country via the foreign banks’ internal capital market. However, as
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006)[76] discovered foreign banks to predominantly
refinance their local lending activity with local deposits, the international
capital transfer through entering banks seems less pronounced than origi-
nally thought. Especially for banks entering via acquisition the deposit-to-
asset ratio of 79% suggests minimal cross-border capital transfers within the
banks’ activity. However, if entering foreign banks are more efficient screen-
ing potential borrowers than existing incumbents the availability of deposits
for commercial loan financing might rise in total, as owners of liquid assets
might be more willing to extend deposits to the banking system (instead of
e.g. transferring assets abroad or invest in government bonds).
Finally, one topic that has also received a substantial amount of interest
in the economic literature is how the presence of foreign banks affect the
general stability of the host country banking sector and financial market.
The empirical studies to date focus on the two main recipient less-developed
regions, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
Theoretically, two specific advantages of multinational banks compared to
local domestic banks might determine whether credit supply is stabilized by
foreign banks or not. On the one hand, a multinational bank might have ad-
ditional/cheaper sources of refinancing, such as better access to international
capital markets or to deposits in the home country or other countries of op-
erations. Therefore these banks might be able to support their subsidiaries
in cases of market-specific liquidity/bank crisis, therefore dampening local
shocks. On the other hand, due to operating in multiple markets, the bank
might transfer liquidity/assets from badly-performing/crisis-plagued coun-
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tries to other regions, therefore strengthening local shocks.
Supporting a subsidiary should generally be a question of a parent bank’s
capability to do so, whereas substituting effects should be seen as an incentive-
based decision within in the bank structure, depending on banks’ opportunity
costs of keeping capital in a respective host country subsidiary.
Due to multinational banks operating in multiple regions, they might
therefore transfer shocks from one region to the other via reallocation of
assets within their international internal capital market.
Recent theoretical work by Morgan et al.(2004)[103], who develop a model
of a multinational bank (along the general banking model of Holmström and
Tirole (1997)[78]), that rebalances its international bank capital reacting to
shocks in bank and real sector capital in respective regions, show what kind of
country-specific shocks might be dampened or strengthened by the presence
of multinational banks. The model predicts that multinational banks dampen
local bank-capital shocks by supporting their local subsidiaries but increase
the volatility of the business sector by reallocating bank capital away from
regions experiencing real sector capital shocks.
Empirically, for Latin American countries, Dages et al.(2000)[43], Peek
and Rosengren (2000)[112], Goldberg (2001)[69], Crystal et al.(2002)[41] and
other studies, find strong evidence that foreign bank presence increases the
stability of domestic banking sectors. Foreign banks seem to show stronger
and less volatile credit growth, and positive growth even in periods of fi-
nancial market crisis22. However, this line of reasoning does not seem to be
specific to the ownership structure of banks, but rather to the underlying rel-
ative financial health of foreign banks in this region. Dages et al.(2000)[43]
observe that domestic banks show the same involatile behaviour as foreign
banks, if they are characterized by similar health e.g. similar levels of shares
of non-performing loans in their portfolio.
For the Central and Eastern European region, de Haas and van Lelyveld
(2006)[44] reinforce the notion of foreign banks as a stabilizing force as they
are found to keep up lending volume during times of financial distress whereas
domestic banks strongly contract lending. However, this seems to hold true
for ”‘Greenfield foreign banks”’23 only.
22Indeed, it seems that foreign banks see these occasions as opportunities to expand
their market shares at the expense of financially stricken local banks.
23Again this is in line with the results of Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2006)[76], which show
that Greenfield banks are much more embedded in a multinational bank group’s internal
capital market, whereas acquired banks within the group seem to be organized as rather
independent capital centers.
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Home market and parent bank effects, affecting the whole bank group via
internal capital markets, also significantly influence the lending activity of
multinational banks abroad.
De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006)[44] find evidence for both a substitution
and a support effect24, depending on parent bank and home market condi-
tions. Concerning the former, they find that foreign banks reduce credit
supply in foreign markets if GDP growth in the home country accelerates,
leading to more potential value-adding business in the home country market.
Again, this substitution effect only applies to ”‘Greenfield foreign banks”’.
The capability to support a subsidiary should critically hinge on the parent
bank’s financial status. Indeed, the authors find that parent banks showing
strong financial health25 have subsidiaries in the CEE region growing credit
volume faster than subsidiaries of weak parent banks. The latter result does
hold for all kinds of foreign bank subsidiaries, however the effect is more
pronounced for Greenfield operations.
The majority of empirical studies on home market effects confirm the
results concerning the substitution hypothesis, as worsening home country
conditions seem to have led banks to enlarge their lending activity in foreign
markets (e.g. Moshirian (2001)[104] and Calvo et al.(1993)[30]).
Summing up, concerning the effect of multinational bank presence on the
stability of local banking markets, such presence seems to increase stability in
the analyzed less developed regions during times of financial distress. How-
ever, there is strong evidence that, while foreign bank presence might dampen
financial crisis in the respective host countries, it could also strengthen or
even import these when home or third country market developments lead the
bank to substitute business and assets from the foreign to its home market
or third countries. The advantages and disadvantages of multinational bank
presence strongly depend on the level of integration of the respective local
subsidiary in the bank group’s international internal capital market. Both
disadvantages and advantages seem to be less pronounced for foreign sub-
sidiaries established via the acquisition of local incumbent banks, as these
structures seem to be more or less financially segregated from their parent
banks.
After discussing what existing literature has to say about multinational
24The following results are also confirmed in a newer study by the same authors (de
Haas and van Lelyveld (2006b)[45].
25The authors use the ratio of loan loss provision over net interest revenue as a proxy
for financial health.
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banking, the chapter now turns to a practitioner-oriented view, discussing
the behaviour of multinational banks with the help of a case study of one of
the success stories of multinational banking, Bank Austria Creditanstalt and
its successful expansion into Central and Eastern European markets.
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2.3 A case study of successful multination-
alization: Bank Austria Creditanstalt in
Central and Eastern Europe
2.3.1 Overview of objects and sources of the case study
One of the hot spots of the evolution of multinational banks in recent years
have been the former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Nowadays, concerning the scope of internationalization of their banking sys-
tem, these countries are special in that their banking system is dominated by
foreign bank subsidiaries. For example Bol, de Haan, Scholtens and de Haas
(2002)[24],for the year 2000, find foreign bank asset share in total banking
assets to be 54% in Central Eastern Europe and 87% and 77% in South East-
ern Europe and the Baltic States respectively. This dominance holds true in
large countries like Poland (69%) and the Czech Republic (66%).
Within this environment one other fact of note is that the leading home
country of multinational banks operating in these transition economies is
Austria, with the regional market leader in this region being Bank Austria
Creditanstalt (BA).
These two facts rationalize choosing the respective bank in the respec-
tive region for a case study on Bank Austria’s operations in these (former)
transition countries.
The following insights have been won by screening annual reports and
presentations of Bank Austria and its Austrian competitor Erste Bank, but
the major insights were won by interaction with Mr Gerhard Smoley, Head
of Investor Relations of the Bank Austria Group at this time26.
I proceed as follows. First a general overview about Bank Austria Cred-
itanstalt (BA) and its history is given. In the following the focus is on the
bank’s operations in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, giving
an overview of the development of the bank’s market position. A discussion
of BA’s entry motives, modes and market strategy follow, yielding insights
into how, from a practitioner’s view, home country, host country and bank-
specific characteristics determined the internationalization strategy of Bank
26The following insights strongly base on telephone interviews[109] as well as additional
email communication.
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Austria. After discussing the future strategic focus of Bank Austria Credi-
tanstalt in the region, an overview of operations of Erste Bank, BA’s main
competitor in the CEE region concerning size, is given, allowing some in-
teresting comparisons between two very different, yet both highly successful
market entry strategies. The case study finally is concluded by deriving gen-
eral insights into topics in multinational banking, that can be won from the
proposed case study.
2.3.2 Bank Austria Creditanstalt: An Overview
Bank Austria Creditanstalt today is the leading bank in its original home
country Austria (1.8 million clients at a country population of 8 million) and
what it now deems as its ”‘second home market”’[40] Central and Eastern
Europe27. Since November 2005 Bank Austria Creditanstalt, formally a part
of the HypoVereinsbank (DE) group, has become a member of the UniCredit
(IT) banking group via the latter acquiring the former. 95% of Bank Austria
shares are now held by UniCredit with 5% in free float.
Concerning historical roots, Bank Austria was founded in 1991 via the
merger of ”‘Oesterreichische Landesbank”’, ”‘Zentralsparkasse”’ and ”‘Kom-
merzialbank”’. In 1997 Bank Austria took over the Austrian government’s
shares in ”‘Creditanstalt”’ fully integrating into the Bank Austria Credi-
tanstalt group in 1999. As ”‘Creditanstalt”’ was privatized by the Austrian
government only in 1990, all formerly independent parts of the newly arising
bank had formally been state-owned.
In the year 2000 Bank Austria Creditanstalt merged with HypoVereins-
bank and became the competence center for CEE business of the group.
BA fully concentrated on the Austrian as well as 11 selected Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, taking over HVB business in these countries while trans-
ferring other international business to the HVB organization. Bank Austria
embraced this friendly merger, as management saw Bank Austria’s further
growth possibilities limited due to the fact, that Bank Austria stand-alone
had grown too large for its home market but was too small to establish
strong operations in an integrating European banking market28. After the
HVB-UniCredit merger in 2005, Bank Austria became part of UniCredit
27In Bank Austria Group definition this also includes CIS countries as well as Turkey.
28Additionally Bank Austria had become too small for the risk it carried in its portfolio.
Especially its exposure to risks in the North American market was too large for further
growth stand-alone.
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group structure and now acts as the primary holding and operations center
for the group’s Central and Eastern European business[40].
2.3.3 Bank Austria Creditanstalt in Eastern Europe
Bank Austria Creditanstalt was the first mover in the Central and Eastern
European states, especially with Creditanstalt already having had established
agencies in Hungary (1975), Prague and Moscow (both 1987) even before the
fall of the iron curtain. Creditanstalt also was the first foreign bank to take
over a domestic target in the CEE states, acquiring a majority stake in the
Slovenian ”‘Nova banka”’ as early as 1992[40].
In general, between 1989 and 1991 both Bank Austria and Creditanstalt
started to enter markets in Central and Eastern Europe on a large scale.
Nowadays Bank Austria Creditanstalt is by far the market leader, not
only among foreign but all banks, in Central and Eastern Europe, with to-
tal assets of 41bn and 39.000 employees in 1,800 branches serving roughly
18 million clients in the region. As the CEE competence center of Uni-
Credit group, this includes former subsidiaries of UniCredit and HypoVere-
insbank.Concerning assets, BA-CA-group subsidiaries are the No.1 bank in
Croatia, Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegowina, and are among the five largest
banks in eight countries in total[39].
Table 1 gives a detailed look at the group’s positioning in the respective
countries29.
29data as reported 31.12.2006
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Table  2.1: BA-CA Operations in Central and Eastern Europe   
 
 
Country Subsidiaries Total 
Assets 
(€bn) 
Branches Market 
position 
Bosnia • HVB Central Profit Banka 
• Nova Banjalucka Banka 
• UniCredit Zagrebacka Banka 
1.7 180 No. 1 
Bulgaria • UniCredit Bulbank 4.2 300+ No. 1 
Croatia • Zagrebacka banka 10 127 No. 1 
Czech 
Republic 
• HVB Bank Czech Republic 
• Zivnostenska Banka 
9.2 79 Top 5 
Estonia • HVB Bank Talinn 0.07 NA Top 10 
Hungary • UniCredit Bank 5.3 76 Top 10 
Lithuania • HVB Bank Vilnius 0.38 2 Top 10 
Macedonia Representative Office only 
Montenegro Representative Office only 
Poland • Bank BPH 
• Bank Pekao 
33 1,292 No. 1 
Romania • UniCredit Tiriac Bank 3.7 130 Top 5 
Russia • International Moscow Bank 
• Yapi Kredi Moscow 
6.6 NA Top 10 
Serbia • UniCredit Bank 0.86 46 Top 5 
Slovak 
Republic 
• UniCredit Bank 3.6 93 Top 5 
Slovenia • Bank Austria Creditanstalt 
Ljubljana 
2.2 14 Top 5 
(Turkey) • Yapi Credi 29.5 653 Top 5 
Ukraine • HVB Bank Ukraine 
• UniCredit Bank 
0.25 6 13 
 
Source: Bank Austria Creditanstalt Corporate website http://www.bankaustria.at 
 
2.3.4 Entry motives, entry modes and market strategy
of Bank Austria Creditanstalt in CEE
The following section draws most of its information from communication with
Bank Austria group head of investor relations Mr Gerhard Smoley.
Three headline motives for BA’s entry in CEE countries became apparent
in discussions. I describe these hand in hand with what seems like underlying
or complementing characteristics of Bank Austria.
Home country push factors seem to have played a significant role in
Bank Austria’s decision to expand internationally. The Austrian market
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was severely overbanked in the early 1990s and no further significant growth
in the home market was deemed feasible. In this surrounding, Bank Austria,
a recently privatized group of formerly state-owned bank, had to grow its
profits fast after privatization to reach sufficient levels of shareholder value.
Therefore BA was one of the banks most committed to finding profitable
business opportunities. The political development in Eastern Europe pre-
sented an unexpected window of opportunity for this.
‘By chance the possibility for feasible international expansion arose by
the fall of the iron curtain.”’(Smoley, 2007)(Smoley (2007)[109])
Host country factors in the beginning of the geographical expansion were
more restricted to indirect follow your customer considerations. The first
clients in these markets were Austrian commercial clients of BA entering the
respective markets. According to Mr Smoley this was the main motive or
building stone in the beginning. ”‘If not for so many of BA’s customers from
Austria entering the CEE markets, Bank Austria would most probably have
entered these markets significantly later in the process”’(Smoley (2007)[109].
Additionally the CEE markets turned out to be in large need for stable banks
(Bank Austria back then offered an AAA rating).
Also, Bank Austria, almost from the beginning, did not only service Aus-
trian clients in Eastern Europe, but also a variety of multinational firms from
other home countries, such as McDonalds and VW-Skoda. The bank might
have had an additional home country advantage in the latter business, as
Vienna functions as a management platform for a number of multinational
firms operating in the CEE region. For example, McDonalds Eastern Euro-
pean operations center is located in Vienna, therefore close personal contact
between Bank Austria top management and McDonalds’ CEE management
was available quite easy.
A helpful ”‘snowball effect”’, stemming from business in the CEE re-
gion with such multinational customers, partly materialized, as these multi-
national customers often used local suppliers in the value chain. Getting
into business with these local firms was made significantly easier by this
link[109]30.
The general identification strategy of Bank Austria concerning attractive
host country markets, which was applied for location choice in the latter
process of transition, was based on basic macroeconomic indicators, such
as GDP, GDP growth and population. Additionally BA analyzed potential
cross-market synergies, trying to identify markets, where entry would also
30This might be another avenue for research as one could discuss how the possibility of
follow your customer-motivated entry into foreign markets supports local market-seeking
operations later on.
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leverage opportunities in BA’s global business network[109].
Compared to banks from other countries, Bank Austria might have had
an advantage concerning ”‘appetite for entry”’ by an indirect home market
effect. Bank Austria stems from a relatively small home market with a
population of 8 million. Therefore the bank was less reluctant to enter, what
banks from other home countries like Germany might have perceived as rather
too small, markets in CEE, as from the perspective of a small country bank
the market seemed to be sufficiently large[109]. Additionally the bank had
experience how to profitably operate in a small market. These two points
might also explain the fact, that Austrian banks in general have been heavily
involved in the CEE region already early in the transition process.
Another reason why banks from the small host country Austria were
first-movers in the CEE region, outpacing German banks who, according
to other theoretical considerations, such as the availability of large deposit
volumes and the effect of strong competition in large markets on efficiency
of market participants, should have benefited from their larger home country
market while also being close geographically, might have been the fact, that
German banks, in the early period of transition, very much concentrated
on growing their business in the former GDR. This focus possibly restricted
organizational capabilities left to explore the CEE markets.
The early geographic pattern of Bank Austria’s expansion into CEE mar-
kets also was closely linked to the follow your customer-nature of its early
FDI projects. Bank Austria first expanded into markets close to Vienna,
namely Prague in the Czech Republic, Bratislava in the Slovak Republic and
Budapest in Hungary. Whereas in the economic literature (e.g. Buch and
de Long (2004)[28]) the influence of distance on bank FDI is predominantly
perceived to base on an intuition of information costs, Mr Smoley stated,
that, in the case of Bank Austria, distance was simply negatively correlated
with the amount of activity of potential real sector customers to be followed
abroad[109].
Additionally though, the transition economies closest to the EU-15 also
profited most from the fall of the iron curtain, experiencing faster economic
growth than more distant countries. According to the practitioner, and prob-
ably due to considerations of eastern enlargement of the EU, a more rapid
increase in institutional quality also was evident in these countries. There-
fore they were also the most interesting markets from a pure foreign market-
seeking perspective in the region.
Digging deeper into the expansion strategy of Bank Austria, to under-
stand the entry modes preferred by the bank one has to take the general
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strategic setup of Bank Austria in the 1990s as well as the changing land-
scape in the financial sector in CEE into consideration.
Both Bank Austria and Creditanstalt started to enter the CEE markets
in an extensive way, first setting up small agencies in the countries’ capi-
tals. Bank Austria’s general strategy was to enter the market via Greenfield
investment. Usually its first step was to enter via its investment banking
division, which acted as a pathfinder to screen respective market character-
istics and the legal environment. As laid out before, primary early clients
for BA in the region were Austrian corporate customers and other multina-
tional firms. In general Bank Austria, in Austria as well as in CEE, heavily
focused on the commercial wholesale segment, at least in the 1990s. Due to
this strategic positioning, a large branch network to attract retail and SME
customers and soft information about these informationally opaque poten-
tial clients were not mandatory for successful operations in these markets.
Indeed, for conducting wholesale business, it is often sufficient to establish a
handful of regional headquarters in the big cities[109]. This latter argument
might make clear why Bank Austria, compared to other multinational banks
in CEE, was less active in the takeover market for local banks.
However, as margin pressure in commercial banking increased in Eastern
Europe, due to the development of capital markets and an increasing number
of foreign, efficient banks operating in the region in this segment, Bank Aus-
tria added retail banking as an additional focus for growth in the region[109].
This rededication to retail banking in the region was further motivated by
the rapidly growing demand for services such as asset management and tra-
ditional retail banking arising through the economic development of these
countries.
One of the most attractive, due to being the largest, markets for retail
banking in Central and Eastern Europe is Poland. Bank Austria took a share
in the Polish bank PBK in 1997, becoming majority shareholder by 200031.
However, Bank Austria was not able to grow its business via acquisi-
tions at this time in many CEE countries strongly. The reasoning shows how
strategic choice in one market is influenced by an institutions’ business devel-
opment in other markets. Bank Austria was one of the very few international
banks heavily involved in Russia when the Ruble crisis materialized in 1998.
The incurred losses of Bank Austria in its Russian business restricted the
possibility for growing its business in other parts of Eastern Europe for the
following years, due to a lack of financial power. BA was not able to partic-
31Polish regulation at that time was such that only 10% stakes in a domestic bank could
be bought per round. Therefore reaching a majority share in a Polish bank could not have
been attained immediately.
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ipate full scale in the bank privatization rounds in Eastern Europe in 1999
and 2000[109]. Its main Austrian competitor in Eastern Europe size-wise,
Erste Bank AG, took advantage of this strategic weakness very actively tak-
ing part in takeover/privatization markets in Eastern Europe. Erste Bank
AG also was less reluctant to pay high strategic prices for banks especially
offering sufficient retail and SME client contacts, as these business segments
also happen to be the strategic focus of Erste Bank in its Austrian home
market.
So in general, Bank Austria was relatively weakly involved in significant
acquisitions in Eastern Europe. BA tried to grow its retail business via
acquisitions in the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary, but failed
to do so, due to a regional takeover market ever more characterized by bidding
wars on attractive targets. From an ex post point of view the bank’s forced
low acquisition activity in the early years however seems to have been a
blessing in disguise, as Bank Austria was one of the foreign banks in the
region not negatively affected in their growth possibilities by having to take
on a large share of non-performing loans from an acquired local bank[109]32.
An additional explanation for the bank’s relatively low M&A activity,
according to Mr Smoley[109], was that Bank Austria had no punctual geo-
graphic expansion strategy, therefore being less dependent on specific acqui-
sition, rather focusing on entering the Eastern European market on a broad
regional basis. With this implemented strategy Bank Austria has also been
able to gain significant economies of scale on the regional basis via synergies
both on the profit as on the cost side. On the cost side, Bank Austria Cred-
itanstalt was able to build up centralized transaction centers for the whole
region and also introduced a, though partially adapted to local needs, com-
mon IT infrastructure. Additional economies of scale and scope according to
the practitioner are available on the revenue side[109]. As the CEE region
itself strongly integrates trade-wise, with intra-region trade becoming ever
more important, as well as an ongoing legal integration due to the adoption
of common EU law, two potentially profit-enhancing opportunities arise for
a bank with a complete network across the whole region. For one, the trade
32Indeed with this ”‘Greenfield”’ strategy Bank Austria itself was surprised with the
low ex post risks in their loan portfolio. Ex post risks for some time now have been lower
in BA Eastern European operations than in Austrian operations, which was a completely
unexpected development for the bank. One advantage according to the practitioner is
social culture in the CEE states, in the respect that e.g. in Poland not paying back a
loan is still seen as a personal shame, leading to a perceived lack of moral hazard in loan
provision.
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integration increases the need of local firms for banking services in multiple
countries in the region, favouring a bank with a complete network. Concern-
ing the legal integration, the possibility for selling homogeneous products in
the whole region increases, yielding cost-saving and reputation-spillover pos-
sibilities for Bank Austria. These available economies suggest, that banks,
analyzing single country markets stand-alone (and deeming them too small),
might miss an important point. As Mr Smoley stated
‘Bank Austria is the No.5 bank in Slovenia, a country with a population
of 2 million. Therefore looking at the market stand-alone one could ques-
tion whether significant value-added can be achieved by entering this market.
However being present there creates network effects and value-added for com-
mercial customers in Poland, Czech Republic, etc.. One has to take this into
account when thinking about entering a market.”’(Smoley, 2007[109])
Bank Austria also indirectly grew by acquisition in Eastern Europe, tak-
ing over Creditanstalt in 1997, who itself already had a significant physical
presence in numerous market in this region, such as for example the Slovenian
”‘Nova banka”’ Creditanstalt had acquired back in 1992. One of the success
factors in this integration was that brands stayed independent for five years
to keep goodwill immanent in both brands in these countries, while at the
same time exploring economies of scale centralizing back office operations for
both brands.
Additionally Bank Austria’s CEE operations grew via two other M&A
deals Bank Austria was part of. As discussed before Bank Austria today
bundles all former CEE operations of HypoVereinsbank and UniCredit33.
For Bank Austria Creditanstalt the merger with HypoVereinsbank brought
a number of significant advantages for CEE operations with it. BA was able
to significantly strengthen its network in Eastern Europe. The HVB opera-
tions taken over were further successfully leveraged, as Bank Austria already
was a more established brand name in Eastern Europe. BA was also able to
manage existing HVB operations more efficiently due to its greater experi-
ence and vaster market knowledge in CEE markets34. One clear-cut synergy
was that HVB had already also taken over a Polish domestic bank. As the
respective Polish subsidiaries were merged the newly created subsidiary now
33Except one polish subsidiary bank which became part of the UniCredit organization
due to political restrictions by the Polish government.
34The former claim can be backed by the fact that for a while HVB changed the name
of subsidiaries of the group in the region to HVB (country). The brand name was not
as well known as Bank Austria and stunted business growth for some time in the CEE
region.
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became the third-largest bank in the Polish market and even more impor-
tant, the lone universal bank with a strong retail business in Bank Austria’s
Eastern European portfolio[109]. As stated before, this was of significant
interest especially in Poland. The increased size of the group’s Eastern Eu-
ropean operations also allowed the bank to take on fixed costs risks of further
expansion into the retail sector.
As Bank Austria tried to grow its retail business, it grew its branch net-
work in Poland, Romania, Croatia and Hungary via Greenfield Investment.
As Hungarian target banks became too expensive for takeover, BA tried to
grow organically on a large scale, establishing 100 new Greenfield branches
in short time.
Additionally, in recent years, Bank Austria became more active in the
takeover market, acquiring banks ”‘Splitska banka”’ in Croatia and ”‘Biochim”’
in Bulgaria in 2002 as well as ”‘Central Profit Banka”’ in Bosnia in 2003.
In the retail sector ”‘Bank Austria started out with Greenfield Investment
and then tried to speed up the growth process via acquisitions, even though
acquisition prices grew higher, too.”’(Smoley, 2007[109]. Concerning target
strategy, Bank Austria, contrary to other banks in the region, focused on
acquiring healthy local banks and paying the high prices for these, whereas
other entrants sought a low acquisition price first and foremost, banking on
being able to restructure badly-performing banks burdened with a high share
of non-performing loans[109].
Based on this discussion, one may be able to derive that in general full-
scale retail banking services can probably only be provided in a market en-
tered via M&A. In almost all countries BA was not involved in takeovers it
still focuses on the commercial clients segment[109].
The underlying reasons can be identified by evaluating the banking mar-
ket in the Czech Republic. Bank Austria there has limited scope winning
retail clients away from other banks due to a lack of network size. Whereas,
for example, Erste Bank AG subsidiary Ceska sporitelna has 630 branches
in this country, Bank Austria only operates 40. So due to missing local
structures, there is no real possibility to attract retail customers as well as
SME customers in some regions of the Czech Republic. Still, Bank Austria
in terms of value of assets is the fourth largest bank in CZ concerning assets,
due to its leading position in the field of industry and trade (commercial)
clients[109].
Strong existing bank-client relationships and therefore a general lack of
customer mobility in the retail segment are reasons why Bank Austria is re-
luctant to build up large Greenfield branch structures in most CEE countries,
even more so, as BA tries to position itself as a quality-, not price-leader,
where the former strength can hardly be marketed to potential customers
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locked in an existing relationship with another bank.
Besides engaging in retail and commercial banking, Bank Austria has a
very well-positioned investment banking division in the CEE region. Due
to having been one of the first-movers in the markets, BA has excellent
long-lasting relationships especially with government agencies in Central and
Eastern Europe, also evidenced by the bank being awarded a price for ”‘Best
Investment Bank in CEE”’ by ”‘Financing New Europe”’. In this field BA
also still profits from the fact, that most large investment banks early on
deemed this regional market to be too small to put a strategic focus on it.
According to Mr Smoley these relationships to local customers that are in
place now are more important for successful investment banking than strong
relationships to the capital market where products are placed35. Now being
part of UniCredit group also strengthens BA’s position in the latter respect,
such that BA expects to keep its market leadership in CEE in this area of
business[109].
One final interesting point concerning Bank Austria Creditanstalt’s strat-
egy is the mode of refinancing of operations in Central and Eastern Europe.
Start-up investments and acquisition prices were financed by the Austrian
parent bank. However concerning the refinancing of operating business such
as loan provision, the pecking order is local first, global only if needed. Sub-
sidiaries should first and foremost refinance their operations via raising local
deposits. BA tries to refinance all of its local loans in the respective local
market. However the degree of local refinancing differs among countries (be-
tween 100% and 80%). The larger the subsidiary concerning the number of
branches, the higher tendentially the percentage of local refinancing36. Early
on in the transition process. as loan demand exceeded wealth, the picture
percentage-wise looked different, with the bulk of loans by CEE subsidiaries
refinanced by the parent in Austria. One important part of local deposits for
BA, as the group’s main strength is still with commercial clients, are large
deposits from its commercial clients, who hold liquid assets in local currency
in a substantial amount[109].
If a subsidiary comes short of complete self-refinancing, Bank Austria
operates an internal capital market structure trying to optimize capital across
the group. Usually the subsidiaries should not refinance themselves via the
capital market themselves, as Bank Austria has better refinancing conditions
35However placement power has to be sufficiently large to keep the trust of customers
in the bank being actually able to secure financing.
36This again points at the need for a large branch network to attract a large volume of
retail customers.
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there due to a better rating[109].
The following reasoning can be put forward for such an implemented
pecking order of refinancing. First, local deposits should be the main and
first source of refinancing, due to a complete lack of currency risks37 when
refinancing that way, as well as an increasing distaste of stock analysts for
intra-group cross-subsidiaziation[109].
If local deposits are however not available to a sufficient degree, the in-
terest rate advantage of Bank Austria Creditanstalt over its subsidiaries in
capital markets should be made use of.
2.3.5 The future strategy of Bank Austria Creditanstalt
in CEE
With Bank Austria Creditanstalt now a part of UniCredit group, the geo-
graphic focus of BA’s business is shifting further to the east. Bank Austria
has recently entered markets in Russia and Turkey and is in the process of
doing so with a large commitment in Kazahstan and the Ukraine. In Rus-
sia, Bank Austria group is present via the International Moscow Bank. In
Turkey, BA holds a 50% share in the Yapi Credi Bank. In Kazahstan and
the Ukraine Bank Austria is in the process of taking over ATF Bank and
Ukrsotsbank respectively[40].
This further eastern expansion is driven by market dynamics in the CEE
regions already serviced as well as by a perceived comparative advantage of
Bank Austria over other competitors in the new markets.
Large CEE markets have already become quite consolidated and further
significant growth is hard to achieve there. One prime example is the Czech
market. The first three market positions are firmly established there, espe-
cially in the retail banking sector characterized by a low customer switching
rate. The market is more or less divided in stable market shares, and BA is
restricted to keep operating within its niche strategy there. While organic
growth can hardly be achieved, profitable growth via acquisitions is also not
feasible as attractively priced and available targets are missing[109].
In contrast, vast profitable growth potential in Russia and Turkey exists,
especially due to the fact that a lot of foreign banks are still not present in
37Note that additional to the direct costs of currency risks, Basel 2 guidelines force
banks to either completely costly hedge these risks or build up legal reserves for them,
which is also very costly as the respective amount of capital can then not be used in more
profitable opportunities.
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these markets due to perceived political risk. There is high profit potential
in the retail segment as well, as especially in Turkey demographic trends lead
to an arising interesting market for financial products[109].
According to Bank Austria, two comparative advantages of the bank over
competitors exist concerning these markets. For one, Bank Austria is one of
the very few banks that have build up vast relevant experience from being
present in the very early years in transition economies. With target countries
for further expansion being similar to CEE countries in the early years of
transition (Smoley, 2007[109]), Bank Austria might have best practices to
deal with such surroundings including political risk, a lack of institutional
quality and a just developing modern real sector.
Additionally the integration into the large UniCredit group enables Bank
Austria to expose itself to such higher risks. Bank Austria Creditanstalt, with
strong financial backing of the complete group, is able to pursue a long-run
oriented strategy. Turkey and Russia might even be candidates for financial
crisis in the next year in the eyes of BA, but the is be able to sustain 2-3 loss-
making years in the market, being able to focus on the long-term potential,
especially for Turkey.
2.3.6 Same region, different strategy: The case of Er-
ste Bank AG in Central and Eastern Europe
Erste Bank AG also started out as a purely Austrian bank, rooting from
the mutual savings bank structure in Austria. Like Bank Austria the pub-
licly stated geographic focus of further business development is Central and
Eastern Europe[1].
In contrast to Bank Austria Erste Bank AG started to enter the CEE
markets relatively late, starting with the acquisition of Mezbank in Hungary
in 1998. This first step was followed by further acquisitions of Cakovecka
banka, Bjelovarska banka and Trgovacka banka in Croatia in 199938, Ceska
sporitelna in the Czech Republic in 200039, Rijecka banka in Croatia in 2002,
Postabank in Hungary in 2003 and Novosadska banka in Serbia as well as
Banca Comericala Romana S.A.40 in Romania in 2005. In July 2007 Erste
Bank, like Bank Austria Creditanstalt, expanded further eastwards, acquir-
ing Bank Prestige in the Ukraine[1].
38These three banks were later merged into Erste&Steiermaerkischen banka.
39To be precise Erste Bank bought a 52% majority share in this bank in 2000 gradually
increasing its share to 100% by 2005.
40BCR is the largest bank in Romania with a market share of 32%.
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Erste Bank AG operations in the respective countries today are subsumed
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Erste Bank AG Operations in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
 
Country Subsidiary Clients 
(million) 
Branches Market 
position 
(number 
of clients) 
Croatia • Erste Bank Croatia 0.6 114 No. 3 
Czech 
Republic 
• Ceska Sporitelna 5.3 637 No. 1 
Hungary • Erste Bank Hungary 0.9 186 No. 2 
Romania • Banca Comerciala Romana 3.5 485 No. 1 
Serbia • Erste Bank Serbia 0.3 NA No. 9 
Slovak 
Republic 
• Slovenska Sporitelna 2.5 279 No. 1 
Ukraine • Erste Bank Ukraine Just founded in December 2005 
 
Source: Erste Bank AG Corporate website http://www.erstebank.com 
 
 
The main difference concerning general strategy between Bank Austria
Creditanstalt and Erste Bank AG is, that the former predominantly focuses
on the wholesale banking segment, including loans to larger commercials
as well as investment banking services, whereas Erste Bank AG’s primary
focus is the retail segment and, to a lesser degree, the provision of financial
services to small and medium-sized (SME) firms[1]. This general difference
also seems to at least partly explain both different timing and mode of entry
between these banks. Whereas the strategy of Erste Bank AG requires a large
branch network as well as soft information about informationally-opaque
potential loan clients, Bank Austria’s need for these due to its focus on
the wholesale business, was less pronounced (at least until 2000 when BA
started to increase its interest in the retail segment in the CEE region).
Therefore Erste Bank was much more active acquiring these needed assets or
capabilities via the acquisition of local banks. Erste Bank did not enter any
market on a large scale via Greenfield Investment but predominantly choose
an acquisition strategy from the beginning[1].
Also, the fact that Erste Bank AG entered the region way later than Bank
Austria Creditanstalt could also be seen in light of different core business
segments. Whereas historically BA had a large portfolio of large Austrian
firms equipped to enter the Eastern European markets, and therefore scope
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for applying follow your customer-strategy, Erste Bank AG commercial client
portfolio was more skewed towards SMEs, who were less ready to engage in
the CEE region from the beginning. Additionally the retail segment in these
markets itself might have been to risky and small to enter in the early phase
of transition.
Erste Bank AG also focuses on less markets in the region, being active
in only 7 countries[1]. It has a very strong position in the retail segment
especially in the Czech and Slovak Republic and Romania, as well as to
a lesser degree in Hungary. Interestingly Erste Bank AG is not active in
Poland, deemed to be the most interesting market for retail banking in CEE
due to its large population.
Concerning future growth strategies Erste Bank AG tries to make use of
the banking sector development cycle in the heterogeneous markets in the
region. Whereas the Ukraine, Serbia and Romania are now seen as ”‘emerg-
ing markets”’ characterized by a low market penetration rate of banking
services, where growth short-term is driven by demand for simple banking
services such as savings, payment transfers and debit cards, these countries
will become what Erste Bank AG calls ”‘developing markets”’ like the Czech
and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Croatia, where bank penetration rates
are somewhat higher therefore experiencing tougher competition, but at the
same time enabling growth in high-margin products such as mortgage loans,
consumer loans, credit cards and wealth management products[1].
2.4 Conclusion
Quite a lot can be learned for multinational banking in general from the
above case study.
Concerning home country effects in multinational banking, it is con-
cluded, that banks from saturated markets are more likely to expand abroad,
due to missing significant growth opportunities in the home market. This
result has already been discussed in the empirical literature (e.g. de Haas,
van Lelyveld (2006)[44]). Interestingly home country characteristics in the
majority of studies are most often seen as shaping firms’/banks’ capabilities
to become multinational (e.g. Buch and de Long (2004)[28], Focarelli and
Pozzolo (2000)[60], not so much as a push factor in incentives to become
multinational.
New to this discussion are soft home market effects mentioned by Bank
Austria Creditanstalt, namely that the relative size of the home country
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has an effect on whether a potential target country is perceived by a multi-
national bank as sufficiently profitable (large). Whereas this result seems
somewhat irrational, an additional home market size effect concerning ge-
ographical characteristics of expansion might be, that banks from a small
market might simply be better equipped to be profitable in foreign small
markets, due to experience in this type of surroundings.
This knowledge in similar markets might also explain why some banks are
able to enter risky accending markets at an earlier stage than others. Bank
Austria seems to be more equipped to enter markets such as the former CIS
states due to experience in similar markets, namely the Central and Eastern
European countries at an early stage of transition.
One very clear result of the case study is the importance of follow your
customer strategies in multinational banking. Especially having customers
to follow seems to allow early entry in accending markets, which stand-alone
might not be attractive enough at this stage of development.
Additionally the geographic pattern of bank internationalization, at least
in non-OECD countries might to a large degree be explained by FYC strate-
gies. This result adds an additional explanation on the influence of distance
on multinational bank location choice, as distance might play a minor role
in this decision directly through information costs considerations (e.g. Buch
and de Long (2004)[28]) but a larger role indirectly as distance is an im-
portant variable in the location decision of real sector firms to be followed
who actually face a decision concerning the trade of physical goods over this
distance41.
Another mentioned benefit of follow your customer strategies is that local
firms might be easier to attract for a bank if the former has business ties to
multinational customers of the respective bank.
The most interesting point of the case study might be the findings on how
a bank’s product strategy shapes entry modes and entry timing into foreign
markets, as well as the geographic pattern of such entry.
One conclusion derived is that banks focusing on the wholesale business,
characterized by informationally non-opaque clients with low switching costs
41Along the FDI theories of e.g. Markusen and Venables (2000)[98] we would expect
market-seeking horizontal foreign direct investment between distant countries and vertical
production-cost minimizing foreign direct investment between neighbouring countries. For
less-developed countries we would rather expect inflowing vertical FDI. So in the early
CEE case we would expect countries close to Austria to be main recipients of vertical
FDI, therefore close countries to be main recipients of Austrian bank FDI.
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and low requirements concerning the scope of the branch network, are more
likely to enter via Greenfield investment, whereas banks focusing on the retail
and SME42 business are more likely to enter a foreign market via the acquisi-
tion of a local bank due to the client group’s informational opacity (especially
SMEs), high switching costs from existing bank relationships (especially re-
tail customers) and large requirements concerning the branch network scope
(especially retail customers). These assets might most easily be acquired via
the acquisition of an existing bank, whereas wholesale-focused entrants might
probably not be willing to pay for these assets, as they are of second-order
importance for their business focus.
Additionally, timing of entry in a respective market43 might be a function
of product strategy of a bank. As discussed above, a retail-oriented bank not
having large real sector clients in its portfolio ex ante, might want to wait
to enter an accending market until the retail market in this country has
grown sufficiently large. In contrast, a wholesale-oriented bank might be
able to enter a market earlier on, banking on early profit from follow your
customer-business, business with third-country multinational firms as well
as investment banking services for the host country government and large
corporations.
For the economic literature these results propose a research strategy both
treating banks as conglomerates as well as on a market level taking care of
the fact that banking is not a single homogeneous industry. Therefore multi-
national bank behaviour might require differentiated theories for respective
banking segments. Entry modes, further strategic decisions and potentially
associated different impacts of bank entry into foreign host markets might
have to be discussed separately for banks with a retail and SME financial
services focus and wholesale/investment banking-oriented institutions.
The empirical literature, when discussing the location choice of multina-
tional bank subsidiaries, primarily focuses on host country effects. Taking
a result of the above case study into consideration, this picture might be
partially misleading. Indeed location strategies might take complete regions
into account, not single countries stand-alone. An isolated view on a re-
spective country market might be insufficient, as due to potential network
effects within a region the market’s attractiveness also depends on potential
cost or revenue synergies with other markets in the region. The notion of
network economies of scope across regions also seems rather new to economic
42Small and Medium-sized enterprises
43This could also be seen as locational choice, as a market A in period ti might mimic
a market B in period tj .
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theory concerning banking, but has been a standard feature of business lit-
erature discussing international one-stop-shopping possibilities for clients as
well as follow your customer strategies, which constitute a special case of
such network economies of scope.
The final point I want to stress is the result obtained on the refinancing
of multinational bank activity in host countries. Indeed it seems that in
sufficiently developed markets foreign bank activity does not lead to a large
volume of capital inflows into this market, as the subsidiaries’ refinancing
might primarily take place in the host country (via deposits). Therefore
internal capital markets in multinational bank organizations might only play
a residual role in the financing of these subsidiaries.
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Chapter 3
M&A versus Greenfield -
Optimal Entry Modes into
Markets with Sequential Entry
3.1 Introduction
One of the topics concerning foreign direct investment, that has just recently
become a core focus of economic literature, is the choice of the exact entry
mode of firms into foreign markets.
Foreign direct investment can take place via the acquisition of a local firm
in the target market (M&A), via the set-up of a completely new structure
(Greenfield Investment) or some impure organizational designs in between
these two modes (e.g. Joint Ventures, Brownfield Investment).
The most general advantage for a firm entering via M&A instead of Green-
field lies in the differing effect on the ex post host market structure and
therefore on the degree of competition in the market ex post. A firm enter-
ing a market with d incumbents via Greenfield Investment will ex post face
d competitors in the market, whereas, when entering via M&A, it will only
face d-1 competitors (abstracting from the possibility of additional entry).
In markets with imperfect competition, e.g. due to horizontal product dif-
ferentiation, all else equal, profits for the entrant should therefore be higher
if the firm enters via M&A. This positive characteristic of entry via M&A is
for example modelled by Müller (2001)[105] and Görg (2000)[70].
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However, this beneficial ”competition” effect might be a short-sighted
motivation for entry via M&A. If one would consider foreign firms to enter
markets sequentially, such that some firms due to various reasons1 move into a
specific host market faster than others, the entry mode of early movers might
affect the entry decisions of sequential entrants in the future. Obviously, if
the early mover entered via Greenfield Investment, a sequential entrant would
face the decision whether and how to enter a market with d+1 incumbents,
whereas with early mover entry via M&A he would face a decision on a market
with d incumbents. Therefore sequential entry might be accommodated by
the early moving firm entering via M&A instead of Greenfield Investment.
So the static positive ”competition” effect of entry via M&A might to some
degree be offset up by an increase in the likelihood of further sequential entry.
Two types of questions arise in such a ”dynamic” setting, the first one
being ”ex post”, how the entry mode of the early mover affects potential
sequential entrants’ decisions, and therefore ”ex ante” how the optimal entry
mode choice for the early mover looks like given its effect on sequential entry.
To analyze entry mode decisions in a less static setting a simple two-period
model, featuring a potential early and sequential entrant, is proposed.
To focus on pure market structure effects of entry modes I, at least in
the basic model, abstract from other incentives for entry via M&A such
as asset complementarity between acquirer and target (see e.g. Nocke and
Yeaple (2007)[107]), but from the possibility, that an entrant might be bet-
ter equipped to operate a company in general compared to its host country
target. In this simple setup firms are assumed to be symmetric in their mar-
ginal costs, only differing in what can be called their fixed costs of operating
in a market. In such a model I show, that entry via Greenfield Investment
indeed has a valuable strategic entry deterring effect for early entrants, such
that sequential entry in general is less likely than if the early entrant enters
via M&A. It is also shown, that the chosen entry mode of later entrants dif-
fers in expectations for differing early mover entry modes, as do acquisition
prices for domestic targets. Which early movers should enter via Greenfield
Investment or M&A, and how modelling potential sequential entry reduces
the relative probability of early movers choosing M&A over Greenfield In-
vestment as entry mode, is then derived.
To sum up, the model will have the following intuition. The general trade-
off faced by firms, when choosing their entry mode, is between increasing net
variable profits (variable profit minus acquisition price) and not having to
1For example practitioners mentioned that German banks did not enter the market
in Eastern Europe early on because they focused on building up their business in East
Germany at this time.
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sustain the fixed costs of Greenfield entry when entering via M&A, versus
working in the market at lower fixed operating costs per period when entering
via Greenfield Investment. The heterogeneity in possible entrants’ general
fixed operating cost levels determines their respective fixed cost disadvantage
when entering via M&A.
Modelling potential sequential entry reduces the expected variable profit
advantage of entry via M&A, as this kind of entry is shown to increase the
probability of profit-reducing sequential Greenfield entry. Additionally, the
profit reducing effect for the early entrant of sequential entry via Greenfield
Investment is more pronounced if the early entrant entered via M&A, than if
it had entered via Greenfield Investment. In sum these two effects are shown
to reduce the attractiveness of M&A entry for all types (concerning fixed
operating costs) of early entrants, even though the threat of sequential entry
also works to reduce the acquisition price to be paid for takeover targets. As
the fixed cost disadvantage of M&A is unaffected by such an entry threat,
a smaller relative fraction of potential early entrants (namely only the very
fixed-cost efficient firms) chooses entry via M&A compared to a static setting
not taking the threat of sequential entry into account.
The main result of the basic model is, that taking into account the threat
of sequential entry reduces the incentive for early movers to enter via M&A
compared to a static world. This result holds true for all markets where both
kinds of entry modes are principally probable2. These market characteris-
tics should be present in the majority of real-world markets, as we generally
observe both kinds of foreign direct investment modes in the respective coun-
tries.
The possibility of market incumbents to deter or accommodate further
entry is well-established in economic literature, starting with the work of
Stackelberg (1934)[122] and continuing with contributions by e.g.Bernheim
(1984)[20] and Gilbert and Vives (1986)[67]. However, according to my
knowledge, no one has linked entry deterrence in models with sequential
entry to the entry mode choice of multinational corporations. Also, the ma-
jority of theories have been restricted discussing entry deterrence in markets
with Cournot competition.
The proposed basic model can therefore contribute to the understand-
ing why Greenfield Investment still makes up a substantial share of foreign
2This means, that structures are such that firms entry choice will be heterogeneous in
equilibrium, with some firms entering via Greenfield Investment, some via the takeover of
an incumbent firm and some will not enter the market at all.
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direct investment. For example, Raff, Ryan and Staehler (2006)[113] find,
that for Japanese firms Greenfield Investment is the dominant mode of entry,
with cases of Greenfield entry outnumbering M&A entry by a factor of 2.5 to
1. Even concerning value of investments, Lorentowicz, Marin and Raubold
(2002)[95] show evidence that for German Direct Investment in Eastern Eu-
rope Greenfield Investment makes up 56% of total FDI flows. Concerning
number of projects, this dominance of Greenfield Investment in their study
is even more striking when one considers that the mean size of M&A invest-
ments is roughly 2.4 times the mean size of Greenfield Investments in the
authors’ dataset.
Recent theoretical contributions on optimal entry modes have however
stressed additional reasons of firms to enter via M&A, especially the impor-
tance of asset complementarity (e.g. Nocke and Yeaple (2007)[107]). Con-
cerning the found dominance of Greenfield Investment in the number of oc-
currences, we think a counterbalancing theoretical contribution stressing the
advantage of Greenfield Investment is needed.
Also, when controlling for firm size effects, Raff, Ryan and Staehler
(2006)[113] find, that the widespread perception that the most efficient firms
enter via Greenfield Investment, does not hold true. Indeed, when controlling
for firm size, they find, that tendentially the more efficient firms enter via
M&A, though the effect is not significant. Andersson and Svensson (1994)[4]
find, that firms with strong organizational skill tend to enter foreign markets
via the acquisition of local incumbents rather than via Greenfield Invest-
ment. Theoretically the latter point is theoretically rationalized in the paper
by Nocke and Yeaple (2007)[107], as an internationally mobile asset such as
organizational skill can be leveraged by combining it with non-mobile capa-
bilities of acquired local market incumbents. I incorporate these findings,
that have else been neglected in the literature, to date, with the general per-
ception being that the most efficient firms enter via Greenfield Investment
(e.g. Mueller (2001)[105]), in my model setup.
Additional to the above main result it is shown, that the advantageous
effect of early entry via Greenfield Investment is more pronounced when
takeover possibilities in a market are limited, such that early entry via M&A
deletes the option of M&A entry for sequential entrants. Interestingly de-
creasing potential competitors options then has a negative effect for early
movers. I therefore come up with a new, strategic indirect, ”‘perverse”’ ef-
fect of missing takeover targets on the choice of entry mode of firms into
foreign markets.
Welfare analysis within the proposed basic model yields, that in a world
50
with sequential entry, the negative effect welfare effect of entry via M&A is
even more pronounced than in a static setting. This is due to the fact, that
additional sequential entry, which is accommodated by early entry via M&A,
in the proposed setup reduces profits of foreign firms more than it increases
consumer rent.
A final proposed extension of the basic model is to incorporate what can
be called country- or market-specific learning by doing-effects, which changes
the results from the basic model for some types of markets. Indeed it is
shown, that when the degree of product differentiation in the market is low
and learning-by-doing effects are sufficiently strong, an ”efficiency effect”
dominates the ”competition effect” of entry modes, such that in this case
early entry via M&A deters sequential entry. In this setting then taking into
account the threat of sequential entry increases the incentive for early movers
to enter via M&A.
One could argue that this latter extension might yield an especially valu-
able insight into the retail and commercial banking sector, where ex ante
product differentiation between banks is generally perceived to be low and
learning-by-doing effects perceived to be both strong as well as predominantly
country-specific, due to the heterogeneity of banking regulation across coun-
tries. Indeed the result, that in this industry M&A entry should be very
dominant due to its additional sequential entry deterring nature, is getting
support from the findings in the case study in this thesis.
From a general theoretical point of view, this chapter contributes to the
existing literature by being, to my knowledge, the first to leave a static world
of entry mode decision analysis to implement a more forward-looking behav-
iour of potential foreign direct investors. Additionally, within the model, I am
able to discover yet undiscussed potential effects of limited takeover possibil-
ities on entry mode choice, as well as the effect of country- or market-specific
learning by doing effects on the choice of entry modes, in at least a stylized
way.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic
model and assumptions, analyzes the contingent sequential entry structure
and the derives the optimal entry mode decision of early movers, finally
comparing the results to a benchmark world without sequential entry. Section
3 discusses welfare implications Two extensions/setup changes are introduced
in the following. In Section 4 the effect of limited takeover possibilities is
analyzed. Then the model is extended by including country-specific learning-
by-doing effects in Section 5. The final section concludes and discusses open
questions.
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3.2 The basic model
The building stone of the model is a host country market characterized by
Bertrand competition in horizontally differentiated goods. The market is set
up as a Salop circle of size Y = 1 and transport costs or degree of product
differentiation t > 0.
Before any foreign entry into the market, there are two incumbent do-
mestic firms A and B operating in the market at marginal costs cA and cB
and fixed costs of operation per period of OA and OB, respectively.
The simple timing structure of the model is illustrated by the following
graphic.
Figure 3.1: Time Structure of the Model
Foreign
firm 1 entry
(mode) 
decision
T=1: First 
period of 
market
competition
Foreign
firm 2 entry
(mode) 
decision
T=2: Second 
period of market
competition
T
Foreign entry happens sequentially, such that an early-moving firm enters
the market one period before the next potential entrant.
At the beginning of period T = 1 there is one potential foreign entrant
F1 with marginal costs c1 and fixed costs of operation per period of O1.
The potential entrant firm has three options concerning entry into the
host country market. It can either enter the market via the acquisition of
an incumbent firm (M&A), by establishing a completely new firm structure
in the host country (Greenfield Investment) or not enter the market at all.
After the entry decision the first market game in the host country market
takes place.
At the beginning of period T = 2 a second potential entrant F2 with
marginal costs c2 and fixed costs of operations per period of O2, with O2
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assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 13, decides on whether
and how to enter the market. After the sequential entry decision the second
market game takes place.
For simplicity symmetric marginal costs of firms are assumed, such that
c1 = c2 = cA = cB = c. Therefore it is straightforward that firms will locate
equidistantly to each other on the Salop Circle4.
Additionally, incumbent firms are assumed to be perfectly symmetric,
such that OA = OB = OD > 0, where OD is then the level of fixed costs of
operation per period for all domestic firms.
Concerning entry modes the setup is as follows.
If a firm enters via Greenfield Investment it bears fixed costs of entry of
F > 0. The newly setup structure will then work at marginal costs c and
fixed costs Oi.
If it enters via M&A, the firm has to pay an endogenous acquisition price
A for the respective target. Bargaining power is assumed to reside with
the acquirer, such that the acquisition price will equal the outside option of
the target firm, which is the respective targets (expected) foregone profits
when staying independent. The acquired structure will work at marginal
costs c and fixed costs αOi with α = 2 for simplicity. The results would be
unchanged as long as we assume α > 1.
Therefore fixed costs of operation are assumed to be higher under M&A
then under Greenfield Investment. α determines how relatively large this
difference is. The usual explanation for higher (operational) costs under
operating with an acquired organization is, that company cultures between
target and acquirer may clash (see e.g. Feely and Kompare (2003)[57])or that
there might be some costs of restructuring the target to fit into the acquirer’s
organizational structure (see e.g. Müller (2001)[105]). In the proposed setup
the fixed costs of operation are twice as large under M&A compared to stand-
alone Greenfield operation of entrants.
Special to the proposed setup is then, that the absolute negative effect of
operating with an acquired organizational structure instead of a completely
new setup structure (Greenfield Investment) on operating fixed costs depends
on the general fixed costs efficiency Oi of the entering bank. The intuitive
idea is, that a generally well managed firm should also be better equipped to
handle post-merger integration problems than a badly managed firm.
3The actual realisation of O2 of the potential entrant is then drawn by nature.
4Obviously this would be the profit maximizing location choice. As in this model
incumbents have a ”‘location history”’, it is implicitly assumed that location switching
costs are zero.
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Note that for reasons of tractability the model abstracts from directly
arising differences in marginal costs between Greenfield and M&A operation.
Therefore I do not claim to fully discuss the effect of a firms general efficiency
on its choice of entry mode. I’ll be content to discuss effects of non-marginal
cost efficiency on entry mode choice.
The final restriction made to reduce cases to be analyzed is what can
be called a ”no passive consolidation”-clause, which means that the focus of
the analysis will be on cases of transport costs t and incumbent firms’ fixed
costs OD such that incumbent firms are not driven out of the market by
competition5. Such passive consolidation would occur if profits of incumbents
would be negative in the case of four players in the market, so iff t < 16OD
6.
To sum up, general profit functions of firms then look as follows:
For firms entering via Greenfield Investment:
πi,j(GF ) = (pi,j(GF )− ci)× xi,j(GF )−Oi − F (3.1)
For firms entering via Acquisition:
πi,j(MA) = (pi,j(MA)− ci)× xi,j(MA)− 2Oi − Aj(MA) (3.2)
with i ∈ {1, 2} denoting early and sequential entrant and
j ∈ {MA,GF, NE} the entry mode of the other entrant.
For incumbent firms, profits of operating in the market are simply respec-
tive variable profits depending on the entry mode(s) of entrant(s) minus the
firms’ respective fixed operating costs.
πA,j = πB, j = (pA,j − cA)× xA,j −OD (3.3)
In appendix 1 the respective variable profit for firms for different cases
of entry are derived. In this basic model the only difference between entry
modes concerning variable profits lies in the respective number of firms that
compete in the market.
5Besides reducing cases to be analyzed let us abstract from passive consolidation among
incumbents to keep the analysis non-trivial. If e.g. any kind of entry of firm 1 would lead
incumbent firms to leave the market in period 1 then there would never be an incentive
for 1 to enter the market via M&A and no possibility for 2 to enter the market via M&A
in period , as there would be no targets to be acquired.
6The respective profits under a given number of market participants are derived in
appendix 1.
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Before getting onto the core questions one intermediate result is derived
to help determine equilibrium acquisition prices.
Lemma 1
The structure of entry decisions is such, that firms will enter via M&A if
they have low fixed costs of operation, via Greenfield Investment for medium-
level fixed costs and will not enter the market at all with high fixed costs of
operation.
The Lemma is proved in appendix 2 and the following graph illustrates
this result.
Figure 3.2: The General Structure of Entry Mode Decisions
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Greenfield entryM&A entry No entry
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Therefore one can conclude that firms making an acquisition offer to
an incumbent firm will be those that would enter via Greenfield if the ac-
quisition fails to materialize. Therefore the outside option of the target is
its (expected) profits under the case that the potential acquirer enters via
Greenfield Investment.
First now the ex post question will be analyzed to determine how entry
patterns differ for the sequential entrant in period 2 depending on the early-
mover’s choice of entry mode.
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3.2.1 Analyzing entry (mode) decisions of the sequen-
tial entrant in period T=2
In general the entry decision of firm 2 can be subsumed as follows
a) Firm F2 enters via M&A iff
π2,j(MA) > π2,j(GF ) and π2,j(MA) > 0
7
b) Firm F2 enters via Greenfield iff
π2,j(GF ) > π2,j(MA) and π2,j(GF ) > 0
c) Firm F2 does not enter the market iff
π2,j(GF ) < 0 and π2,j(MA) < 0
8
From this general decision structure sequential entrants’ decisions contin-
gent on early entrant entry mode decisions can be derived.
Early mover entry via Greenfield Investment
In this case firm 2 decides upon entry and entry mode into a market with three
incumbents, the two domestic firms and the early entrant firm 1. Therefore
if firm 2 enters via Greenfield four firms will divide market profits between
them. Firm F2 profit then is
π2(GF ) = π
V ar(4)− F −O2 = t16 − F −O2
Firm F2 will not enter the market at all if Greenfield profits are negative,
so iff t
16
− F −O2 < 0 or fixed costs of operation above
O
GF
2 =
t
16
− F (3.4)
Firm F2 profit when entering via M&A in this case is
π2(MA) = π
V ar(3)− πV ar(4) + OD − 2O29
7Where we do know that the former is binding due to the structure of the entry mode
decision.
8Where the former is binding again due to the structure of the entry mode decision.
9As the acquisition price to be paid in this case equals πV ar(4)−OD.
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Firm F2 will enter via M&A if M&A profits are larger than Greenfield
profits, so iff
πV ar(3)−πV ar(4)−πV ar(4)+F +OD−2Oi = t9 −
t
16
− t
16
+OD +F −O2 > 0
or fixed costs of operation below
Õ2
GF
= − t
72
+ OD + F (3.5)
Firm F2 will enter via Greenfield Investment if such entry yields both
positive profits and higher profits than entry via M&A, so iff t
16
−F −O2 > 0
and − t
72
+ OD + F −O2 < 0, or fixed costs of operation O2 in the range
Õ2
GF
< O2 < O
GF
2 (3.6)
Early mover entry via M&A
In this case firm F2 decides about entry and entry mode into a market with
two incumbents, one independent domestic firm and the early entrant orga-
nization. Firm F2 profit under Greenfield Investment then is
π2(GF ) = π
V ar(3)− F = t
9
− F −O2
In this case F2 will not enter the market iff
t
9
−F −O2 < 0 or fixed costs
of operation above
O
MA
2 =
t
9
− F (3.7)
Firm F2 profit under M&A then is
π2(MA) = π
V ar(2)− πV ar(3) + OD − 2O2 = 536t + OD − 2O2
The condition for F2 to enter via M&A is then
πV ar(2)− πV ar(3)− πV ar(3) + F + OD − 2Oi = t4 −
t
9
− t
9
+ OD + F −O2 > 0
or fixed costs of operation below
Õ2
MA
=
t
36
+ OD + F (3.8)
F2 will therefore enter via Greenfield if its fixed operational costs are such
that
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Õ2
MA
< O2 < O
MA
2 (3.9)
As a side result, from the above cases it is obvious, that M&A entry in this
model in general is preferred to entry via Greenfield Investment if fixed costs
of Greenfield entry as well as the operating fixed costs of domestic banks are
large, as the latter leads to a reduction in the acquisition price to be paid.
Comparing contingent entry and entry mode probabilities
One can now compare the respective entry and entry mode probabilities for
sequential entrants for the cases of firm F1 entering via Greenfield Investment
or via M&A. With O2 uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 the probabilities
are easily matched with the respective fixed costs threshold levels for the
respective entry mode10.
The following analysis is restricted to cases where parameters t, OD, F are
such that all probabilities are larger than zero and smaller than one. Intu-
itively that means we look at markets where all entry modes are possible in
general, so depending on operating cost levels of a respective potential entrant
market structure leads to heterogeneous profit-maximizing entry strategies,
with some firms preferring entry via M&A, others preferring Greenfield entry
and some maximizing profit by not entering at all.
Taking into account the threshold levels and the characteristics of the
uniform distribution, the probability of any sequential entry given that firm
F1 entered via Greenfield is
P1 = O
GF
2 =
t
16
− F (3.10)
The probability of any sequential entry given that firm F1 entered via
M&A is
P2 = O
MA
2 =
t
9
− F (3.11)
10The probability of e.g. Oi < Oi for any distribution of Oi simply equals the cumulative
distribution function from the lower bound of the distribution up to Oi. For a uniform
distribution between bounds a = 0 and b = 1 the cumulative distribution then is
F (Oi) = Oi−ab−a therefore F (Oi) = Oi
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Intuitively, a potential sequential entrant with overhead costs below these
threshold level will enter the market in some mode, while if the potential
entrant has higher costs he will not enter, as entry would result in negative
profits then. The following proposition directly follows from comparing the
above probabilities.
Proposition 1
The probability of sequential entry is lower if firm 1 entered via Greenfield
Investment instead of M&A. Potential sequential entrants deterred from entry
in the former case are firms with fixed operating costs of O
MA
2 < O2 < O
GF
2 .
The probability of sequential entry is reduced by 4PE = 7144t.
The proposition is derived in appendix 3. Note that the reduction of
the probability of sequential entry is larger the larger, the degree of prod-
uct differentiation t in the market. The reasoning is, that the larger t, the
stronger the negative effect on profits of an increase in the number of market
participants is for market participants11.
The absolute probability of sequential entry via M&A equals the oper-
ating cost threshold level for M&A entry of the potential sequential entrant
F2, therefore
P3 = Õ2
GF
= − t
72
+ OD + F (3.12)
if F1 entered via Greenfield Investment, and
P4 = Õ2
MA
=
t
36
+ OD + F (3.13)
if F1 entered via M&A.
Comparing these probabilities gives further insight into the effect of early
entrant’s decisions on successive entry modes, as stated in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2
The absolute probability of sequential entry via M&A is lower if firm 1
enters via Greenfield Investment instead of M&A . Potential sequential en-
trants with Õ2
MA
< O2 < Õ2
GF
would enter via Greenfield Investment in the
former case and via M&A in the latter. The probability of sequential entry
via M&A is reduced by t
24
.
11This can also be seen technically, as the equilibrium price chargeable in the market is
p = 1n t, so
∂p
∂n∂t = −n
−2. This shows that an increase in the number of market participants
reduces prices in the market stronger, the larger the degree of product differentiation.
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The Lemma is proved in appendix 4.
As we will discuss later on, the most important question for the early
entrant is, how its’ entry mode will affect the absolute probability of se-
quential entry via Greenfield Investment. This probability simply equals the
probability of any kind of sequential entry minus the probability of sequential
entry via M&A. So the absolute probability of sequential entry via Greenfield
Investment is
P1 − P3 = t16 − F − [−
t
72
+ F + OD] =
11
144
t− 2F −OD
for early entry via Greenfield Investment and
P2 − P4 = t9 − F − [
t
36
+ F + OD] =
t
12
− 2F −OD
for early entry via M&A.
Again comparing these probabilities the following important Lemma can
be stated.
Lemma 3
Early entry via Greenfield Investment compared to entry via M&A reduces
the probability of sequential entry via Greenfield Investment by t
144
.
The Lemma is derived in Appendix 5.
The effects of the early movers’ entry mode on F2’s entry decision can be
subsumed by the following graphic.
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Figure 3.3: The Effect of Early Entry Mode on Sequential Entry
To sum up, early entry via Greenfield Investment compared to early entry
via M&A has the following effects on sequential entry. For one, the absolute
probability of sequential entry is lower in the former case. This is however
not a sufficient result for our following analysis, as it is shown, that part of
the total reduction of entry also occurs via the reduction of the probability of
sequential entry via M&A. Further analysis however shows, that early entry
via Greenfield Investment is shown to definitely decrease the probability of
sequential entry via Greenfield Investment, which is the actual harmful type
of sequential entry from the point of view of the early mover in this model.
3.2.2 The optimal entry mode of the early mover
Now knowing how the entry mode of the early mover shapes sequential entry
probabilities, one can analyze the optimal entry mode for the early-moving
firm F1.
To that end, profits of firm F1 under entry via Greenfield and entry via
M&A, given the respective effects on sequential entry, are simply compared.
Firm 1 profit when entering via Greenfield Investment can be written as
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π1(GF ) =
πV AR1 (3) which is the variable profit of F1 in period 1
+P3 × πV AR1 (3) which is the probability weighted variable profit of F1 with F2
entering via M&A in period 2
+ (P1 − P3)× πV AR1 (4) which is the probability weighted variable profit of F1
with F2 entering via Greenfield in period 2
+ (1− P1)× πV AR1 (3) is the probability weighted variable profit of F1 with F2
not entering in period 2
−2O1 − F is the fixed costs of operation in both periods and of Greenfield entry
for F1
Inserting variable profits and rearranging the terms we can rewrite profit
under Greenfield as
π1(GF ) = 2×
[
t
9
−O1 −
F
2
]
− (P1 − P3)×
7
144
t (3.14)
where (P1 − P3)× 7144t constitutes the expected negative effect of sequen-
tial entry via Greenfield on firm 1 profits, as (P1 − P3) constitutes the ab-
solute probability of sequential entry via Greenfield Investment.
In the proposed setting, it is quite obvious that the only sequential en-
try mode affecting firm 1 profits negatively is Greenfield Investment as this
increases the number of firms in the market12.
Firm 1 profit when entering via M&A can be written in similar style
12Entry via M&A in this model does not change profits of firm 1 as it is assumed that
all foreign entrants and local incumbents have the same marginal costs. Therefore sequen-
tial entry via M&A, from the point of view of firm 1, simply constitutes interchanging
identically behaving firms in the market.
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π1(MA) =
πV AR1 (2)− πV ARA (3) which is the variable profit of F1 minus the ”variable part of
the acquisition price” in period 1
+P4 ×
[
πV AR1 (2)− πV ARA (3)
]
is the probability weighted variable profit of F1
minus the ”variable part of the acquisition price” with F2 entering via M&A in
period 2
+ (P2 − P4)×
[
πV AR1 (3)− πV ARA (4)
]
is the probability weighted variable profit
of F1 minus the ”variable part of the acquisition price” with F2 entering via
Greenfield in period 2
+ (1− P2)×
[
πV AR1 (2)− πV ARA (3)
]
is the probability weighted variable profit of
F1 minus the ”variable part of the acquisition price” with F2 not entering in
period 2
−4O1 + 2OD is the fixed costs of operation in both periods and the effect of a
targets fixed costs on the acquisition price.
Again inserting variable profits and rearranging yields
π1(MA) = 2×
[
5
36
t− 2O1 + OD
]
− (P2 − P4)×
13
144
t (3.15)
with (P2 − P4) × 13144t again being the expected negative profit effect of
sequential entry via Greenfield Investment of firm 1 profits.
Solving for respective operating fixed costs profit levels like it has been
done for the sequential entrant in T=2 the following result can be derived.
Lemma 4
Firm 1 will enter via M&A, if its fixed costs of operation are low, such
that
O1 < Õ1 =
t
36
+ OD +
F
2
− (P2 − P4)× 13288t + (P1 − P3)×
7
288
t
via Greenfield Investment if fixed costs of operation are of medium size,
such that
Õ1 < O1 < O1 =
t
9
− F
2
− (P1 − P3)× 7288t
and will not enter the market if fixed costs of operation are high, such
that
O1 > O1
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The Lemma is derived in Appendix 6. The general pecking order of the
entry mode of the early moving firm 1 is not influenced by the threat of
sequential entry and therefore arising strategic effects of entry mode, which
is unsurprising due to the way the model is setup, as this order is determined
by assumptions on the influence of entry modes on the ex post operating
efficiency of the foreign structure in the market.
The more interesting question is whether the threat of sequential entry
reduces the probability or amount of M&A and Greenfield entry in compar-
ison to a world, where there no such threat exists. In order to analyze this,
a two-period benchmark case without a sequential entry threat is derived.
For further use, the relative probability of early entry via M&A given
general entry is simply Õ1
O1
, which intuitively is simply the proportion of
firms with operating fixed costs such that they enter via M&A, divided by
the proportion of firms with operating fixed costs such that they enter the
market at all.
3.2.3 Benchmark Case (No sequential entry)
The following benchmark case without a sequential entry threat is con-
structed. The benchmark would be a two-period market game with perfectly
symmetric periods concerning market structure from the perspective of the
early entrant.
In such a setting, cumulative profits of firm 1 under Greenfield Investment
over both periods are then
πBM1 (GF ) = 2×
[
t
9
−O1 −
F
2
]
(3.16)
which is simply twice the profit of firm 1 in period 1 under Greenfield
Investment13.
Cumulative profits of firm 1 under M&A entry are therefore14
πBM1 (MA) = 2×
[
5
36
t− 2O1 + OD
]
(3.17)
13With three players in the market in each profit each firm makes variable profits of 19 t
per period. Fixed costs of entry are F , which occur only once, so per period fixed costs of
Greenfield entry are F2 .
14Entry via M&A leaves two players in the market generating per-period variable profits
of 14 t. Foregone target profits per period would have occurred in a market with three
players, so the acquisition price per period would be 19 t−OD.
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Solving for fixed operation cost levels O1 one finds that in the benchmark
case firm 1 will enter via M&A if
O1 < Õ
BM
1 =
t
36
+ OD +
F
2
(3.18)
will not enter the market if
O1 > O
BM
1 =
t
9
− F
2
(3.19)
and for fixed overhead cost levels in-between firm 1 would enter via Green-
field Investment.
It can be immediately seen, that
ÕBM1 = Õ1 + (P2 − P4)× 13288t− (P1 − P3)×
7
288
t
and
O
BM
1 = O1 + (P1 − P3)× 7288t
The relative probability of entry via M&A given general entry is
ÕBM1
O
BM
1
for
the benchmark case.
3.2.4 How does the threat of sequential entry change
the entry mode decision of early movers?
Comparing the benchmark case with the case of potential sequential entry
yields the following first result.
Lemma 5
The threat of sequential entry leads to a lower probability of general entry
for early movers.
The result is derived in Appendix 7.
This Lemma is very intuitive. With some positive probability another
firm will enter the market in period 2 via Greenfield Investment in the case of
potential sequential entry. Therefore, with this positive probability, variable
profits of the early mover will be lower in period 2. So some potential early
moving firms able to make small positive profits ε in a market with two
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other competitors will in expectation make negative profits, as there is the
possibility of having to compete with three other competitors in period 2.
Our main interest however concerns the non-trivial effect of introducing
the threat of sequential entry on the relative probability of the early entrant
choosing entry via Greenfield Investment over entry via M&A. Analyzing this
question gives the following main result of the basic model.
Proposition 2
The threat of sequential entry leads to entrants choosing Greenfield In-
vestment over M&A with a higher probability, formally
ÕBM1
O
BM
1
> Õ1
O1
if the general structure of the market supports all available entry modes
with positive probability.
This proposition is proved in Appendix 8.
The main result is easily explained intuitively. With sequential entry,
Greenfield Investment, compared to early entry via M&A, reduces the prob-
ability of sequential Greenfield entry, which would reduce early mover profits.
Due to expectations, acquisition prices for targets will also be lower for
the early entrants with the threat of sequential entry, as incumbent domestic
firms expect lower profits in period 2. However the variable profit-benefit of
entry via M&A decreases disproportionately due to the non-linear relation-
ship between profits and number of firms in the market.
Altogether the existence of a sequential entry threat makes M&A a less
interesting entry mode option compared to a static setting.
The difference between this model of sequential entry and the benchmark
case is illustrated by the following graphical example, where it is quite easy
to see that the relative probability of M&A entry decreases strongly when
modelling sequential entry.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Benchmark and Sequential Entry Case
In the proposed model setup there are markets that would only be entered
via M&A by early movers, no matter sequential entry threat or not. This
would be the case if either fixed costs of Greenfield entry and fixed operative
costs of incumbents are sufficiently large15. One can easily see that O1 − Õ1
would become negative in this case as well as P2 > P4, such that entry would
only occur via M&A.
In general, however, neglecting the market dynamics effects of entry
modes underestimates the attractiveness of entry via Greenfield Investment.
15Restricted to F being small enough for potential acquirers entering via Greenfield
Investment if takeover negotiations fail and operating fixed costs OD such that no passive
consolidation takes place.
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3.2.5 A note on completely endogenous market struc-
ture
For simplicity the model only discusses at 2 potential entrants. In a com-
plete equilibrium we would have sequential entry in period 2 until profits for
potential entrants become zero.
However, if e.g. one would assume n potential symmetric sequential en-
trants with operating fixed costs of O2 the qualitative results would not
change at all. In fact entry deterrence considerations would become more
important for firm 1 as its profits would reduce much more for nEntry > 1
firms entering the market.
3.3 Welfare analysis
In this section it is shown how welfare effects of entry modes differ between
a model without potential sequential entry and with such a threat. To that
end, the welfare effects of firm 1 entering via Greenfield and via M&A are
analyzed.
As a simple welfare measure, the sum of profits of domestic firms (which
include acquisition prices if a domestic firm is acquired) and the consumer
rent in the market, is used.
Welfare in the case of firm 1 entering via Greenfield is
WGF = πGFDom + CR
GF = πGFA + π
GF
B + CR
GF (3.20)
where πGFDom is the sum of profits of domestic incumbent firms A and B in
both periods and CR is the consumer rent in both periods, which in general
per period is
(
s− td− p
)
×X, where s is consumer willingness to pay, td is
the average transport costs incurred by customers and p is the equilibrium
price in the market and X is the trade volume in the market. As we assumed
market size equal to 1 and s large enough, such that total demand in the
market equals market size, CR reduces to s− p− td16.
Total domestic profits are then simply17
16It is common knowledge, that average transport costs for customers in the Salop setup
equal t4n with n the number of firms in the market.
17to reduce notational clutter in the following it is assumed that c = 0 without loss of
generality.
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πGFDom =
4
9
t− 4OD − P1 × 772t + P3 ×
7
144
t18
where it is straightforward, that 4
9
t − 4OD = πGFDom(BM) is the profit of
domestic firms without potential sequential entry. Compared to the bench-
mark case, one can observe that domestic firm profits are lower in markets
that generally support all entry modes19, which is obvious as a potential
additional competitor reduces profits for each market participant.
Inserting case dependent consumer rents and case probabilities and rear-
ranging we get the following consumer rent in case of early entry via Green-
field Investment
CRGF = 2s− 7
18
t + (P1 − P3)× 572t
where again it is straightforward, that 2s − 7
18
t = CRGF (BM) is the
consumer rent without potential sequential entry. Again comparing to the
benchmark case we can see that consumer rent is higher in markets that gen-
erally support all entry modes, which is intuitive, as an additional sequential
entrant reduces both prices to be paid as well as average transport costs for
the consumers.
Welfare in the case of entry via Greenfield Investment by firm 1 is there-
fore
WGF = πGFDom + CR
GF =
t
18
− 4OD + 2s− P1
t
36
− P3
t
48
(3.21)
or WGF = WGF (BM)− P1 t36 − P3
t
48
.
Deriving welfare under early entry via M&A works the same way.
The sum of profits of domestic firms in this case is
πMADom =
13
18
t− 4OD − P2 27144t + P4
7
144
t
18Deriving these profits is simple. If firm 1 enters via Greenfield Investment both local
firms make profits t9 − OD in period 1 respectively. In period 2, if a sequential entrant
enters via Greenfield both local firms make profits t16 −OD each, if the sequential entrant
enters via M&A one local firm gets his outside option as the takeover target of t16 − OD
and the other local firm makes profits t16 −OD. If no sequential entry occurs, local firms
make profits t9 − OD in period 2. Multiplying with respective probabilities of sequential
entry decisions yields the above domestic profit level.
19So P3 < P1
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where again πMADom(BM) =
13
18
t− 4OD is straightforward.
Consumer rent in the case of early entry via M&A is
CRMA = 2s− 3
4
t + (P2 − P4)× 1372t
Therefore welfare in this case is
WMA = πMADom + CR
MA = 2s− t
36
− 4OD − P2
t
144
− P4
19
144
t (3.22)
where again 2s− t
36
− 4OD = WMA(BM).
A comparison between the welfare effect of entry modes between the
benchmark case and the case of sequential entry can now be made.
The welfare difference between entry via Greenfield Investment and entry
via M&A in the benchmark case is
∆WBM = WBM(GF )−WBM(MA) = t36
so in the benchmark case entry via Greenfield Investment is the welfare
maximizing entry mode, yielding t
36
higher welfare than entry via M&A.
In the case of sequential entry after some rearranging, the welfare differ-
ence can be shown to be
∆W = W (GF )−W (MA) = t
36
− t
144
[−31
72
t− 19F − 16OD]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
or
∆W = W (GF )−W (MA) = ∆WBM −
t
144
[−31
72
t− 19F − 16OD]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(3.23)
Therefore the following propositions can directly be stated.
Proposition 3
Early entry via Greenfield Investment is the welfare maximizing mode of
entry, with or without potential sequential entry.
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Proposition 4
With sequential entry, the welfare advantage of entry via Greenfield In-
vestment over entry via M&A is more pronounced, than without the threat of
sequential entry.
Whereas the first proposition does not come as a surprise, the second
result is not so obvious. Intuitively entry via M&A in the case of potential
sequential entry accommodates further entry. However such accommodated
further entry, besides increasing expected consumer rent, also decreases ex-
pected profits (including acquisition prices) for the domestic firms. In the
proposed setup, the second effect dominates the first, not least because only
sequential entry via Greenfield Investment increases consumer rent, whereas
both types of entry reduce domestic profits for at least one firm20.
3.4 Markets with restricted takeover possi-
bilities
Another interesting result can be derived from the model if one changes the
setup such, that only 1 out of 2 incumbents can be taken over. Assume that
only firm A can be taken over, while B, due to various possible reasons 21
can not be taken over.
Intuitively, one might at first guess that in this setup the choice of entry
mode of the early mover shifts towards M&A, because by taking over firm A
it disables the sequential entrant to enter via M&A, as there are no targets
left in this case. So, by taking away this option from sequential entrants, one
might think firm 1 should be better off. Therefore M&A might seem to be a
more appealing entry mode for firm 1 now.
However with symmetric firms concerning marginal costs this is not the
case as will be shown. The reason is, that, with symmetric firms, sequential
20The reasoning runs through acquisition prices to be paid. If the sequential entrant
enters via M&A he pays the target its outside option, which is profits the latter would
make if the sequential entrant enters via Greenfield Investment. Therefore the threat of
Greenfield Investment reduces the targeted firm’s profits even when being taken over, so
the sequential entrant entering via M&A.
21e.g. the firm might be state-owned with the state having a strategic interest in keeping
the firm state-owned, or the firm might be family-owned, where the family might not be
interested in selling the firm to some entrant due to non-monetary reasons.
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entry via M&A is harmless to the early mover, whereas Greenfield entry re-
duces early mover profits in period 2. Within the setup of restricted takeover
probabilities now firm 1, by choosing to enter via M&A, does not change the
entry consideration of sequential entrants that would have entered via Green-
field anyway, but it will push sequential entrants that would have entered via
M&A if a target had been available to enter via Greenfield Investment now.
We show this in the following.
If firm F1 enters via Greenfield nothing changes compared to the base
model, as no additional limitation is introduced for the strategic entry deci-
sion of the sequential entrant.
Sequential entry (mode) probabilities still are P1 = O
GF
2 =
1
16
t − F and
P3 = Õ2
GF
= − 1
72
t + OD + F .
If firm F1 enters via M&A the probability of any entry is still P2 = O
MA
2 =
1
9
t− F , but now P4 = 0, as there is no available target for firm 2 left in the
market now.
Analyzing firm 1 behaviour there is no difference concerning the threshold
level of operative costs for general entry of F1.
A look at the threshold level for entry via M&A for firm 1 points out the
difference to the base specification.
In the base model
ÕBase1 =
1
36
t + OD +
F
2
− (P2 − P4)× 13288t + (P1 − P3)×
7
288
t
Without a target for sequential entrants this reduces to
ÕExtension1 =
1
36
t + OD +
F
2
+ (0− P2)×
13
288
t + (P1 − P3)×
7
288
t (3.24)
It is straightforward that
ÕExtension1 =
1
36
t + OD +
F
2
+ (0− P2)× 13288t + (P1 − P3)×
7
288
t
<
ÕBase1 =
1
36
t + OD +
F
2
+ (P4 − P2)× 13288t + (P1 − P3)×
7
288
t
as the inequality reduces to 0 < P4 × 13288t, which is true for t > 0 and
P4 > 0, which is true for all markets that in general support entry via M&A.
As O
Extension
1 = O
Base
1 it is also straightforward that the relative probabil-
ity of M&A entry of the early mover firm 1
ÕExtension1
O
Extension
1
is lower with restricted
takeover possibility than in the basic model
ÕBase1
O
Base
1
.
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As the benchmark case is unaffected by the proposed change in the model
setup it then must be true that
Proposition 5
The negative effect of the threat of sequential entry on the relative proba-
bility of early entry via M&A is more pronounced, when takeover possibilities
in the market are limited, such that early entry via M&A eliminates the
option of sequential entrants to enter via M&A. In absolute terms such lim-
ited takeover possibilities increase the probability of early movers entering via
Greenfield Investment instead of entering via M&A.
This result is quite astonishing. Whereas general literature discusses ob-
vious effects of missing targets on entry mode choice, namely that there is
no possibility for a firm to enter via M&A if no target is available for this
firm, we come up with an additional indirect missing target effect, due to
strategic considerations about potential sequential entry taken into account
by an early entrant.
3.5 Country-specific learning-by-doing effects
A final interesting extension of the model proposed is incorporating the
availability of learning-by-doing effects in the market. With country-specific
learning-by-doing effects it is meant, that in the respective industry increas-
ing sales volume in other countries does not change the efficiency of a firm in
the respective host country market, such that efficiency of a firm in a market
only increases with the volume of former (sales) experience in this specific
market.
This extension is considered in a further simplified version of the basic
model. We will see that, if learning-by-doing effects are strong for some
kind of industry, M&A is actually the sequential entry deterring mode for
early movers and therefore it is obvious that the threat of sequential entry
leads early movers to rather enter the market via M&A compared to the
benchmark case.
Assume for simplicity that in period T=1 all firms have marginal costs
of c = 1. Further assume that incumbents have been in the market for
such a long time that they have already used up all learning-by-doing effects
available, such that cA = cB = 1 in both periods. The potential sequential
entrant does by design not participate in the market inT = 1, so his marginal
costs in T=2 are also c2 = c = 1.
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For the early entering firm 1 assume that his marginal costs in period 2 are
a function of how much 1 has sold in the market in period T=1. Specifically
let us assume
c1(T = 2) =
1 if x1(T = 1) < 0, 5
0 if x1(T = 1) ≥ 0, 5
This is a very simple, special form of learning-by-doing effects, but the
results can be generalized22. By assuming this specific form we can abstract
from any strategic selling behaviour of firm 1 in period 1 as well as reduce
notational clutter.
3.5.1 Sales volumes in period T=1
With firms 1, A,B being symmetric in marginal costs and market size equal
to 1 it is straightforward that the sales volume of firm 1 in period 1 is x1(T =
1) = 1
3
if 1 enters via Greenfield Investment and x1(T = 1) =
1
2
if 1 enters
via M&A.
Therefore c1(T = 2) = 1 if 1 enters via Greenfield and c1(T = 2) = 0 if 1
enters via M&A.
3.5.2 Sequential entry probabilities in period T=2
If F1 enters via Greenfield Investment results do not differ from the base
model, as marginal costs of market participants are unchanged.
The probability of any entry as well as the absolute probability of entry
via M&A is still P1 =
1
16
t− F and P3 = − 172t + OD + F respectively.
If F1 now enters via M&A the sequential entry probabilities differ from
the base model, due to the additional effect of M&A on marginal costs of
firm 1.
The probability of any entry in T=2 is now23
22It is always true that first period sales will be higher for firm 1, if it enters via M&A
compared to Greenfield Investment. Therefore its marginal costs in the second period will
always be lower if it enters via M&A compared to Greenfield Investment.
23One has to stay simple in this analysis, therefore I keep assuming that firms will
locate equidistantly from each other, which is a strict assumption, but actually even coun-
terbalances our results, so the assumption does not drive our results. To be concrete, it
is additionally assumed that the sequential entrant locates farthest away from the early
entrant at the other side of the Salop circle with the two local incumbents in between.
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P2 =
1
t
(
1
3
t− 1
5
)2
− F (3.25)
and the absolute probability of entry via M&A is now
P4 =
1
t
[(
1
2
t− 1
3
)2
− 2×
(
1
3
t− 1
5
)2]
+ OD + F (3.26)
Analyzing probabilities we come up with the main interesting result of
analysis of this extension.
Proposition 6
With learning-by-doing effects in the market and product differentiation
low early-mover entry via M&A compared to entry via Greenfield deters se-
quential entry. If product differentiation is high early-mover entry via M&A
still accommodates sequential entry.
The proposition is proved in Appendix 9.
The intuition is straightforward. If product differentiation is of low de-
gree, the base model-effect of entry deterrence via Greenfield through an
increase in the number of market participants faced by a sequential entrant
is small, as has been shown before. With learning-by-doing-effects entry via
M&A leads to firm 1 being able to price more aggressively in period 2, due to
lower marginal costs than under Greenfield Investment. This second ”‘effi-
cient competitor”’effect then dominates the first ”‘more competitors”’ effect
for sufficiently low levels of transport costs, as a more efficient competitor
hurts potential sequential entrants in expectations more than a larger number
of competitors.
The following figure shows how the respective probabilities of entry and
entry modes depend on ”‘transport costs”’ t in this extension.
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Figure 3.5: Contingent Sequential Entry Probabilities and
Transport Costs
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How the threat of sequential entry then influences the entry mode choice
of the early mover is obvious. As the threat of sequential entry already
reduces the acquisition price to be paid by the early mover as well as the
strategic entry deterring effect also favouring M&A entry it follows that
Proposition 7
In markets with low degrees of product differentiation and strong learning-
by-doing effects the threat of sequential entry increases the relative probability
of entry via M&A.
3.6 Conclusion
Modelling the threat of sequential entry makes it possible to discuss more
forward-looking entry mode strategies of potential foreign direct investors.
I come to the conclusion, that when the ”competition” effect, due to a
difference in the number of competitors in the market is the main difference
between entry modes, Greenfield Investment of early entrants compared to
entry via M&A has the profit-enhancing effect of reducing the probability of
harmful sequential entry by other foreign firms. Even though the former en-
try mode might additionally have the negative effect of pushing the sequential
entrant’s decision towards Greenfield Investment, the absolute entry deter-
ring effect is profit-enhancing, as the absolute probability of sequential entry
via Greenfield Investment is reduced.
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And while acquisition prices will also be lower with the threat of sequential
entry, it is show, that early movers will choose Greenfield Investment with
a higher probability than in a static world without sequential entry, as the
entry deterring effect on profits outweighs all other effects.
The above result holds true for all markets where both kind of entry
modes are chosen by the group of potential entrants with positive probability,
so if the degree of product differentiation, fixed costs of Greenfield entry and
fixed cost structure of incumbent banks give support to both M&A as well
as Greenfield Investment. Obviously there are markets, where modelling
sequential entry does not change entry mode choices, due to incentives for
one specific entry mode being too dominant.
Additionally it is shown in the model, that with sequential entry, the
effect of early entry via M&A instead of entry via Greenfield Investment is
even more harmful to welfare than in the static case. The reason is, that
early entry via M&A accommodates further entry of foreign firms, which
decreases domestic firm profits by more than it increases customer rent.
Slightly changing the setup of the model to account for ”scarcity” of
takeover targets, further shifts early entrants’ incentives towards Greenfield
Investment, due to the effect that entry via M&A in this setup takes away
the entry mode option for sequential entrants that is less/not harmful to
early mover profits. I therefore find a ”‘perverse”’ missing target effect on
entry mode choice, such that missing targets for other entrants pushes an
early entrant towards entering via Greenfield Investment.
All in all the proposed basic model helps explain the still very significant
share of Greenfield Investment in total FDI (see e.g. Raff, Ryan and Staehler
(2006)[113] via the market structure effect of entry modes and the latter effect
on entry dynamics.
Extending the model to account for country-specific learning by doing
effects in a stylized way, it is found that in such a setting the early mover
can become a ”terrifyingly” efficient competitor in period 2 by entering via
M&A early on. The effect of becoming a stronger competitor via M&A
then dominates the ”competition” effect of reducing the number of market
participants by M&A concerning sequential entry probability for some kind
of markets. It can be shown then, that in this extended setup M&A is the
entry deterring early entry mode if the respective market shows a low degree
of product differentiation and if country-specific learning-by-doing effects are
sufficiently strong (like they are modelled here).
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Referring to the general scope of this thesis, I deem this latter extension
to be a very good fit for international retail and SME loan markets. Indeed
one can probably state, that product differentiation concerning financial ser-
vices for these types of customers is rather low 24. Also, due to heterogeneous
(banking) regulation in countries, banks (and also probably insurance com-
panies, for that matter) compared to firms in e.g. the real sector, might
be less able to transfer knowledge won by learning-by-doing in one market
to other markets. So efficiency in a specific market in the former industries
should mainly depend on the cumulative volume of business in exactly this
market, and not so much on general world-wide level of experience. The fact
that heterogeneous regulation in part prohibits banks from making use of
other market experience in a respective host country market has been shown
by various studies of e.g. Berger et al.(2000)[12], who show that, except U.S.
banks in some specific markets, foreign banks are almost always less efficient
than domestic banks in OECD countries. A similar story is discussed in the
case study, stating that general international market experience only helps
in conduction business in a specific country, if the other markets mimic this
specific market.
24At least this should be true ex ante. Ex post there might be some product differenti-
ation stemming from an existing lending relation with a respective customer.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Deriving variable profits
For starters I assume that willingness to pay s for the product is such,
that in equilibrium the whole market Y is served by the firms in the market.
In general sales volume of firm i can be derived by the indifference condition
of the marginal customer of the respective firm. The condition yields
xi =
pj+pk−2pi
2t
+ Y
n
where pj,pk are the prices of the two closest competitors and n is the
number of firms in the market.
Inserting into firm i profit function yields
πV ari = (pi − ci)×
(
pj+pk−2pi
2t
+ Y
n
)
Solving for the optimal price and taking into consideration that all firms
will charge the same price due to same marginal costs c we get equilibrium
price charged by all firms
p = Y
n
× t
Inserting into the sales volume we get equilibrium sales volume for all
firms
x = Y
n
Therefore variable profit for each firm is
πV ar =
(
Y
n
)2
× t
With market size 1 and potential number of firms ranging between 2
(both foreign entrants enter via M&A or no entry at all) and 4 (both for-
eign entrants enter via Greenfield) the relevant variable profit levels for the
analysis are
πV ar(2) = 1
4
× t
πV ar(3) = 1
9
× t
πV ar(3) = 1
16
× t
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Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 1
The difference between M&A and Greenfield profits for a respective bank
and a respective entry mode of another bank is of the form
4 = πV ari (MA)− πV ari (GF )− A + F − 2Oi + Oi =
πV ari (MA)− πV ari (GF )− A + F −Oi
So
d4
dOi
= −1 < 0
which means the larger Oi so M&A is preferred over Greenfield Investment
for low values (as πV ari (MA)− πV ari (GF )−A > 0 for the proposed setup) of
Oi and vice versa for higher values of Oi.
Greenfield profits are of form
πV ari (GF )−Oi
so d4
dOi
= −1 < 0 and entry becomes less likely if Oi is high.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
I want to show that
P1 < P2
so
1
16
t− F < 1
9
t− F
which reduces to
7
144
t > 0
which is true for t > 0,which is fulfilled by assumption.
The difference between P2 and P1 is
1
9
t− 1
16
t = 7
144
t
Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 2
I want to show that
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P3 < P4
which is equal to P3 − P4 < 0. Inserting yields
− 1
72
t− 1
36
t = − 1
24
t < 0
true for t > 0, which is true by assumption.
The absolute difference between probabilities is P4 − P3 = 124t.
Appendix 5: Proof of Lemma 3
We want to show that
P2 − P4 > P1 − P3
equal to
1
12
t− 2F −OD > 11144t− 2F −OD
which reduces to
1
144
t > 0
which is true for t > 0. which is given by assumption.
The difference [P2 − P4]− [P1 − P3] = 1144t.
Appendix 6: Proof of Lemma 4
Solving profit inequality
π1(MA) = 2×
[
5
18
t− 2O1 + OD
]
+ (P4 − P2)× 13144t
>
π1(GF ) = 2×
[
1
9
t−O1 − F2
]
− (P1 − P3)× 7144t
for O1 yields
O1 <
1
36
t + OD +
F
2
− (P2 − P4)× 13288t + (P1 − P3)×
7
288
t
Solving inequality π1(GF ) > 0 for O1 yields
O1 <
1
9
t− F
2
− (P1 − P3)× 7288t
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Appendix 7: Proof of Lemma 5
It should be shown that an early mover with some overhead fixed costs
O1 would enter the market without the threat of sequential entry, but will
not enter if the threat of sequential entry exists. This is true iff
O
BM
1 > O1
Inserting yields
(P1 − P3)× 7288t > 0
By the pecking order of entry modes we know that P1 > P3 as long as
the market structure in general supports both kinds of entry. As additionally
t > 0 it must hold true that RHS > 0.
Appendix 8: Proof of Proposition 2
I want to show that some potential entrant firm 1 with operating fixed
costs of O1 would enter via M&A without the threat of sequential entry and
via Greenfield if the threat of sequential entry exists. Therefore we got to
show that
ÕBM1
O
BM
1
> Õ1
O1
Inserting in the RHS yields
ÕBM1
O
BM
1
>
ÕBM1 +[(P4−P2)× 13288 t+(P1−P3)×
7
288
t]
O
BM
1 +(P3−P1)× 7288 t
which can be simplified to
(P3 − P1)× 7× ÕBM1 > [(P4 − P2)× 13 + (P1 − P3)× 7]×O
BM
1
for markets where entry is feasible (O
BM
1 + (P3 − P1) > 0)
Inserting for probabilities and benchmark threshold levels after some ma-
nipulation yields the following inequality
239
18
t2 − (428F + 290OD) t + (2016O2D + 5904FOD + 3744F 2) > 0
Analyzing the LHS yields
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∂LHS
∂t
< 0 for t < 3852
239
F + 2610
239
OD
∂LHS
∂t
= 0 for t = 3852
239
F + 2610
239
OD
∂LHS
∂t
> 0 for t = 3852
239
F + 2610
239
OD
as well as LHS(t = 0) = 2016O2D + 5904FOD + 3744F
2 > 0
and LHS(t →∞) →∞.
So, the LHS has a minimum at t = 3852
239
F + 2610
239
OD.
Therefore it is sufficient to show that the inequality LHS > 0 holds for
this minimum.
Inserting the minimizing t-level yields
70488
239
F 2 + 294776
239
FOD +
103374
239
O2D > 0
which is fulfilled by F > 0 and OD > 0.
Appendix 9: Proof of Proposition 6
I show that P2 < P1 for sufficiently low levels of t. P2 < P1 iff
P2 =
1
t
(
1
3
t− 1
5
)2
− F < t
16
− F
which reduces to inequality
7
144
t2 − 2
15
t + 1
25
< 0
which is fulfilled for t < 2, 4. For t > 2, 4 it is still true that P2 > P1.
83
Chapter 4
When do Banks Follow their
Customers Abroad?
4.1 Introduction
Among the often-stated motives for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
banking sector, besides the classical market-seeking reasoning, is a bank’s
desire to follow its existing customer base abroad. This motive is well-
established both in the economic as well as the business literature (e.g. Aliber
(1984)[3],Casson (1990)[31], Williams(1997)[130] and Bain, Fung and Harper
(1999)[5]). As Casson (1990) states
”‘... US banks capitalize on their goodwill by following their
customers overseas; the multinationalization of manufacturing
firms creates a derived demand for the multinationalization of
banks as well”’
Nolle and Seth (1996)[108] cite a study conducted by the U.S. General
Accounting Office 1 reporting that in the United States ”‘most foreign banks
serve customers of their home countries. An industry representative told us
that only a few banks are large enough to penetrate through home country
loyalties to attract other customer”’.
1”‘Foreign Banks: Assessing their Role in the U.S. Banking System”’, Report to the
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S.
Senate, GAO/GGD-96-26 (1996)[110]
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Though this latter claim might be too strong2, the general statement
drives home the point, that follow your customer(FYC)-considerations are
an important reason for banks to establish a physical presence abroad.
In some instances existing clients even actively lobbied for their respec-
tive primary banks to follow firm expansion abroad. Well-documented and
often-stated early examples were U.S. multinational companies US Steel and
DuPont urging Citibank to establish a foreign presence in South America to
provide their local operations with banking services (e.g. Huertas (1990)[80]).
A large empirical and business/case study literature deals with this topic
and indeed finds strong indications that this motive plays a significant role
in the multinationalization decision of banks.
In one of the earliest studies Fieleke (1977)[58], in his study on the de-
terminants of U.S. banks’ overseas expansion, found that ”‘financial need
of U.S. firms abroad”’ was the major factor in U.S. banks foreign location
choice. This early result for U.S. banks has been supported by numerous
studies, e.g. Nigh, Cho and Krishnan (1986)[106].
A similar role for follow your customer motives in the foreign direct in-
vestment decision of multinational banks has been found for foreign banks
entering the U.S. market by e.g. Hultmann and McGee (1989)[82] and Gold-
berg and Grosse (1994)[68] and for bank entry into less developed markets
(Sabi (1987)[116]). For example, Goldberg and Grosse (1994) study bank
sector foreign direct investment in respective U.S. states. They come up
with evidence, that states, that attract a large volume of real sector foreign
direct investment, also attract more bank FDI.
Nolle and Seth (1996)[108] also analyze the U.S. banking market. They
find indication that follow your customer strategies indeed seem prevalent
in foreign bank strategy in the U.S. banking market, as evidence points to
foreign banks devoting the dominant part of total extended loans to foreign
real sector firms. However their approach yields the some indication, that
this strategy might not be the main reason for foreign banks entering the U.S.
market. Then again, in contrast to some recent remarks in the industry, they
discover, that follow your customer strategies are still at least as important
in the entry decision of foreign banks as in previous times3.
2As at least some banks seem able to attract local customers, see e.g. Berger et
al.(2000)[12].
3The authors find, that the share of loans to foreign firms as a percentage of total loans
of foreign banks in the U.S., after decreasing for some time, had reached and partly even
exceeded former levels again in the 1990s.
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Even though the topic is has drawn a lot of attention in the empiri-
cal literature, there is a lack of formal theory on this subject. This seems
bothersome, especially when one considers the direction of argumentation
of a growing literature on market-seeking bank foreign direct investment.
This literature is strongly concerned with information asymmetries and prob-
lems of foreign banks when trying to serve local markets (e.g. Dell’Arricia,
Friedman and Marquez (1999)[47], Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004)[48] and
Lehner (2007)[92]). These theories might not yield a sufficient explanation
for bank FDI that is induced by the follow your customer-motive.
Particularly the question arises, why a home bank, with an existing rela-
tionship to a home country multinational firm, does not simply provide bank-
ing services cross-border, or indirectly via providing the loan to the parent
company from its home base, to the multinational firm’s foreign subsidiary.
Physical transport costs seem negligible for loans and similar financial ser-
vices, and informational requirements to provide a loan might already be
met by the bank’s general intimate knowledge about the client firm due to
previous and ongoing interaction.
Whereas there might still be motivation for following clients to assist in
local cash management and other services requiring face-to-face contact4, the
question is whether there also is such motivation concerning the provision of
loans.
In the following, a model is proposed to motivate such latter follow your
customer-behaviour by applying and refitting a well-established theoretical
literature on the choice of type of financing on this specific topic.
The following model setup is based on a view first clearly laid out by Gert-
ner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994)[65], who discuss the benefits and costs of
debt financing compared to internal financing in a setup of a two-dimensional
moral hazard problem (managerial effort and managerial discretion in di-
verting project payoffs to himself) faced by a firm conducting a manager-run
investment project.
Marin and Schnitzer (2006)[97] broaden the scope of such analysis by
introducing a geographic dimension of debt financing in the financing decision
of a multinational firm setting up a manager-run subsidiary in a foreign
country. Letting liquidation efficiency of banks differ exogenously by their
proximity to the respective investment project, they find that, depending
on project/firm characteristics, multinational firms will either use host or
home/third country bank financing (or financing from internal sources) for
4However the question then is, whether sales volume of such services are sufficient for
banks to have an incentive to enter a foreign country.
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their FDI projects.
The trade-off faced by the investing firm here is, that high liquidation effi-
ciency of the chosen bank type on the one hand allows the investing multina-
tional firm to capture a larger share of ex post project returns if the project is
successful, as well as in some cases being able to claim a larger excess liquida-
tion value (liquidation value minus debt repayment) in case the project fails.
On the other hand, however, managerial incentives to spend effort, therefore
increasing the expected size of the pie (larger expected project payoffs) to be
shared, are negatively affected by high liquidation efficiency, as the manager
expects a lower share of project returns to be available to himself due to
a better outside option of the investing firm in negotiations about sharing
project continuation value.
I closely follow this main idea in this paper5. However, in order to in-
corporate strategic choice of domestic banks into the model, I allow for this
home bank to potentially make non-zero profits as well as having discretion
in locational choice, or to put it simply, for home country banks to establish a
physical presence in the firm subsidiary’s host country. That way the respec-
tive bank has discretion in a profit-determining choice of the loan provision
mode, as the decision then faced by this bank is to whether establish a phys-
ical presence abroad or to serve the client from its home base. As the focus
will be on this conditional location decision faced by the bank, the model
abstracts from cases discussed in Marin and Schnitzer (2006)[97], where the
parent firm can potentially completely finance this FDI project from internal
cash flow or wealth.
Additionally the location-specific liquidation efficiency of a bank is endo-
genized. This is first done in a very simple fashion, where I lay out the fact
that physical transport costs might after all play a role in the decision of how
to supply a loan, as physical assets to be liquidated of a bank’s unsuccessful
client abroad might have to be transferred back to the bank’s home country
to sell these assets at a high price. With the help of a simple political econ-
omy story transport costs are then further endogenized by introducing the
ability of host country governments to (partially) keep assets to be liquidated
in the home country, restricting cross-border physical asset flow. In a sim-
plified setting the respective government’s incentive to do so are discussed,
contingent on the country’s endowment in human capital. I do so by using
the notion of asset-embedded human capital, that therefore is immanent in
5I’d really like to thank Prof. Marin for pointing out this paper as a possible starting
point for discussing bank location choice.
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the liquidation value of the respective project6.
Introducing bank location choice as well as country-dependent liquida-
tion values, allows an analysis on why and under which circumstances banks
engage in foreign direct investment induced by the follow your customer-
motive.
The reason for engaging in follow your customer-bank FDI is then a po-
tentially different liquidation efficiency attained by the bank, in comparison
to the bank supplying the loan to its multinational client without a physical
presence in its client host market. The model therefore offers the possibility
to discuss project/firm-specific and host country-specific optimal provision
modes for the respective domestic bank, showing that these two dimensions
of contingency are intertwined in shaping the location choice of the bank.
Using basic results attained from the model, the argumentation of Marin
and Schnitzer (2006)[97] concerning the link between foreign direct invest-
ment and international capital flows can be scrutinized.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the
basic model, analyzing firm level, bank level and government level decision
making to at the end come up with the optimal loan provision modes from
the bank’s perspective for respective circumstances. Section 3 concludes.
First, I discuss the empirical observations the model can explain. Second, I
analyze how my results compare to those obtained by Marin and Schnitzer
(2006)[97]. Finally I point to the potential obstacles to exposing the theory
to an empirical test.
4.2 The Model
The following setup is considered. There are two countries, Home and For-
eign. A firm (investor) from Home considers entering the market in Foreign
via the establishment of a subsidiary in this host country. In order to do so,
the firm has to hire a manager to operate the subsidiary. Additionally the
firm is cash-strapped in so far, as it is not able to finance this foreign direct
investment completely via internal funds. Therefore the firm has to take on
a loan of size K from a bank.
The foreign direct investment project of the firm analyzed is a two-period
project, yielding return X1 in period 1 with probability p and 0 with proba-
bility 1−p and return X2 in period 2 with certainty. The subsidiary manager
controls the success probability p in period 1 by his choice of effort level which
6A similar notion is proposed in a chapter of the upcoming PhD. thesis by Yanhui Wu,
University of Munich.
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equals the probability of success. The costs of effort are assumed to be of
the quadratic form C(p) = 1
2
zp2 with z ∈]0;∞].
The problem from the point of view of the parent firm is, that neither the
effort level of the manager, nor the project returns in the respective periods
are verifiable. Therefore the choice of effort level cannot be influenced by
the investor firm directly via an effort-based contract. Additionally the firm
needs to give indirect incentives to the manager to at least partially transfer
project payoffs back to the parent company.
Following Marin and Schnitzer (2006)[97] the two incentive problems can
be called the effort problem, and the repayment problem, where the former
must be solved by the parent firm by to maximize the expected return of
the FDI project, while the latter must be solved to maximize its share in the
expected return.
The combination of the other stakeholders in the subsidiary, bank and
parent firm, has two means to influence the actions of the manager. For one,
the parent has the ability to monitor the project closely, therefore being able
to make the payoff partially verifiable. That way it is able to capture a share
β of period 1 project payoff. However, monitoring comes at a cost which is
assumed to be of the quadratic type C(β) = 1
2
β2.
Additionally the bank has the right to liquidate the project after period
1, if the loan is not paid back. Precisely, the parent firm has to pay back the
demanded repayment Di to the bank, else the bank will liquidate. Following
(implicitly) Marin and Schnitzer (2006)[97] it must be the case, that only the
parent firm, not the local subsidiary manager has the right to pay back the
loan to the bank7.
A negotiation stage between manager and investing parent firm, after
period 1 payoffs are realized and before the credit repayment is due, is mod-
elled. If the parent firm does not repay the loan to the bank the project
is liquidated by the bank. As long as it is efficient to continue the project
(X2 > Li), as will be assumed in the following analysis, the parent firm and
the subsidiary manager can bargain over the continuation value, leaving both
stakeholders better off ex post by continuing. Furthermore it is assumed, that
the bargaining power in such a renegotiation is exogenous, with the investing
7When latter discussing the model it becomes obvious that when the parent firm could
decide on whether to repay the loan itself or to make the subsidiary a relatively independent
capital center it would always choose the former. As we will implicitly see, the reason is
that if the manager could repay the loan himself the investor would not be able to extract
anything more than net β ×X1 from the manager, therefore not participating in period 2
profits at all.
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parent firm able to claim a fraction 0 < α < 1 of the continuation value and
the manager therefore able to claim (1− α) of it.
The banking market structure is as follows. There is a bank monopolist
in the home market, which has an existing relationship with the above men-
tioned firm8. In the foreign market a large number of operating homogeneous
banks is assumed, such that there is perfect competition between these banks
leading to zero profits for them in equilibrium.
The domestic bank can differ from the foreign banks in terms of the ability
to efficiently liquidate the firm’s subsidiary if the loan is not paid back. Bank
ex post liquidation value for the client firm’s subsidiary is denoted Ld for the
domestic bank and Lf for all foreign (local) banks
9.
Within this setting the domestic bank can decide on whether to set up a
subsidiary abroad itself (follow its customer), or try to win the loan contract
and extend the loan without such a physical presence abroad10. The dif-
ference between the two modes of loan provision will be potentially differing
liquidation values the bank can achieve, which will be discussed in greater de-
tail below. Finally, if the bank decides to follow its customer abroad it incurs
small fixed costs of setting up an agency or other organizational structure of
size F 11.
The structure of the model can be subsumed in the following figure.
8Actually one would not need to assume only one bank being active in the home market,
but from its existing relationship with the respective firm the bank analyzed might be able
to act as a monopolist concerning this firm due to various reasons.
9As bank efficiency should be shaped by characteristics of its main market, the assump-
tion, that banks stemming from the same country should, all else equal, be more similar
to each other concerning efficiency than banks from other markets, seems reasonable.
10The latter simply means, that the bank finances a project abroad without establishing
a local physical presence there, but does so by either actually giving the loan to the
domestic parent firm, which then internally transfers the capital to its subsidiary, or by
extending the loan to the subsidiary cross-border, where in the latter case the contract
still must call for repayment by the parent firm only as well as excess liquidation value
in case of failure falling back to the parent firm directly. Again this follows the implicit
setup by Marin and Schnitzer (2006)[97].
11In the remaining paper these fixed costs will not be discussed explicitly, only func-
tioning as a tiebreaker between loan provision modes when the bank is indifferent else.
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Figure 4.1: Time Structure of the Model
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4.2.1 Bank profit maximization under given liquida-
tion value
In a first step the domestic banks profit maximization decision for a given
liquidation value it can achieve is analyzed.
Two possible cases have to be distinguished, the case of a moderately
cash-strapped firm and the case of a severely cash-strapped firm. From the
perspective of the bank, the first case translates into a small loan (small K)
compared to the total size of the investment project, whereas in the latter case
the loan size would be large compared to the investment volume (large K).
As the liquidation value should depend on the total size of the investment
project, different relative K
Li
result, which lead to completely different risk
structures between these two types of firms from a bank’s perspective.
The case of a moderately cash-strapped firm
Let us first consider the case of a relatively small loan, such that for all banks
Li > K, therefore bank i gets back at least the face value of the loan in all
circumstances, even when the project fails. The expected profit for bank i is
then
πi = p̂Di + (1− p̂)min[Li; Di]−K (4.1)
where p̂ is the expected success probability, equalling the effort level cho-
sen by the manager in equilibrium, of the investment project, depending, as
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we will see, on a bank’s liquidation efficiency Li.
Financing by a foreign (local) bank
As the local banks are symmetric concerning the liquidation value Lf they
will demand the same repayment Df in equilibrium
12. As the liquidation
value in this case of a small loan always suffices to repay at least the loan
size, the project is riskless to all banks. Note also, that even in the case the
liquidation value is very large (Li > Di), the bank will only be allowed to
keep Di and give the excess liquidation value (Li−Di) to the investing parent
firm. Therefore the local banks will compete themselves down to demand a
repayment of Df = K, such that demanded repayment equals the size of the
loan and these banks make zero profits in expectation13.
In order to analyze the effort and monitoring choices inside the firm,
which determine rents to be distributed, the problem is solved by backward
induction.
If the project is not liquidated before, the project yields a payoff of X2
in period 2. Due to the non-verifiability of the payoff, the manager can keep
the whole payoff to himself. Also, there is no more control right the other
stakeholders can use to give the manager an incentive to hand over part of
this payoff ex post.
At the end of period 1, at the negotiation stage between parent firm and
subsidiary manager, two possible cases are to be distinguished. If the project
failed in period 1, yielding a return of 0, which happens with probability
(1 − pi) no payoffs can be transferred from the manager to the parent firm.
Therefore the loan can not be repaid to the bank by the parent firm and the
bank will liquidate the foreign subsidiary. In this case the manager does not
get any rent from the project and bears his effort costs of C(pi). The invest-
ing parent firm’s payoff in this case is the excess liquidation value (Li −Di)
it gets from the bank minus its cost of monitoring C(βi) =
1
2
β2i . Obviously,
monitoring goes to waste, if the project is not successful. If however the
project is successful in period 1, which happens with probability pi, yielding
a payoff of X1, the manager can pay the investor part of period 2 payoffs ac-
cruing to him from his share of the first-period payoff, to prevent liquidation
12This symmetric equilibrium is a standard result in such a game of Bertrand Compe-
tition with perfectly symmetric firms.
13As Li > K it is straightforward that Di = K leads to zero profits in expectation. If
any foreign bank would demand repayment K + ε another foreign bank could win the loan
contract and make positive profits by e.g. demanding repayment K + ε2 .
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of the project by enabling the investor to repay the loan. If the negotiation
is not successful, leading to liquidation of the subsidiary, the parent firm gets
βiX1 + (Li − Di) − 12β
2
i and the manager’s payoff is (1 − βi)X1 − 12zp
2
i . As
effort and monitoring levels have already been chosen at the stage of nego-
tiation, therefore also costs of effort and monitoring sunk at this stage, the
negotiation-relevant outside option of the parent firm is therefore (Li −Di)
and 0 for the subsidiary manager, respectively. As continuation is assumed
to be efficient we will have the firm and the manager getting their outside
option plus their share of the continuation value via renegotiation14.
Altogether the respective expected payoffs given financing via a foreign
bank are then
EI(f) = K+pf [βfX1+(Lf−Df )+α(X2−Lf )]+(1−pf )[Lf−Df ]−
1
2
β2f (4.2)
for the parent firm and
EM(f) = pf [(1− βf )X1 + (1− α)(X2 − Lf )]−
1
2
zp2f (4.3)
for the subsidiary manager.
Foreign banks will compete themselves down to a required require repay-
ment
Df = K. Inserting for Df into (3.2) then yields
14Note however, that two additional constraints have to be fulfilled to prevent inefficient
liquidation. For one, the parent firm has to be able to extract enough repayment from
the manager to be able to repay the loan, formally βiX1 + (Li −Di) + α(X2 − Li) ≥ Di
or βiX1 + αX2 + (1 − α)Li ≥ 2Di, which is fulfilled for the investment project being
sufficiently profitable and parent firm bargaining power vis-a-vis its manager sufficiently
high (note that with efficient continuation X2 > Li, so
∂αX2+(1−α)Li
∂α > 0). Additionally,
the manager’s share of period 1 profits must be sufficiently high to be able to transfer
the above payment to the parent firm, formally (1 − β)X1 > (Li −Di) + α(X2 − Li) or
Di > (1−α)Li+αX2−(1−β)X1 . Note that the latter constraint does not present an upper
bound to required repayment levels of banks! I assume both of these constraints to be
fulfilled, because else the project would never be continued (if these constraints would not
at least hold for one type of bank i). I check all upcoming results on whether they interfere
with these constraints but only report when they do so. The implicit constraints will not
play any role in the qualitative results but are just stated for the sake of completeness.
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EI(f) = pf [βfX1 + Lf + α(X2 − Lf )] + (1− pf )Lf −
1
2
β2f (4.4)
To find the equilibrium payoff for the parent firm one has to analyze the
effort and monitoring choice of manager and parent firm respectively.
In appendix 1 the equilibrium effort level chosen by the manager under
financing by a foreign (local) bank is derived.
pf =
X1+(1−α)(X2−Lf )
z+X21
which is larger zero if project continuation is efficient, and
βf =
X1[X1+(1−α)(X2−Lf )]
z+X21
is the equilibrium monitoring level chosen by the parent firm15.
The intuition behind the above effects of some right-hand side variables
are quite obvious. (1 − α) denotes the bargaining power of the manager
in negotiating sharing the second period payoff. The higher the manager’s
expected share in second period payoff, the higher is his willingness to spend
effort, which leads to a higher probability of the project to continue into
the second period. From the perspective of the parent firm, this leads to
the choice of a higher monitoring level. The reason is that the investor firm
can now take a large share of period 1 payoff for himself without harming
the managers’ incentive to spend effort too much, as the latter is sufficiently
incentivised to do so by his high share of second period payoff when the
project is continued16. Also, a higher continuation value, due to similar
reasoning, induces the manager to spend more effort and the parent firm to
15Before discussing these intermediate results, one should note, that in the following
the analysis for moderately cash-strapped firms (due to the structure of the analysis this
restriction does not play a role for the analysis of severely cash-strapped firms) has to be
restricted to levels of variables, such that pi < 1 and βi < 1,as neither profit shares nor
probabilities can be allowed to exceed 100%. Evaluating the inequality at the equilibrium
levels of the former variables, we can state this restriction e.g. via the definition of sufficient
levels of effort cost parameter z. So the analysis is restricted to effort costs and project
payoff characteristics such that
z ≥ Max[(1− α)(X2 − Li)X1;X1(1−X1) + (1− α)(X2 − Li)].
16In absolute terms βf is still restricted, as the manager must still have sufficient liquidity
(1− βf )X1 to induce the parent firm to not let the project get liquidated by the bank.
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monitor more. A higher ”‘marginal”’ effort cost z leads both the manager
to spend less effort and the parent to monitor less. Whereas the former
is obvious, the latter stems from the fact that, with higher effort costs, the
parent firm would destroy effort incentives of the manager too much by taking
away too large a share of first-period profits.
Financing by the domestic bank
The domestic bank is allowed to generally differ from the local foreign
banks by the liquidation value Ld it is able to generate. As the payoff of
the parent firm, who chooses the bank it wants to work with, positively
depends on the equilibrium monitoring and effort level βi and pi, parent
firm payoff directly and indirectly depends on the liquidation value of the
bank used in financing. Intuitively a higher liquidation value increases the
expected payoff of the parent firm when the project fails in the first period,
due to a higher excess liquidation value falling back to the parent firm, and
also enhances the parent firm’s position in bargaining over second period
profits. Additionally, a higher liquidation value however reduces the effort
the manager will spend for the project, as the outside option of the parent
firm in bargaining over second period payoffs increases, leaving less payoff of
continuing for the manager in expectation.
As the domestic bank can have a liquidation value differing from the local
foreign banks it might be able to demand a higher loan repayment, therefore
generating positive profits for the bank. For this bank it need not be true
that Dd = K.
The expected payoff of the parent firm under financing by a domestic
bank is
EI(d) = pd[βdX1+(Ld−Dd)+α(X2−Ld)]+(1−pd)(Ld−Dd)+K−
1
2
β2d (4.5)
which reduces to
EI(d) = pd[βdX1 + α(X2 − Ld)] + (Ld −Dd) + K −
1
2
β2d (4.6)
and the expected payoff of the manager is
EM(d) = pd[(1− βd)X1 + (1− α)(X2 − Ld)]−
1
2
zp2d (4.7)
The payoff maximizing effort and monitoring levels are of identical struc-
ture to the case of financing by a local foreign bank, the only difference being
the different liquidation values, formally:
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pd =
X1+(1−α)(X2−Ld)
z+X21
and
βd =
X1[X1+(1−α)(X2−Ld)]
z+X21
Note that βd and pd are (negatively) depending on the respective banks’
liquidation efficiency17, but not on the size of repayment demanded by the
domestic bank.
The optimal choice of the repayment size for the domestic bank
One can now derive what the optimal and feasible repayment for the
domestic bank looks like. As the size of repayment Dd does not influence the
equilibrium effort and monitoring level, it is true that the optimal demanded
repayment Dd equals the maximum feasible (contract-winning) repayment
D. When choosing the level of required repayment the domestic bank has to
take into account that, if it requires too large a repayment, the parent firm
will instead choose financing by a local bank. So the domestic bank has to
choose Dd such that it leaves the parent firm with its outside option, which is
the expected payoff for the latter when financing the FDI project via a local
bank. Therefore the maximum feasible required repayment D can be derived
from the condition under which the parent firm is indifferent between using
the domestic or a local bank, formally
pd[βdX1 + α(X2 − Ld)] + (Ld −D) + K − 12β
2
d
=
pf [βfX1 + α(X2 − Lf )] + Lf − 12β
2
f
Solving the indifference condition for D yields
D =
pd[βdX1 + α(X2 − Ld)]− pf [βfX1 + α(X2 − Lf )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+ (Ld − Lf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
− 1
2
(β2d − β2f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
III
+K
(4.8)
17One can easily see that both βd and pd negatively depend on Ld, as ∂βd∂Ld = −
(1−α)X1
z+X21
<
0 and ∂pd∂Ld = −
1−α
z+X21
< 0.
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The first part (I) of the RHS captures the effort and repayment effect
of choosing a domestic instead of a local foreign bank. The second part (II)
captures the direct effect of excess liquidation value when choosing a domestic
over a foreign bank. The third part (III) shows the effect on monitoring costs,
due to different equilibrium monitoring levels chosen by the firm, for different
bank types.
Obviously if the domestic bank generates the same liquidation value as
the local banks, it can at the maximum require a repayment that leads to
zero profits for the bank in expectations D = K18.
As I later want to discuss the choice of the domestic bank between follow-
ing its customer or not, which will affect the liquidation efficiency Ld of the
bank, one first has to understand how the maximum requirable repayment
for the bank depends on its liquidation value19.
Differentiating D with respect to Ld, as is done in appendix 2, one finds
dD
dLd
= 1− Ω (4.9)
with Ω = pdα− ∂pd∂Ld [βdX1 + α(X2 − Ld)]
Intuitively, the maximum repayment premium D−Df over foreign banks
the domestic bank can demand equals the investing firm’s willingness to pay
for the domestic bank’s different liquidation efficiency. The firm in general
looks for a bank generating a relatively high liquidation value if the resulting
benefit of excess liquidation value and an induced higher feasible share in
payoffs exceeds the disadvantage of reducing the manager’s incentive to spend
effort. This is the case if Ω < 1. If the higher liquidation value reduces the
manager’s effort too much, the parent firm would rather like to work with
a bank that achieves a relatively lower liquidation value. This is the case if
Ω > 1.
18This can be checked easily: If Ld = Lf , then βi and pi are also the same for both
types of banks. The equation boils down to D = K = Df .
19The constraint that the parent firm has to get a transfer sufficiently high to be able to
pay back the firm could potentially be binding here, however only in a quantitative way
and only in the case of very large differences in the liquidation efficiency of the domestic
bank and its foreign competitors. Qualitatively, given the assumption, that the liquidity
constraint holds for zero-profit making banks requiring Df , the constraint tendentially also
holds for D = Df + ε. The constraint that the manager has sufficient funds from period
1 profits to transfer back to the parent firm can be neglected here, as, as seen above, this
constraint just adds a lower bound to the required repayment Dd.
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Technically, the effect of the liquidation value on the effort problem is
captured by ∂pd
∂Ld
< 0. The larger this negative effect of a high liquidation
value Ld on the manager’s effort level pd, the larger (positive) − ∂pd∂Ld [βdX1 +
α(X2 − Ld)] > 0 and therefore the larger Omega. So Ω < 1 becomes less
likely and therefore it is more likely that the firm will prefer a bank with low
liquidation value.
What is going to be the situation in the market for this loan?
If the effort problem is sufficiently small, the parent firm has a positive
willingness to pay for a higher liquidation efficiency of a bank. Therefore
the domestic bank can win the loan contract with a demanded repayment
of D > K and make positive expected profits, if it can generate a higher
liquidation value Ld > Lf from the investment project than the local banks.
If, in that case, the domestic bank generates a lower liquidation value than
the local banks K < Ld < Lf , it could only charge D = Df = K at
the maximum, which would lead to zero profits for the bank, whether the
contract is won or not (where the domestic bank will straightforwardly not
win the contract.).
If however the parent firm, due to the effort problem faced, has a positive
willingness to pay for a lower liquidation efficiency, the domestic bank wins
the contract and makes positive profits (D > K), only if it creates liquidation
value lower than the local foreign banks. With higher or equal liquidation
efficiency the domestic bank will make zero profits20.
Next up the case of a firm that needs to take up a large loan relative to
the size of the investment project is discussed.
The case of a severely cash-strapped firm
The difference between this and the former case is, that the size of the loan
K the firm has to take up to finance the project compared to project size is
now so large that K > Li, so the liquidation value of the complete project
for any bank does not cover the loan. Therefore, from the perspective of the
banks, the loan is risky now. In case of a project failure the bank will make
a loss K−Li. As all banks will only be willing to supply the loan if expected
profit is non-negative, they will all ask for a repayment Di > K to make
positive ex post profits in the case the project is successful.
20Note, that the discussion is restricted to cases where all banks have sufficiently high
immanent liquidation efficiency, such that Li > K holds true.
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Again the expected profit of the bank is πi = p̂Di + (1− p̂)Li −K.
The payoffs for parent firm and subsidiary manager can intuitively be
derived again. We will immediately see the difference to the small loan case.
If the project fails, it is again liquidated by the loan providing bank. As
Li < K there is no excess liquidation value left for the parent firm. So its
payoff in this case is now 0. If the project is successful, the outside option of
the investing firm in bargaining with the manager is 0 and the continuation
value is now (X2 −Di).
The expected payoff of the investing parent firm in general therefore is
now
EI = K + pi[βiX1 + α(X2 −Di)] + (1− pi)0−
1
2
β2i (4.10)
and the expected payoff of the manager is
EM = pi[(1− βi)X1 + (1− α)(X2 −Di)]−
1
2
zp2i (4.11)
One again needs to check for the maximum repayment that can be de-
manded by the domestic bank. In this case, the analysis is very straightfor-
ward.
Financing by a foreign (local) bank
As local banks are symmetric, they will again compete themselves down
to zero profits in expectations, so the demanded repayment Df is
Df =
1
pf
[K − (1− pf )Lf ] (4.12)
The payoff of the parent firm when choosing a local bank is now
EI(f) = K + pf [βfX1 + α(X2 −Df )]− 12β
2
f
One can again I derive equilibrium effort and monitoring levels (see ap-
pendix 3)
pf =
X1+(1−α)(X2−Df )
z+X21
and
βf =
X1[X1+(1−α)(X2−Df )]
z+X21
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Note that the equilibrium effort and monitoring level are now directly
negatively depending on the demanded repayment of the respective loan-
providing bank.
Financing by the domestic bank
It is straightforward that under financing by the domestic banks expected
parent firm payoff, effort and monitoring levels respectively, are simply
EI(d) = K + pd[βdX1 + α(X2 −Dd)]− 12β
2
d
with
pd =
X1+(1−α)(X2−Dd)
z+X21
and
βd =
X1[X1+(1−α)(X2−Dd)]
z+X21
The optimal choice of the repayment size for the domestic bank
As ∂pi
∂Di
< 0 and ∂βi
∂Di
< 0 it is obvious that the payoff of the parent firm
is strictly decreasing in the demanded repayment Di irrespective of a bank’s
liquidation efficiency.
Therefore the maximum repayment the domestic bank can demand equals
the demanded repayment of local foreign banks D = Df .
As the local foreign banks compete themselves down to zero profits, D =
Df =
1
pf
[K − (1 − pf )Lf ] is such that the domestic bank would make zero
profits in expectations, if it generates liquidation value Ld = Lf , as expected
profit of the domestic bank then is
pdDd + (1− pd)Ld −K = pfDf + (1− pf )Lf −K = 0
Therefore the domestic bank would make negative profits if it generates
liquidation value lower than the local foreign banks. In that case the domestic
bank, in order to break even, would have to demand a larger repayment
than feasible Dd > Df = D, therefore not winning the loan contract. If it
generates higher liquidation value it can demand repayment Dd = Df and
make positive expected profits from winning the loan contract as (1−p)Ld >
(1− p)Lf .
The results of subsection 2.1 can be subsumed by the following Lemma
that can be used in advance.
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Lemma 1
The domestic bank will choose the liquidation value-maximizing loan pro-
vision mode, if its client is severely cash-strapped or moderately cash-strapped
without facing too large a problem of incentivising its subsidiary manager to
spend effort (Ω < 1). If the bank’s client is moderately cash-strapped and
faces a very large effort problem by its manager (Ω > 1), the bank will choose
the liquidation value-miminizing loan provision mode, however restricted to
Ld > K.
4.2.2 Loan provision mode choice and endogenous liq-
uidation value
I now want to discuss, what the liquidation value of the domestic bank might
look like, depending on how the bank provides the loan and where it therefore
liquidates the project assets.
For starters, the ”‘basic bank-inherent liquidation value”’ of the project
is discussed. As the domestic bank already has an existing relationship with
the respective firm, all else equal, due to the bank already having extended
loans to the firm and therefore possibly having generated information about
potential asset takers in the industry in the home country, the domestic bank
should have a higher ”‘inherent liquidation”’ efficiency in the home country
than the local foreign banks in the foreign country, formally L0d > L
0
f .
Let us assume that the domestic bank can not sell the liquidated project
assets in the foreign market, if it has no physical presence in this country, as it
can not find potential takers in this market21. Therefore, if the bank wants to
provide the loan from its home office, it has to transfer the liquidated assets
back to its home market, where it has knowledge about potential takers of
the assets. However, the bank occurs transportation costs by shipping the
asset cross-border, such that only a fraction of the value Ld = (1 − t)L0d
arrives in the home country, with 0 < t < 1.
If the domestic bank follows the customer abroad, establishing a physi-
cal presence, it is assumed, that the domestic bank does get to know about
potential asset takers in the foreign market aided by its general industry
knowledge. However, it does not have as good an idea about potential de-
21This rather strict assumption is made for simplicity only. As long as it holds true, that
liquidation in a market can be done more efficiently if the respective bank has a physical
presence, and therefore e.g. managers that can locally screen the market for asset-takers,
the following qualitative results hold true.
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mand in the foreign market compared to the home market only generating
Ld = φL
0
d with 0 < φ < 1 when selling the asset abroad.φ can be interpreted
as a proxy for the local information requirement to find the asset-taker with
the highest willingness to pay for the liquidated assets.
The domestic bank’s liquidation value of the project is therefore max-
imized by following its customer, establishing a physical presence abroad,
if
φL0d > (1− t)L0d or φ > (1− t)
If φ < (1− t), the liquidation value is maximized by shipping liquidated
assets back home. Therefore the maximum attainable liquidation value is
independent of the bank following its customer or not, as the advantage of
being present in the local market is not made use of in equilibrium.
Lemma 2
The domestic bank’s liquidation value for the project is maximized by
establishing a physical presence abroad, if transport costs t of repatriating the
physical assets to be liquidated are high relative to the bank’s disadvantage
when selling the assets in the local market (φ > (1 − t)). If φ > (1 − t) the
maximum liquidation value achievable by the bank is independent of its loan
provision mode choice.
This result does not add too much to a discussion about bank’s contin-
gent liquidation efficiencies, compared to the exogenous assumptions about
liquidation values made by Marin and Schnitzer (2006). Rather the above
setup just acts as a starting point for the further analysis.
Let us now discuss a further interesting endogenization of the transport
costs of shipping assets abroad from a political (foreign government) perspec-
tive.
Retaining ”‘local”’ assets: Political interference in cross-border as-
set transfer
Assume now that the project assets include human capital. Imagine the
assets of the project that are liquidated to be for example high-tech produc-
tion machinery lines. Therefore an amount of human capital HFDI is asset-
embedded. This notion is not wide-spread in the theoretical literature yet,
but a closer look at the intuition shows this concept makes sense. Consider a
subsidiary which operates an assembly line. It buys the single machines for
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the line. However, to make the line work efficiently the engineering produc-
tion manager has to align the machinery properly and specify them, so they
operate together in an optimal way. By doing so the engineering production
manager leverages his human capital onto the physical assembly line. Even
if this engineer now is strapped from these assets, part of his human capital
in form of his specification/alignment skills are still present in the physical
assembly line. When a bank after liquidation decides to transfer these assets
back home, therefore the total stock of human capital in the foreign economy
decreases by this level.
Foreign’s economy-wide production function is assumed to be of the sim-
ple form
Y = HσK1−σ = (HFDI + H0)
σK1−σ (4.13)
where H0 is foreign’s own endowment in human capital, HFDI is the
human capital stock embedded in the assets of the discussed FDI project,
and K is the country’s capital stock22.
Assume now that the foreign government can restrict physical asset-
transfer out of the country such that a fraction tL0d and therefore tHFDI can
be kept in the country. The government can actively choose t by defining
physical asset export restrictions. However, if the government does so, it faces
costs of C(t) = γt, for example because it has to invest in border patrols, or
more generally because it looses reputation among potential following foreign
investors, or due to other reciprocal actions by other governments.
We assume that the government’s objective is simply to maximize gross
domestic product Y 23 over t, taking the costs of implementing t into consid-
22Let us abstract from the fact that FDI also increases the capital in the country as it
does not yield additional insight, and taking this into account could also interfere with the
analysis of whether the subsidiary manager can, from a political point of view, actually
transfer period 1 profits back to the mother company. Alternatively, one could distinguish
between portfolio capital (profit streams) and physical capital (liquidated assets), such
that the host country government would be able to block transfers of physical capital,
but not of portfolio capital. This assumption would also be absolutely sensible, when you
think about trying to smuggle a suitcase across border, compared to trying to smuggle an
assortment of large machines across border. In this case the following results on human
capital scarcity in the FDI host country would just as well apply to capital scarcity of this
country.
23This objective function of the government could e.g. be rationalized if the government
levies a withholding tax on all value-added in the economy. In this case, tax income, all
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eration. So the government maximizes over t
Y = (tHFDI + H0)
σK1−σ − C(t) (4.14)
As shown in appendix 4 the optimal asset export restriction t then is
t∗ =
( γ
σK1−σHFDI
)
1
σ−1 −H0
HFDI
(4.15)
The simple point to be made is, that dt
∗
dH0
= − 1
HFDI
< 0, so that due to
decreasing marginal productivity of human capital a country with a low hu-
man capital endowment will be less permissive concerning asset-repatriation
than a country with high human capital endowment.
So another intermediate result can be stated.
Lemma 3
”‘Transport costs”’ for repatriation of project assets from the FDI host
country to the (parent firm and bank) home country will be larger, the lower
the endowment of the host country in human capital.
So, taking into account Lemma 2, the domestic bank’s liquidation value
of the project is maximized by following its customer, establishing a physical
presence abroad, if the host country is endowed with little human capital,
such that (1 − t∗(H0))L0d < φL0d. In this case the bank attains maximum
liquidation value by selling the assets in the host country market. If the re-
spective target country for the firm investment is richly endowed with human
capital, such that (1− t∗(H0))L0d > φL0d the domestic bank’s ex post liquida-
tion value is maximized by shipping the assets cross-border and sell them in
the home market. The threshold value for the human capital endowment in
this evaluation is
H0 = (
γ
σK1−σHFDI
)
1
σ−1 − (1− φ)HFDI (4.16)
4.2.3 When do banks follow their customer abroad?
Having derived the qualitative optimal liquidation value to be implemented
by a domestic bank, as well as the partially endogenized relationship between
type of loan provision and respective liquidation value for the domestic bank,
these results can now be combined to discuss when a domestic bank should
else equal, would be maximized by a maximization of country GDP.
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follow its customer abroad24. Fixed costs of entry only act as a tiebreaker in
the model if, concerning the liquidation value, the bank is indifferent whether
to follow the customer or provide the loan without a physical presence abroad.
The below results directly follow from the previous analysis. For starters,
the general structure of the bank decision to follow its customer abroad or not
depends on whether the respective loan project favours banks with high or
low achieved liquidation values, and how these liquidation values are shaped
by the bank’s decision to engage in FYC foreign direct investment itself or
not. If a maximized liquidation value is profit-maximizing for the bank, it
will choose the provision mode that maximizes the liquidation value it can
generate. If a (relatively) low liquidation value is profit-maximizing, the bank
will choose the loan provision mode that leads to the lowest liquidation value
it can generate. Additionally, the relative liquidation value for the domes-
tic bank, compared to the characteristics of local foreign banks, determines
whether the loan contract can be won by the domestic bank.
For the latter consideration, two other following threshold levels play a
role in the analysis, namely the threshold level for human capital endowment
H0, such that the liquidation value for the domestic bank, when selling the
liquidated asset in its home market, equals the liquidation value for the local
foreign banks, formally (1−t∗(H0))L0d = L0f , and φ, such that the liquidation
value for the domestic bank when selling the liquidated asset in the host
country equals the liquidation value for the local foreign banks, formally
φL0d = L
0
f .
Solving for the respective threshold levels yields
H0 = (
γ
σK1−σHFDI
)
1
σ−1 − (1−
L0f
L0d
)HFDI (4.17)
and
φ =
L0f
L0d
(4.18)
Taking above results and Lemmas 1-3 together, and taking into account
the fixed costs of establishing a physical presence abroad as a tie-breaker,
the following final summarizing proposition can be made25.
24I focus on the ”‘political”’ interpretation of cross-border transport costs for assets.
Of course, one could just as well discuss results when having t depending on geographical
distance.
25It is implicitly assumed that, even when the foreign government blocks away a rela-
tively large portion in a cross-border asset flow, the loan for a moderately cash-strapped
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Proposition
The domestic bank will follow its customer abroad, establishing a physical
presence in the foreign market, and provide the loan to the firm if
a) its customer is either severely cash-strapped (K > Li) or moderately
cash-strapped (K < Li),while facing a not too large effort problem of the
subsidiary manager (Ω < 1), and the target country for the firm’s investment
is poorly endowed with human capital (H0 < H0). Additionally the domestic
bank must not face too high an informational disadvantage in finding local
asset-takers, formally φ > φ.
b) its customer is moderately cash-strapped (K < Li),the firm faces a large
effort problem for the subsidiary manager (Ω > 1), and the host country is
richly endowed with human capital (H0 > H0). Additionally the domestic
bank must face a relatively high informational disadvantage in finding local
asset-takers, formally K < φL0d < L
0
f .
The domestic bank will supply the loan to its customer without a physical
presence in the subsidiary’s host market if
c) its customer is either severely cash-strapped or moderately cash-strapped,
while facing a small effort problem, and the host country is richly endowed
with human capital ((1− t(H0))L0d > max[φL0d; L0f ]).
d) its customer is moderately cash-strapped while facing a large effort
problem, and the host country is relatively poorly endowed with human capital
(K < (1− t(H0))L0d < min[φL0d; L0f ]).
The domestic bank will not supply the loan to its customer, leaving the
provision to a local foreign bank if
e) its customer is either severely cash-strapped or moderately cash-strapped,
while facing a small effort problem, the host country is poorly endowed with
human capital and the local information disadvantage for selling assets in the
host market is high for the domestic bank (L0f > max[(1− t(H0))L0d; φL0d]).
firm stays non-risky for the domestic bank. This simply restricts the cases to be analyzed,
not changing the general qualitative following results. Allowing t to change the risk type
of a loan from a non-risky to a risky loan would simply add the result, that the lower the
human capital endowment of a host country, the more likely the FDI project is risky from
the point of view of the banks. Then unambiguously the optimal strategy of the domestic
bank is to follow its customer abroad, if this bank is able to overcome the informational
disadvantage of selling the potentially liquidated assets in the host country. This finding
simply reinforces the notion that a domestic bank’s physical presence in the FDI host
country maximizes its liquidation efficiency on its client’s assets, if the host country is
characterized by human capital scarcity.
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f) its customer is moderately cash-strapped, while facing a large effort
problem, the host country is relatively richly endowed with human capital
and the local information disadvantage for selling assets in the host market
is low for the domestic bank (K < L0f < min[(1− t(H0))L0d; φL0d]).
Concerning cases where liquidation value should be minimized by the do-
mestic bank two remarks have to be made. For one, these cases are restricted
to moderately cash-strapped firms (K < Li), so e.g. minimizing liquida-
tion value by selling assets abroad without a physical presence is ruled out
(Ld = 0). The domestic bank only wants to reduce liquidation value to the
lower bound Ld = K in these cases. Below this threshold level the project
would be ex post (after choosing the provisioning mode) risky, which changes
the objectives of the bank.
Additionally it is straightforward that, down to this threshold level Ld,
it is not ex post inefficient for the bank to liquidate the assets in the low-
est value-yielding way, as ex post all excess liquidation value (Ld − K) is
transferred to the client firm.
To sum up, in general the loan provision mode choice of the domestic
bank can be mapped by the type of client (Ω, K), the type of host country
(H0, φ, L
0
f ), and bank-specific characteristics L
0
d.
The two following illustrations summarize the qualitative provision mode
outcomes, showing the equilibrium provisioning outcomes given client firm
and country/market characteristics.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium Bank Strategies - The Case of Severely
Cash-Strapped or Moderately Cash-Strapped/Small Effort
Problem Firms
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium Bank Strategies - The Case of
Moderately Cash-Strapped Firms with a Large Effort Problem
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Basically the optimal provision mode (Follow your customer FDI ver-
sus staying at home) of the domestic bank is a non-unique function of the
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provision mode-specific liquidation value attainable. The optimal and the liq-
uidation value-maximizing provision mode are identical in two out of three
project/firm-characteristics cases. However, in the case of a moderately cash-
strapped firm facing a severe effort problem concerning the manager, this
result does not hold true. The liquidation-value maximizing mode is shown
to be a function of country-specific characteristics.
So, for the majority of cases discussed, the domestic bank will follow its
customer abroad if the latter enters a country relatively poorly endowed with
human capital.
4.3 Conclusion
I proposed a model yielding insight into the decision of banks to enter a
foreign market physically to follow an existing customer abroad or to serve
this customer from home.
The building stone for the analysis is the paper by Marin and Schnitzer
(2006)[97], who discuss the choice of financing mode for an investor/parent
firm engaging into foreign direct investment, taking into account a double
moral hazard problem on the side of the host country subsidiary manager
concerning effort and repayment. Building on their model, the possibility
of profit-making domestic banks, having the choice to follow their customer
abroad, has been added, as well as, in a stylized way, an endogenous provision
mode-dependent arising difference in this bank’s liquidation efficiency. The
former remodelling is done to bring in a dimension of general strategic choice
for banks to be analyzed, while the latter uses a simple ”‘political”’ story to
specify the effect of host country characteristics on bank follow your customer
FDI.
Through these additions to the model I am able to discuss bank-,
project/firm- as well as country specific determinants of whether a bank
follows its customer abroad or not.
It is first shown that banks unambiguously choose the liquidation-value
maximizing strategy if the respective customer is severely cash-strapped,
making the loan risky from the perspective of banks. Then the liquidation-
value maximizing strategy given country characteristics is described.
I find that, in this case, follow-your customer induced bank FDI tenden-
tially takes place if the host country is poorly endowed with human capital.
Principally it could also be shown, that follow your customer FDI takes place
if home and host country are distant from each other (high t exogenously)
or, in a slightly twisted setup, if the host country is poorly endowed with
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capital. Additionally the client-following bank must have a sufficiently high
immanent liquidation advantage over local foreign banks to overcome its in-
formational disadvantage (φ < 1) in the local market, or stated in another
way, this informational disadvantage must not be too high.
As could be expected from the basic model by Marin and Schnitzer
(2006)[97], the bank will not necessarily choose the liquidation value-maximizing
provision mode, if the respective customer is only moderately cash-strapped,
such that its FDI project can be considered non-risky from a bank’s perspec-
tive.
The intuitive difference to the former case, from the point of view of
banks, is, that an increased liquidation value does not directly affect bank
profits. Ex post, the loan providing bank will always get K if the financed
multinational firm subsidiary fails, if the loan is small compared to the size
of the project and its assets. Therefore the liquidation value only indirectly
determines the maximum repayment that a bank can require in case of a
successful project outcome, as well as whether the bank can actually win the
loan contract without making negative expected profits.
In this case one additionally needs to distinguish between firms that, due
to the exogenous relative bargaining power of parent firm and subsidiary
manager, the structure of effort costs for the subsidiary manager and payoff
characteristics of the project, face a high or low problem in implementing
sufficient effort spent by the manager.
In the subcase of a small effort problem the domestic bank will choose
the liquidation value-maximizing provision mode, but not so if the effort
problem of its customer is large. In the latter subcase, the bank will choose
the liquidation value-minimizing mode (restricted to Ld > K), as in this
case the negative effect of a high liquidation value on the manager’s effort
outweighs the positive effects on excess liquidation value and on the fraction
of profits transferred from the manager to the parent firm.
I think the analysis helps understand what might be deemed to be a
small puzzle of follow your customer FDI by banks. Considering the bank-
ing sector, there does not seem to be a sufficiently satisfying reason why
banks should follow their customers abroad to extend loans to them and not
simply provide the loan cross-border (directly or indirectly) from home, as
”‘transport costs”’ in the classical sense do not really seem to apply to such
cross-border transactions. Also, considering the literature on multinational
banking, which discusses information asymmetries between local and po-
tential entrant banks (e.g. Dell’Arricia, Friedman and Marquez (1999)[47],
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004)[48]) and how to solve the problem of in-
formational disadvantages by physically entering the market compared to
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cross-border lending (e.g. Lehner (2007)[92]), such considerations should
only play a minor role in supplying a loan to a customer the respective bank
already has an existing loan relationship with, therefore already possessing
knowledge about the firm.
Follow your customer-behaviour by banks here is explained by the incen-
tive to alter the liquidation efficiency of the respective bank on a customer
project abroad in a profit-enhancing way. One argument in this reasoning is,
that even though transport costs should not play a large role in the provision-
ing of loans directly, they do play a role in the loan provision mode decision
when it comes to the liquidation of assets, if these assets are of physical na-
ture, e.g. an assembly line or similar machinery. Transport costs in various
forms might then occur when shipping these assets to the market where they
generate the highest market value for the liquidating bank.
Introducing country characteristics in the model might help explain why
we observe bank foreign direct investment in countries that at first sight do
not seem to be too attractive for market-seeking bank FDI. Indeed, as shown
in the introduction of this thesis, bank foreign direct investment in developing
countries has increased significantly over the last decade. In the proposed
model, underdeveloped countries with low human capital endowment would
attract follow your customer-induced bank FDI following some real sector
investment projects.
One could however argue, that these countries should also tendentially
not be likely targets for horizontal real sector FDI. But if these countries e.g.
are attractive targets for outsourcing, they do attract vertical real sector FDI.
Within my story, these FDI projects would then yield an incentive for banks
to engage in follow your customer bank FDI in this country themselves, if
the respective real sector firms would (weakly)26 prefer to finance the project
with a ”‘high liquidation efficiency”’ bank type.
Another implicit result, that is not openly discussed in this paper, stem-
ming from the model structure, is, that a parent firm starting up a subsidiary
abroad would always demand to be the only party allowed to repay the loan.
If the subsidiary manager itself would be allowed to repay the loan, the par-
ent firm would never be able to extract more than D from the manager,
because the latter could else simply repay D to the bank himself to prevent
liquidation of the project. In contrast, with exogenous bargaining power, the
parent firm could extract more than repayment R > D if it can threaten to
break off renegotiation resulting in the liquidation of the project.
26In the case of a severely cash-strapped firm, the firm is really indifferent between banks
concerning their liquidation value.
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Introducing follow your customer strategies in this model world also sheds
some light on the discussion of Marin and Schnitzer (2006)[97]. By introduc-
ing cases where debt financing would be conducted by local banks, they dis-
cuss settings in which Foreign Direct Investment by firms does not constitute
a capital flow into the respective host country. They also show empirically
that the financing of inward FDI by local banks is a significant source of
financing for entering firms.
However, in their model, they do not allow for bank FDI. Empirically,
their dataset unfortunately restricts them to discuss ex post-local banks, so
that they can not distinguish between local foreign banks and local sub-
sidiaries of banks from other countries.
The above theory suggests, that a significant part of these local inward
FDI financiers might actually be subsidiaries of entrant firms’ home coun-
try banks. If these subsidiaries primarily refinance themselves from home
country deposits and/or other domestic sources of finance, real sector FDI
financed by these subsidiaries, even when the former does not constitute a
direct capital flow, leads to an indirect capital flow via the bank structure.
So, even though in a strict sense, indeed some FDI projects would not con-
stitute a direct capital flow, they still might lead to capital flows via local
bank subsidiaries of home country banks financing these projects.
The proposed model yields a variety of testable hypotheses. However,
numerous obstacles for empirical testing of the model exist. For one, bilat-
eral in-depth bank-firm data for each loan project involving a multinational
firm subsidiary is needed to observe the pattern of bank provision mode
for different firm-/project characteristics. Even country characteristics can
not be discussed without information about firm characteristics, due to the
interaction of both types of characteristics.
Also, concerning the discussion of country characteristics on the level of
bank foreign direct investment, one would need explicit information about
whether an observed bank foreign direct investment project is motivated by
follow your customer-considerations, or whether the project is conducted for
local market-seeking reasons. In the latter case, one would expect a positive
influence of the level of host country development on the total volume of
bank FDI inflows, whereas in the above follow your customer-story the effect
works in the opposite direction.
As I at this time do not have access to such a data set, empirical testing
of the proposed theory has to be left to future research.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Equilibrium effort and monitoring levels in case of
small loan and financing by a local bank
The parent firm maximizes its expected payoff EI over the choice of the
monitoring level β given the financing is conducted by a local foreign bank.
MaxβEI = pf [βfX1 + Lf + α(X2 − Lf )] + (1− pf )Lf − 12β
2
f
Simultaneously the subsidiary manager maximizes his expected payoff
EM over the choice of effort level p given the financing is conducted by a
local foreign bank.
Maxpf EM = pf [(1− βf )X1 + (1− α)(X2 − Lf )]− 12zp
2
f
The reaction functions for the parent firm and manager respectively are
βf = pfX1 and pf =
(1−βf )X1+(1−α)(X2−Lf )
z
Inserting reaction functions into each other then yields
pf =
X1+(1−α)(X2−Lf )
z+X21
and
βf =
X1[X1+(1−α)(X2−Lf )]
z+X21
Appendix 2: Maximum feasible required repayment D and bank’s
liquidation value
I start with the equilibrium maximum feasible required repayment D,
which is
D = pd[βdX1+α(X2−Ld)]−pf [βfX1+α(X2−Lf )]+(Ld−Lf )− 12(β
2
d−β2f )+K
The derivative ∂D
∂Ld
is then
∂D
∂Ld
= 1− αpd + ∂pd∂Ld [βdX1 + α(X2 − Ld)] +
∂βd
∂Ld
[pdX1 − βd]
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As we know from the payoff-maximization problem of the parent firm
βd = pdX1 the final term is zero, yielding
∂D
∂Ld
= 1− αpd + ∂pd∂Ld [βdX1 + α(X2 − Ld)]
Appendix 3: Equilibrium effort and monitoring levels in case of
severely cash-strapped firm and financing by a local bank
The parent firm again maximizes its expected payoff EI over the choice
of the monitoring level β given the financing is conducted by a local foreign
bank.
MaxβEI(f) = pf [βfX1 + α(X2 −Df )]− 12β
2
f
Simultaneously the subsidiary manager maximizes his expected payoff
EM(f) over the choice of effort level p given the financing is conducted by a
local foreign bank.
MaxpEM = pf [(1− βf )X1 + (1− α)(X2 −Df )]− 12zp
2
f
The reaction functions for the parent firm and manager respectively are
βf = pfX1 and pf =
(1−βf )X1+(1−α)(X2−D)
z+X21
Inserting reaction functions into each other then yields
pf =
X1+(1−α)(X2−Df )
z+X21
and
β∗ =
X1[X1+(1−α)(X2−Df )]
z+X21
Appendix 4: The foreign government’s choice of t
The governments maximization problem is
maxtY = (tHFDI + H0)
σK1−σ − C(t)
The First Order Condition then is
K1−σσ(tHFDI + H0)
σ−1HFDI − γ = 0
Solving for t then yields
t∗ =
( γ
σK1−σHFDI
)
1
σ−1−H0
HFDI
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Chapter 5
The Effect of Bank Sector
Consolidation through M&A
on Credit Supply to Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises
5.1 Introduction
In recent years the evolution of market structure in banking can be de-
scribed by two characteristics: An overall consolidation of the banking sector,
strongly driven by Mergers and Acquisitions, and an internationalization of
banking institutes driven by Foreign Direct Investment1. This evolution was
made possible by improvements in information technology, financial deregula-
tion, globalization of real and financial markets and, for Europe, the abolition
of exchange rate risks.
International consolidation in the 1990s was partly driven by multina-
tional banks establishing subsidiaries in foreign markets through the acqui-
sition of local incumbent banks. The volume of cross-border M&A involving
target banks in emerging economies for example rose from about 6 billion
USD in the period 1990-1996 to about 50 billion USD in the period 1997-
2000[63].
1As is discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis.
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Still, most of M&A activity in the banking sector was on a national
level, possibly as a reaction to the threat of multinational bank entry, as the
following graph (taken from Berger et al.(2000)[12] illustrates.
Figure 5.1: Volume of M&A Activity in the Banking Sector
Source: Securities data company
In these surroundings two widely-voiced concerns about the changing
structure of the banking sector have come up in public discussion in recent
years.
For one, there is growing concern in OECD countries, that the consol-
idation of the banking sector might lead to reduced credit availability to
small firms. The BIS Group of Ten report on Consolidation [23] identifies
two possible underlying hazardous processes. First, close to the theoretical
story by Stein (2002)[123], larger and more complex credit institutions arising
through consolidation might have a lower propensity to lend to small firms.
Second, as it is widely accepted that ”‘relationship lending”’ is an important
characteristic of credit contracts between banks and small firms (e.g. Berger
and Udell (2002)[19], a problem on the market level may arise. Relationship
banking is often described to be on the basis of soft, non-verifiable informa-
tion such as management character and this type of information by design is
hardly transferable between banks in contrast to hard, verifiable information
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like balance sheets or other audited statements. Therefore, small firms loos-
ing their old loan relationship with a bank due to consolidation might face
difficulties finding new credit partners.
Indeed, Sapienza (2002)[117] finds indication that smaller borrowers are
at the loosing end of bank consolidation, as long-standing credit relations
are disrupted and client information transmission to other banks is hard to
process.
If this negative effect is for real, it constitutes a serious challenge to devel-
oped economies. First of all, SMEs should be more harmed by a contraction
of credit available to them than large firms, as the former tend to be predom-
inantly financed by bank credit (see BIS G10 report)[23]. From the point of
view of the whole economy, small and medium-sized companies accounted
for 66% of total employment in Europe on average and above 50% in the
U.S. and Canada in 1996 (Source: Eurostat). Also SMEs are supposed to
be more flexible than large firms making them key drivers of innovation and
sectoral change. So if possible concerns about small business financing are
right, the problem is of severe economic magnitude.
At the same time there has been growing concern in Less Developed
Countries (LDCs), that foreign bank entry is non-beneficial or even harmful
to small firms in host countries. Stiglitz2 stated that
‘Foreign bank entry in Argentina............failed in terms of providing ade-
quate financing for small and medium-sized enterprises”’.
One important thing to note here is, that ”‘cross-border market penetra-
tions are often performed via M&As, rather than via opening new branch
offices”’(Berger et al.(2000)[12].
Therefore one could argue that both concerns are tightly linked. As a
matter of fact, market entry through M&A is not fundamentally (qualita-
tively) different from in-market or in-country M&A in the banking sector, at
least not in the sense proposed in the following. However, as will be briefly
discussed in an informal extension of the following model, due to home coun-
try effects the impact of national versus multinational consolidation on SME
credit availability may differ in its strength.
I follow the literature by Diamond (1984)[53] in that small firms in respect
to banking really differ from large firms in that they are ”‘informationally
opaque”’. Like Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)[124] point out, ”‘the informational
wedge between insiders and outsiders tends to be more acute for small compa-
nies, which makes the provision of external finance particularly challenging”’.
In this chapter a theory is developed, incorporating both the notion of
2in: El Pais, 10.1.2002
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the influence of organisational characteristics of banks on their lending be-
haviour, using a twisted version of a general model on firm organization and
information processing proposed by Stein (2002)[123], as well as the idea of
relationship banking between banks and small firms, to give an explanation
for the potentially adverse effects of bank sector consolidation through M&A
on credit availability for SMEs. To that end, a fraction of the setup proposed
by Stein (2002)[123], who models the influence of internal capital markets on
management decision making, is used. I twist the model by changing its
objectives, introducing managerial choice in a bank on which type of loan
to specialise on, which allows for a direct discussion of the impact of or-
ganizational change on lending strategies, which also enables me to extend
the model to incorporate the idea of relationship banking. In contrast to
Stein (2002)[123], the model is therefore able to yield results concerning the
impact of organizational change within one bank on small firm credit avail-
ability on the market level. Through the notion of relationship banking one
can indirectly incorporate third bank behaviour into the model. Additionally,
the chapter discusses rather informal extensions usable to analyze optimal
(small) firm policy towards the banking sector, as well as the possible differ-
ence between national and international M&A from the perspective of small
firms.
Agreeing with Stein (2002)[123], that the simple notion of a technological
disadvantage of large banks in dealing with small firms in an overall sense is
rather too vague, this disadvantage is traced back to the organizational setup
of banks. Also I follow his idea ”‘that the key distinguishing characteristic
of small-business lending is that it relies heavily on information that is soft
..... that cannot be verified by anyone other than the agent who produces
it.”’[123]. In contrast, banks extend credit to large firms based on hard-
information such as detailed income statements, balance sheets, etc.., which
in the following model can be learned about by other agents (CEO) inside the
bank but not by the bank’s outside investors. So, to sum up, it is assumed,
that transaction-based lending 3 is predominant in large firm credit supply,
while relationship-based lending dominates with small firm credit.
Large institutions typically show more layers of hierarchy than small ones.
Assuming that at least some of the decision power lies within higher levels
of the hierarchy, the importance of being able to pass on information to
the next level is more critical to the bottom (loan) manager than in small
institutions. This leads to the manager in a small bank being more likely to
3Each transaction stands on its own such that information from the relationship is
irrelevant. Transaction-based lending can be further differentiated in financial statement
lending, asset-based lending and credit scoring.
118
focus on projects generating soft information, small-firm credit, than one in
a large bank. In the following model the effectiveness of soft information as
a means to get to know loan projects’ outcomes additionally depends on the
length of the bank-borrower relationship capturing the notion of relationship
banking. Due to this aspect, it is also less likely that small firms attain credit
from third banks, after their old relationship is cut. I will show that in the
following model, even if the dropped small firms attain credit from a third,
non-consolidated, bank, this will most likely come at the expense of other
small firms.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview about
recent developments in the banking sector, as well as an overview of the
empirical and theoretical literature about possible motives of (cross-border)
consolidation through M&A. In section 3 the basic model about managers’
specialization decisions in small and large banks is laid out. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the market level effects of M&A on small firm financing for a variety of
cases. Section 5 briefly discusses the possible difference between inter- and
intranational bank sector consolidation. Section 6 deals with consequences
of M&A as described in the existing literature and other related facts about
banking that can get some new formal explanation from my model. Section
7 concludes.
5.2 Bank Sector Consolidation: An Overview
Before analyzing possible consequences of (cross-border) consolidation through
M&A, I first want to give an overview about possible motives and underlying
factors for this kind of consolidation.
Why has consolidation in this industry picked up steam recently? For
sure, changes in the institutional environment like the Riegle-Neal and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the U.S.4 and the Single Market Program as well
as the monetary union in the EU, enabled banks to consolidate in a variety
of new ways and at lesser costs.
Concerning bank’s incentives to take an active part in consolidation, prac-
titioners interviewed in a study by the bank for international settlements
(BIS) mention revenue enhancement and cost savings as the primary motives
4The Riegle-Neal Act lifted restrictions on interstate banking for U.S. banks, enabling
the industry to consolidate across U.S. states. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allowed banks
to operate in both the commercial and investment banking segment, therefore making
consolidation across these segments legally feasible.
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for such activity (BIS 2001)[23].Motives unmentioned, quite understandably,
are managerial motives for M&A.
5.2.1 Revenue enhancement as a motive for bank sec-
tor M&A
Revenue enhancement through M&A could come through the following forms
• Economies of Scale and (Geographic) Scope
• Increase in market power
Revenue economies of scale and (geographic) scope
One of the possible motives for/drivers of international bank expansion
overall, and for international M&A as a means of that, is the increased
demand for international financial services by multinational corporations.
Trade in goods increased from 21% of world GDP in 1987 to 40% by 1997
(see World Bank (2004)[7]. Besides that, the volume of FDI and therefore the
geographic separation of production also increased. Such internationally op-
erating firms may be in need of an established banking partner in each of the
places they produce or sell their goods. Several empirical studies underline
this ”‘follow your customer”’-strategy of banks. For example, Goldberg and
Gross (1994) found, that foreign direct investment in a U.S. state was strongly
positively linked with foreign banking assets in this state[68](see chapters 2
and 4 for further studies). Revenue economies of geographic scope therefore
arise in the sense, that firms might be willing to pay premia for a bank’s
services if the same bank can provide services to the firm in other regions of
operation, too.
Special to universal banks providing a large variety of financial services,
scope economies could be at hand through consumers’ willingness to pay a
premium for one-stop shopping, maybe also driven by the consumer’s un-
willingness to share his private information with more than one financial
institution5 , and through ”‘reputation economies”’. The latter may arise if
a universal bank is able to transfer its superior reputation in one banking
service to another by collective branding (Rajan, 1996)[114].
5A simple line of reasoning would be transaction costs of documenting information each
time, another reasoning could be along the line of sharing market information with banks
that also provide services to competitors of the respective firm.
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However there might also be diseconomies of scope in the (banking) in-
dustry, arising from less specialisation leading to less tailor-made products
and therefore lower prices chargeable, or due to customer worries that com-
bining services might lead to conflicts of interest within the bank (e.g. Berger
et al. (2000)[12].
Increase in market power
This motive is most probably a prevalent one for national or even regional
bank M&A, to a lesser degree for cross-border consolidation. In general, the
market level price effect of M&A depends on the induced increase in local
market concentration and the general demand structure.
In-market M&As in small (local) markets, with the demand side having
few outside options (e.g. small businesses who seem to strongly depend on
local banks for financing)6, could most probably enable a consolidating insti-
tution to charge higher prices from their customers through e.g. lower deposit
rates and higher small business loan rates (see e.g. Berger et al.(2000))[12].
Empirical studies back up this conjecture. Banks tend to have better and
more permanent margins in more concentrated markets7.
From a market perspective cross-border consolidation, or even the threat
of it, could however decrease the exercise of market power because of in-
creased market contestability in any given country. However, the empirical
results on this are mixed (e.g. Molyneux et al. (1994)[101], Bikker and
Groeneveld (1998)[22] and Cerasi et al.(1998)[32]).
5.2.2 Cost saving as a motive for bank sector M&A
Possible cost savings theoretically arise through
• Economies of Scale
• Economies of Scope
• Increase in Cost X-Efficiency
6Kwast, Starr-McCluer and Wolken (1997) find that households and small businesses
almost always choose a local financial institution[90].
7They charge higher rates on small business loans and pay lower deposit rates (Berger
and Hannan (1997)[13] and react slower to changes in open-market interest rates (Jackson
(1997)[83].
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Cost economies of scale
Practitioners often mention scale as an important means of reducing av-
erage costs in the banking industry [12]. However several empirical studies
for the U.S. found a rather U-shaped relationship between scale and aver-
age costs, suggesting that medium-sized banks ($100 million – $10 billion in
assets) are slightly more cost efficient than either large or small banks8.
But as Berger et al.(2000)[12], as well as several other studies (see The
Economist (2006)[127], mention, most of this empirical literature relies on
data from the 1980s. The former authors argue, that, due to both techno-
logical process (Automated Teller machines (ATMs, Internet Banking, Risk
Management IT) as well as new dimensions of financial engineering (inter-
national placement of bonds, larger scale economies may have arisen. In
retail business, the emergence of internet banking is a classic example for
conducting banking services in an environment of high fixed costs (such as
the development of the portal) and low variable costs due to less staffing
required per transaction. Other possible sources of cost scale economies are
call centers and payment processing.
However from a broader perspective these latter scale economies, due to
the fact that these processes hardly function as USPs9 of a bank, could prob-
ably be just as well be achieved by small banks outsourcing parts of these
processes or building networks10. If banks in general outsource the parts of
their value chain, that feature cost economies of scale, such effiency consid-
erations concerning the size of the respective bank vanish. One example for
such outsourcing in Germany is Postbank taking over transaction services
for both Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank.
Cost economies of scope
Theoretically there are two main contradicting arguments concerning cost
economies of scope in the banking sector. On the one hand re-usability of
customer information for many products may lead to scope efficiency (e.g.
Greenbaum et al. (1989)[72]), as duplication of effort in information research
is impeded. On the other hand a shift away from core competencies always
may lead to additional administrative costs as well as foregone cost reductions
along the learning curve (see Winton (1999)[132]).
8see e.g. Bauer, Berger and Humphrey (1993)[9] and Clark (1996)[36].
9Unique selling positions
10Therefore one could expect banks to rather downsize by vertical disintegration of
operations, outsourcing e.g. call centers to specialised provider.
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Cost X-Efficiency
Improvements in X-efficiency through M&A can be achieved, if the ac-
quiring bank has superior managerial skill or organizational practice which
spills over to the target bank.
Simulations by Savage (1991)[118] and Shaffer (1993)[120] lead to the
conclusion, that X-efficiency can significantly be raised if inefficient targets
are restructured by X-efficient acquirers.
However empirical research yields weaker results on whether actual M&As
increased costs X-efficiency11.
5.2.3 Efficient Risk diversification as a motive for bank
sector M&A
Scale and scope economics in risk management
One very plausible motive for (international) consolidation via M&A for
a bank is to improve the risk-expected return tradeoff.
Under the modern theory of financial intermediation (e.g. Diamond
(1984)[53], Diamond (1991) [54]) this argument holds against the traditional
view of capital markets, that investors optimize their portfolio in the risk-
return dimension themselves.
It is hard to differentiate however, whether observed risk-adverse behav-
iour of large U.S. banks (see e.g. Hughes and Mester (1998)[81] is for the
benefit of the shareholder or due to managerial objectives.
Literature does not find that scale plays a very important role for the
tradeoff (except when you think about banks getting so big that they ”‘can
not fail”’ because of state intervention (see Berger et al. (2000)[12]), but en-
hancing scope through geographic and service portfolio diversification might
very well reduce risk without a similar decrease in expected returns.
The possibility for international risk diversification in the banking indus-
try can be observed in Figure 5.2, which is taken from Berger et al.(2000)[12].
One striking example for such diversification possibilities is the correlation
between banks’ Return on Equity (ROE) in France and the U.S. in the span
between 1979 and 1996 which is -0,815.
11For the U.S. most studies find positive, but small effects (e.g. De Young (1997)[50]).
Vander Vennet (1996,1998)[128][129] for Europe found that cross-border consolidation
increased X-efficiency, but national M&A often failed to do so.
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Figure 5.2: Correlation Analysis of Bank ROE among Nations
5.2.4 Managerial motives for bank sector M&A
The existing principal-agency literature gives a broad range of reasons why
managers might want to pursue M&As, both nationally and internationally,
as acquirers.
So-called empire-building tendencies of managemers12 have received am-
ple interest in theoretical literature. For all kinds of M&As, the sphere of
control of the acquiring institution’s manager becomes larger which increases
manager’s utility mostly through reputational effects as well as to a lesser
extent through possible increased compensation (e.g. Chevalier and Avery
(1998)[33]).
Cross-border consolidation especially might be motivated from a manage-
rial point of view by two additional points.
First, with shareholders on average still mostly stemming from a firm’s
home country13, establishing additional business abroad instead of at home
12e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990)[84]
13This home bias in equity has first been first discussed by French and Poterba
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might enable a manager to enjoy more perquisites or slack off. The rea-
soning would be, that home country shareholders normally know less about
economic conditions abroad than at home adding more uncertainty about
payoffs which the manager may use to increase his perks or reduce his effort.
Shareholders would then hardly know whether reduced profit (efficiency) is
due to conditions in the new host country or due to changed behaviour of
management.
Also, cross-border consolidation might be comfortable for managers in
that it can reduce risk (see subsection above) increasing their job security 14,
even if this risk reduction is inefficient from the shareholder’s point of view,
in that yields too low a level of risk-adjusted expected return.
After discussing some motives for banks engaging in (cross-border) M&As,
the focus is now on the main topic of the chapter, namely how such activity
effects a specific firm segment in the market.
5.3 The Model
The setup differentiates between large and small banks by their organiza-
tional characteristics. A small bank is assumed to consist of a single loan
manager, whereas a large bank consists of two such loan managers plus a
CEO on top of the organization.
Both kind of banks are exclusively funded by risk-neutral outside investors
with an outside option of zero. Whereas in a small bank the financing relation
is directly between loan manager and outside investor, in a large bank the
capital runs through the hands of the CEO, who receives capital from the
outside investor and subsequently allocates it among his two loan managers.
After a round of lending activity the investor gets back his initial investment
plus all monetary return on investment.
In both banks loan managers have to decide whether to specialise on sup-
plying credit to large firms (L) or small firms (S) ex ante. Let us assume that
the only difference between these two types of firms is the type of information
the bank loan manager can extract from them. To be precise, loan managers
in both type of banks can only extract ”‘soft information”’ from small firms,
which is non-verifiable to investors and other agents inside the bank, whereas
dealing with large firms yields ”‘hard information”’ that is still non-verifiable
to outside investors, but verifiable to other agents inside the bank.
(1991)[64].
14see e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990)[102]
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No matter what kind of credit the loan manager specialises on, he is
assumed to always be able to choose between two potential loan projects.
Each loan can take on size K = {0, 1, 2}. The projects can either be in a
good state of the world (G) yielding return g(K) or in a bad state of the
world (B) yielding return b(K). Both states have ex ante probability 1/2.
The respective projects’ states are non-correlated. Total returns for loan
projects controlled by manager i are denoted ci.
To structurize the problem and later reduce notational clutter, the fol-
lowing assumptions about project returns are made15.
1. −2 < b(2) < −1 < 0 < g(1) < 1
2. g(2) = 2g(1)
3. b(2) < min[3b(1)− g(1); 2b(1)] = 3b(1)− g(1)
4. g(1) > −b(1)
Each loan manager can learn about the actual state of either both of his
possible projects or none of them before deciding how to allocate his capital
under control. The probability of the manager learning about the projects’
actual state of the world is
µ =
{
σ1/t for small firms
θ for large firms
}
with 0 < σ, θ < 1 (5.1)
σ is a general efficiency parameter for a loan manager generating informa-
tion about a small firm project. It is assumed, that this signal becomes more
informative, though with decreasing marginalities, over the length of rela-
tionship t ∈ [1;∞[ between the bank and the respective small firm client16.
This seems to be a very intuitive setup as soft facts like management charac-
ter usually take some time to explore. To further simplify the problem it is
assumed that there are always two possible small firm loan projects at hand
15Assumption 1 gives us a well-constrained problem to work on. Assumption 2 is made
just to reduce notational clutter. Assumption 3 leads to simplified equilibria later on and
will be discussed in advance. However, this assumption doesn’t change the qualitative
results. Intuitively it states that funding a bad project with 2 units of capital yields very
bad results, therefore such funding is tried to be ruled out by decision makers in the model.
Assumption 4 is necessary for investors funding the bank with, as it guarantees positive
expected profits for investors.
16I assume without a prior relationship between bank and firm that t = 1.
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that have same relationship length with the respective bank. In the basic
model analysis each small firm has only on existing banking relationship.
The chapter discusses the multiple relationship case in an extension.θ is the
respective efficiency parameter for a manager generating information about
a large firm loan. As hard information is mostly passed on through stan-
dardized financial statements the signal has a constant value of information
independent of the specific relationship.
To make this problem interesting, θ is assumed to increase over time (or
for that matter, σ to have fallen), else there will hardly have any interesting
equilibria on changing loan strategies in banks17.
Finally, as in contrast to Stein (2002) this model is less one of mechanism
design, but rather of a combined Nash-Bayesian game, one needs to charac-
terize prior believes of agents in the model. It is assumed, that all players
in the game ex ante always believe that other players will not be successful
in their research ex ante. However, except the extreme case, that players
believe with probability 1 that others will be successful in their research, the
qualitative results are unchanged.
All agents, loan managers and a possible CEO, have utility functions
Ui = Ki + ci (5.2)
where Ki is the amount of capital and ci the net cash flow of projects under
control of agent i. Agents therefore act like ”‘efficient empire-builders”’, so
agents’ are interested in both getting as much capital as possible under their
control as well as use the allocated capital efficiently. These preferences,
together with the non-verifiability of project information to outside investors,
leads to financing constraints for banks in equilibrium, as discussed in Lemma
1.
Lemma 1
Investors will finance small banks with two units of capital in equilibrium
if g(1) + b(1) > 0 and b(2) < 2b(1), where the latter is fulfilled by assump-
tion.(see Appendix for proof)
Lemma 2
If Lemma 1 holds investors will finance large banks with four units of
capital
17The rise of θ can very intuitively be explained by e.g. progress in auditing technology
over time. For transition economies a fall in σ could easily be explained by a loss of social
capital in the transition process.
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I will only discuss this intuitively, as this Lemma obviously follows from
Lemma 1 in combination with assumed prior beliefs of players in the model.
In such a setup expected payoffs for outside investors’ funding a large bank
with K units are exactly like funding two small banks with K/2 units, there-
fore Lemma 2 holds.
Having laid out the general problem, one can now discuss the specialisa-
tion decision in both types of banks.
5.3.1 Inside the small bank
I start out with the much easier case of a small bank. The single loan manager
of this bank will choose his specialisation based on his expected utility level.
As shown above he will always have two units of capital to allocate on his
projects. His expected payoff, depending on allocative action and state of
information, can be summarized by the following payoff matrix (with chosen
allocation on the left and information on project 1 and 2 respectively received
by the manager at the top).
A — I {GG} {GB} {BG} {BB} {None}
(2;0) 2g(1) 2g(1) b(2) b(2) g(1) + b(2)
2
(1;1) 2g(1) g(1) + b(1) g(1) + b(1) 2b(1) g(1) + b(1)
(0;2) 2g(1) b(2) 2g(1) b(2) g(1) + b(2)
2
With the assumptions on project return structures made, one can straight-
forwardly see that the manager will choose
• Allocation (1;1) if he does not receive any information or if information
is {BB}
• Allocation (2;0) if he receives information {GB}
• Allocation (0;2) if he receives information {BG}
• Any feasible allocation if he receives information {GG}
His expected utility specialising on small firm loans will then be
EU(S) = σ1/t ×
[
3g(1)
2
+
b(1)
2
]
+ (1− σ1/t)× [g(1) + b(1)] + 2 (5.3)
His expected utility specialising on large firm loans will then be
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EU(L) = θ ×
[
3g(1)
2
+
b(1)
2
]
+ (1− θ)× [g(1) + b(1)] + 2 (5.4)
By comparing the utility levels one can come up with a causal relation
between the specialisation decision and the length of established relationships
at the point of decision between the loan manager and his existing small firm
client base.
Proposition 1
A small bank loan manager will specialise on small firm loans if he has
long-standing relationships with his existing small firm base. Else he will
specialise on large firm loans. The less efficient general research about small
firms is relative to research efficiency about large firms, the longer the critical
length of relationship between small firm and bank to ensure further financing
of the small firm. The critical length of relationship is t = ln σ/ ln θ. (Proof:
See Appendix)
The following graph illustrates the specialisation decision.
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Figure 5.3: Relationship Length and Specialisation Decision18
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In this case small banks that have existing relationships with small firms
with length t > 5 will specialise on small firm credit and small banks with
t < 5 will specialise on large firm credit.
5.3.2 Inside the large bank
The case of the large bank is far more interesting, as it includes strategic
interaction.
There are four different stages to be analyzed to find the equilibrium
specialisation decision.
1. Unit manager specialisation decision
2. Unit manager decision on whether to report information to CEO or not
3. CEO decision on capital allocation to loan managers
4. Manager decision on capital allocation to loan projects
18For σ = 0, 1 and θ = 0, 6
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The model can be solved by backward induction.
Stage 4
From the small bank case we already know the equilibrium allocation strategy
when a loan manager controls two units of capital (Case 1).
However in the case of a large bank managers might have anywhere from
1–4 units of capital to work with.
Case 2) Manager has one unit of capital
The manager’s problem can be summarized by the following payoff matrix
A — I {GG} {GB} {BG} {BB} {None}
(1;0) g(1) g(1) b(1) b(1) g(1)
2
+ b(1)
2
(0;1) g(1) b(1) g(1) b(1) g(1)
2
+ b(1)
2
So maximizing his expected payoff the manager will choose allocation
(1;0) in case he receives information {GB} and allocation (0;1) in case he
receives information {BG}. For any other information he will be indifferent
between feasible allocations.
Case 3) Manager has three units of capital19
A — I {GG} {GB} {BG} {BB} {None}
(2;1) 3g(1) 2g(1) + b(1) b(2) + g(1) b(2) + b(1) 3g(1)
2
+ b(2)
2
+ b(1)
2
(1;2) 3g(1) b(2) + g(1) 2g(1) + b(1) b(2) + b(1) 3g(1)
2
+ b(2)
2
+ b(1)
2
Maximizing his expected payoff the manager will choose allocation (2;1)
in case he receives information {GB} and allocation (1;2) if he receives infor-
mation {BG}. For any other information he is indifferent between feasible
allocations.
Case 4) Manager has four units of capital
Here the only feasible allocation is (2;2),as loan volume per project is
restricted to K = 2.
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Stage 3
Given that the CEO knows the optimal allocation decision of managers at
the loan level he will assign capital to the loan managers such as to maxi-
mize his expected utility. His allocation will therefore be determined by the
information he receives from his loan managers. Remember that the large
bank will be funded with four units of capital in equilibrium. Due to the
non-verifiability of soft information, the manager’s preference structure and
the research success of loan managers being insecure, the CEO will not be
able to distinguish between good and bad soft information and ”‘silence”’ on
the side of the manager due to finding bad hard information20.
With the CEO prior probability belief about managers’ research success
being zero21, his contingent payoff matrix can be subsumed as in the table
in Appendix A22.
We can then identify the optimal contingent capital allocation strategy
for the CEO, as shown in the following table.
20Non-documentable information as non-verifiable to the CEO will not be taken into
consideration by the CEO, as he understands the manager to always claim to have found
his projects to be in the good state of the world.
21Therefore, if the manager does not report any documented information, the CEO will
assume that the manager failed in learning about the projects.
22We do not need to differ between cases (GB) and (BG) so the later is subsumed in
the former.
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Information received CEO utility maximizing allocations
{GG}{GG} (4;0);(3;1);(2;2);(1;3);(0;4)
{GG}{none} (4;0)
{GG}{GB} (4;0);(3;1);(2;2)
{GG}{BB} (4;0)
{GB}{GG} (2;2);(1;3);(0;4)
{GB}{none} (2;2)
{GB}{GB} (2;2)
{GB}{BB} (3;1);(2;2)
{BB}{GG} (0;4)
{BB}{none} (2;2)
{BB}{GB} (2;2);(1;3)
{BB}{BB} (2;2)
{none}{GG} (0;4)
{none}{none} (2;2)
{none}{GB} (2;2)
{none}{BB} (2;2)
These optimal allocations follow directly from the analysis of expected
payoffs of the CEO given the information received.23
Stage 2
One can now analyze the optimal information strategy of a manager towards
the CEO. At this stage it must be differentiated between managers who have
chosen to specialise (at stage 1) on small firms, possibly generating soft in-
formation, and those who have focused on large firms, possibly generating
hard information. It is of no matter whether soft information gets passed on
to the CEO because the latter won’t value this information at all. Also the
manager can not pass on any kind of information if he hasn’t gathered any.
So we can restrict analysis to managers who have gathered hard information
from large firms. These managers can choose whether to report their docu-
mented information to the CEO or keep quiet/just state that their projects
are in a good state. The capital allocation to this manager i, conditional on
23Here is where assumption 3 plays a quantitative role. If not for this assumption, there
would be unclear optimal allocations for information tuples {none}{BB} and {BB}{none},
as the optimal allocation in these cases depends on the relative size ofb(1), b(2) and g(1).
However, the qualitative results are not changed by the assumption.
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reporting or not, can be analyzed with the help of the following table24.
The following table gives the expected capital allocation for each manager
contingent on the information he and the other manager j passes on to the
CEO.
i — j {GG} {GB} {BG} {BB} {None}
{GG} (2;2) (3;1) (3;1) (4;0) (4;0)
{GB} (1;3) (2;2) (2;2) (2,5:1,5) (2;2)
{BG} (1;3) (2;2) (2;2) (2,5:1,5) (2;2)
{BB} (0;4) (1,5;2,5) (1,5;2,5) (2:2) (2;2)
{none} (0;4) (2;2) (2;2) (2:2) (2;2)
The resulting optimal information strategy towards the CEO has the
following main characteristics. First, passing on information to the CEO
when information about both projects is bad is weakly dominated by not
reporting this documented information (”‘none”’). Therefore the manager
will always not report the documented information in that case. Second, for
all other successfully gathered information reporting the actual information
to the CEO always weakly dominates not reporting.
One obvious advantage of specialising on large firm loans potentially yield-
ing hard information is evident here. Positive hard information passed on to
the CEO can increase the capital available to the respective loan manager to
2+ units. At the same time negative hard information can be hidden from
the CEO (not passed on to him), therefore no counteracting negative effect
of generating hard information exists.
Stage 1
With the help of results from stages 2-4 a manager’s decision on whether to
specialise on small or large firms can now be derived. Note that in this final
step one not only has to worry about how the specialisation decision affects
capital allocation among managers but also about the way the specialisation
decision changes the projects’ expected net cash flows due to differences in
research efficiency and capital allocation.
I analyze a normal game between the two loan managers in a large bank
to find conditional Nash Equilibria for specialising on small firms. In order
to do so, first each manager’s expected utility contingent on his own and the
24For multiple allocation equilibria (see stage 3).I assume that the manager assigns same
probability to all of those optimal allocations and furthermore use the expected allocation
for the analysis.
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other managers specialisation decision is analyzed25.
Given that manager j chooses to specialise on large firms, manager i’s
expected utility specialising on small firms is:
EUi,j=L(S) = E(Ki|i = S, j = L) + E(ci|i = S, j = L) (5.5)
Using the results from stages 2 and 3 (and weighing them with respective
probabilities) yields
E(Ki|i = S, j = L) = 2−
θ
2
(5.6)
Note that the expected amount of capital received in this case depends
negatively on research efficiency for hard information. This is very intuitive:
The more likely the other manager, specialising on large firms, attains hard
information about his project the more likely he will get more funding from
the CEO at the cost of the manager specialising on small firms.
Adding the results from stage 4 yields
EUi,j=L(S) = 2−
θ
2
+ (1− θ
4
)
[
(g(1) + b(1) + σ1/t(0, 5g(1)− 0, 5b(1))
]
(5.7)
Given that manager j chooses to specialise on large firms ,manager i’s
expected utility specialising on large firms is:
EUi,j=L(L) = E(Ki|i = L, j = L) + E(ci|i = L, j = L) (5.8)
Again, using results from stages 2-4 yields
EUi,j=L(L) = 2 + (θ
2 − 6θ) [1/8(b(1)− g(1))] + g(1) + b(1) (5.9)
Once more this shows two intuitive characteristics. For one, capital allo-
cation to each manager is independent of research efficiency, as both man-
agers specialise on hard information with same efficiency. Expected utility as
a whole is increasing in θ as allocation among loan projects becomes better,
therefore the expected cash flows of the pool of both projects under control
are higher26.
25Note that by the structure of the game the specialisation decision is made before the
manager learns about the then-available loan projects’ state of the world.
26When e.g. one project is in the good state and the other in the bad state, ci will be
g(1) + b(1) when the manager does not get information about the project states and has
2 units of capital to work with and 2g(1) when the manager learns about the states and
can therefore allocate all capital to the ”‘good”’ loan project.
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The other two conditional expected utilities are constructed in the same
way and are
EUi,j=S(S) = 2 + g(1) + b(1) + σ
1/t(0, 5g(1)− 0, 5b(1)) (5.10)
and
EUi,j=S(L) = 2 +
θ
2
+ g(1) + b(1) + θ[g(1)− 0, 5b(1)] (5.11)
We can put these results in the following simplified standard game form
Defining
X ≡ EUi,j=S(S)
Z ≡ EUi,j=L(S)
V ≡ EUi,j=S(L)
Y ≡ EUi,j=L(L)
yields the following normal game form of the problem.
Manager i – Manager j Small Firms Large Firms
Small Firms X;X Z;V
Large Firms V;Z Y;Y
One can now analyze the critical length of relationship t which leads to
both managers specialising on small firms.
Obviously, specialisation on small firms (S; S) is a Nash Equilibrium if
X > V and it is unique if Z > Y . As managers in large banks are homogenous
in this model it is actually pretty intuitive that the only reasonable equilibria
are (S; S) and (L; L).
Inequality 1 (X > V ) is fulfilled for
2 + g(1) + b(1) + σ1/t(1
2
g(1)− 1
2
b(1))
>
2 + θ
2
+ g(1) + b(1) + θ(g(1)− 1
2
b(1))
Rearranging yields
σ1/t > θ
1 + 2g(1)− b(1)
g(1)− b(1)
(5.12)
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Solving for t yields two case-dependent results:
t >
ln σ
ln
[
θ(1 + 1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1))
] (5.13)
for θ < g(1)−b(1)
1+2g(1)−b(1)
and
t <
ln σ
ln
[
θ(1 + 1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1))
] (5.14)
for θ > g(1)−b(1)
1+2g(1)−b(1)
Case 1 (θ not too large) yields a feasible threshold level for relationship
length
t1 =
ln σ
ln
[
θ(1 + 1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1))
] (5.15)
above which (S; S) is a Nash-Equilibrium. Case 2 would yield a negative
threshold level meaning that for large values of θ (S; S) is never a Nash-
Equilibrium. In this case θ 1+2g(1)−b(1)
g(1)−b(1) is larger than one, so no relationship
length, leading to an increased allocation efficiency of the manager for a given
volume of capital to work with, is sufficient to offset the possible capital
allocation advantage (getting more capital from the CEO to work with) of
choosing to specialise on hard information projects.
Inequality 2 (Z > V ) is fulfilled for
2− θ
2
+ (1− θ
4
)
[
(g(1) + b(1) + σ1/t
(
1
2
g(1)− 1
2
b(1)
)]
>
2 + (θ2 − 6θ)
[
1
8
(b(1)− g(1))
]
+ g(1) + b(1)
Rearranging yields
σ1/t > θ[1 +
1 + g(1)
1− θ
4
(g(1)− b(1))
] (5.16)
Again solving for t, we got to distinguish between two cases, RHS < 1
yielding feasible relationship lengths and RHS > 1, where in the latter case
no t can be sufficiently large.
I find, that for θ > φ−
√
(−φ)2 − 4 with φ = 4+9g(1)−5b(1)
2(g(1)−b(1)) no t exists such
that inequality 2 holds.
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For θ > φ−
√
(−φ)2 − 4 we get
t >
lnσ
ln[θ[1 + 1+g(1)
1− θ
4
(g(1)−b(1)) ]
(5.17)
So inequality 2 is fulfilled for t > t2 (and low levels of θ) with
t2 =
lnσ
ln[θ[1 + 1+g(1)
1− θ
4
(g(1)−b(1)) ]
(5.18)
Summing up the two results, for low enough levels of efficiency in gener-
ating hard information and for sufficiently high relationship lengths to small
firms at hand, loan managers in large banks will specialise on loan provision
to small and medium-sized enterprises27.
The following proposition summarizes the above findings on stage 1.
Proposition 2
Loan managers in large banks will always specialise on large firms, if
research efficiency when dealing with hard information is sufficiently large
(θ > 1
1+
1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1)
), independent of available relationships to small firms.
They will also definitely specialise on large firms, even if θ is small,
if they do not have very long standing relationships with small firms (t <
ln σ
ln[θ(1+ 1+g(1)g(1)−b(1) )]
).
Specialising on small firms in a large bank is an equilibrium strategy iff
θ < 1
1+
1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1)
and t > t1 =
ln σ
ln[θ(1+ 1+g(1)g(1)−b(1) )]
. It is an unique equilibrium iff
θ < φ−
√
(−φ)2 − 4 and t > t2 = lnσ
ln[θ[1+
1+g(1)
1− θ4 )(g(1)−b(1))
]
.
5.3.3 Small business financing in small and large banks
To sum up, small banks will lend to small firms if they have existing rela-
tionships with small firms with length at least
t =
ln σ
ln θ
(5.19)
27This is a results that differs from the line of arguing of Stein (2002)[123], where from
his theory one can derive, that large banks would always choose to finance large firms.
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In comparison, even in the best possible case for small firms (low θ and
managers coordinate on equilibrium (S; S)), large banks will only lend to
small firms with which they have at least relationship length
t1 =
ln σ
ln
[
θ(1 + 1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1))
] (5.20)
It can easily be shown that t1 > t (see proof in Appendix 3). This means,
that small firms having a relationship with their respective bank of length t,
with t < t < t1, will get a positive expected loan volume
28 in the period of
interest, if their bank stays small, but zero loan volume for sure if their bank
becomes part of a larger bank structure.
Proposition 3
Small banks are more likely to extend credit to small firms than large
banks. Large banks are more likely to extend credit to large firms than small
banks. Small business clients, in the period of interest, with relationship
lengths t < t < t1 with their respective banks will attain an expected loan
volume of 1 if their bank is small, but no loan if their bank is large.(Directly
follows from proof in Appendix 3)
In the following, let us focus on firms with such relationship lengths t
with the consolidated institution as the basis of further analysis, as these are
the interesting cases to be studied.
5.4 The Role of Consolidation
Now when one thinks of consolidation as a merger or acquisition between two
small banks, leading to the evolution of a large bank with the respective loan
managers still in place but now headed by an additional CEO, one can easily
discuss the consequences of consolidation on small firm credit on a bank and
market level. In the proposed basic model setup the organisational change
has no impact on bank technological parameters θ and σ and all banks share
the same technology.
28If a client of a small bank, the small firm with respective t as above will get an expected
loan volume of (1− σ1/t)× 1 + σ1/t[0, 25× 4 + 0, 25× 0 + 0, 5× 1] = 1, which can directly
be seen from the expected capital allocation of the manager as laid out in the section on
small banks.
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There is one, though hardly interesting, first result, namely consolidation
will never have any adverse effect on small firms if θ = 0. Let us rule out
that possibility for now.
5.4.1 Changing credit supply within the merged bank
Proposition 4
Small firms with relationship length t with t < t < t1 with their respective
small bank will not be supplied with loans in the analyzed period, if their bank
merges or is acquired, while they would have been financed with an expected
loan volume of 1 by this bank if it had stayed independent.
This result directly follows from Proposition 3, as consolidation via M&A
simply changes the structure of the respective banks from small to large. As
was shown in the case of a small bank, small firms with relationship length
t < t would not have received credit from their respective small bank even
if it stayed independent. Even in the best possible case small firms with
relationship length t, with t < t < t1, will not receive credit from the new
banking structure their old bank is consolidated into, but would have done
so, if the small bank had stayed independent.
The following figure subsumes, which bank-firm relationships are affected
by the respective bank being involved in M&A activity.
Figure 5.4: Bank-Firm Relationships Affected by M&A
t
No Loan, 
unaffected
by M&A
No Loan,
negatively effected
by M&A Positive expected
loan volume, 
unaffected by M&A
t t1
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5.4.2 SME credit supply at the market level
Whether small firms are in the end adversely affected by consolidation de-
pends on whether other small banks make up for the lost loan supply from
the consolidated bank.
For starters let us focus on the case where small firms only have an existing
relationship with just one bank.
If small firms have only one standing relationship with a small bank, then
the firms definitely adversely affected by consolidation will be those who had
relationship length t with t < t < t1 with one of the consolidated small banks.
Again this is straightforward. The small firms identified are those who had
a relationship with one of the consolidated banks but will not get financed
by it again in the period of interest.
With any other bank, small or large, they have relationships with length
t = 1.
As a direct consequence from the results of the basic model above, it must
be true, that these firms will never receive credit from another large bank.
Whether they stand any chance to receive credit from another non-consolidated
small bank depends on whether this small bank has existing relationships to
small firms and how research efficiency parameters look like.
Small firms in general attain credit from small banks in the period of
interest, if they have at least relationship length t = ln σ/ ln θ with this
bank. As t = 1 for the small firm it will only possibly get funded by this
third small bank if σ > θ, whereas it would have received credit if its old
relationship bank had stayed independent if σ1/t > θ, which is a less binding
constraint for t > 1 with the old bank.
If this third small bank had formerly specialised on small firms it will have
relationship length t > 1 with at least two small firms. In this case the small
firm set free by a consolidated institution will not receive credit from the
third bank, even if σ > θ, as the loan manager in this bank achieves higher
expected utility from sticking with supplying loans to its incumbent small
firm clients, due to better knowledge about them leading to more efficient
allocations of loans.
So one can conclude that small firms will not only be affected by the
merger through the direct effect, that it is less likely that the newly merged
bank, in which at least one former part was their credit partner, will extend
credit to them, but also by the fact that it is a lot less likely that they receive
credit from a third non-consolidated bank, which constitutes a real problem
at the market level29.
Proposition 5
29To be precise the only potential source of credit for the analyzed firm are new entrant
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Small firms with a single relationship with a consolidating bank will suffer
in overall credit availability in expectations through this consolidation. They
will be less likely to get credit from the consolidated institution, as well as be
less likely to receive credit from other banks in the market, due to their lack
of a relationship with other banks. The only potential source of finance are
small new entrant banks in a setting where σ > θ.
5.4.3 Small firms with multiple bank relationships –
The odd firm out
The impact of consolidation on small firms above was concerned with small
firms only having an existing relationship with one bank.
Let us now consider the case where these firms have n > 1 relationships
with at least one of the banks not being part of a M&A process, so the
respective firm had taken up a loan from 2 banks in its history at some
differing times.
In this case there exist different possible scenarios for the overall credit
availability to small firms. The easiest case in thinking about the problem is
an economy with three banks i,j,k where i and j are small banks that merger
while k stays independent and the loan market situation for small firm s is
analyzed30. It should be clear, that a small firm s with relations to banks i
and j will not fare any better than if the firm only had a relationship with
either i or j, as both banks merge together.
The respective length of relationships between the small firm and the
banks are ti,s,tj,s and tk,s.
Already knowing that, if bank k is a large bank it will likely not supply
credit to firm s, we focus on the more interesting case of bank k being small.
The benchmark for the following analysis is a single relationship small
firm who will not attain credit from the consolidated institution. So, for
additional insights compared to the case of a single firm-bank relationship,
the focus is on the case ti,s < t1.
Case 1: Bank k has been specialising on large firms so far and tk,s > t
banks. Because if the other type of incumbent small banks, that have specialized on large
firms to date, exists, these will not supply positive expected loan volume to the analyzed
small firm in the period of interest, given the assumption of rising θ over time. This is
shown in appendix 4.
30I do not discuss bank entry here.
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Due to the assumption of rising θ over time this case does not exist31.
Case 2: Bank k has been specialising on large firms so far and tk,s < t <
ti,s
If so, the small firm will definitely not receive any credit from any incum-
bent bank whereas it would with positive probability, if bank i had stayed
independent.
Case 3: Bank k has specialised on small firms serving firms l,m and
tk,s < tk,l = tk,m.
Even if tk,s > t the small firm will not receive credit from the third bank
k because the loan manager of the bank has longer standing relationships
at hand, therefore better knowledge about these firms and therefore higher
expected utility serving firms l,m instead of s.
Case 4:Bank k has specialised on small firms serving firms l,m and tk,s >
tk,l = tk,m > t
This is the case, where the firm suffering from M&A activity is not the
one set free by a consolidated institution, but other small firms are negatively
affected by such a development.
Here firm s will attain positive expected loan volume from bank k but
only at the expense of either firm l or m. Remember that small banks in
the model are restricted to only screen two possible loan projects. So even
though in this case firm s still possibly attains credit, at least one other small
firm will be adversely affected by the ripple effect of consolidation through
M&A.
The case analysis can be subsumed in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
Keeping up multiple relationships with banks decreases the probability of a
small firm being negatively affected by consolidation through M&A. However,
as a group, small firms overall suffer from consolidation. Small firms nega-
tively affected by consolidation need not be direct clients of the consolidated
institution.
31With rising θ if tk,s > t in the period of interest it must be true that tk,s > t in
the period before. Therefore bank k would have specialised on small firms in the earlier
period.
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5.5 National versus Multinational Consolida-
tion through M&A and heterogeneous coun-
tries
Up to this point I have established a model giving insights into potential
effects of overall M&A in the banking sector on small firm credit availability.
Let us now discuss an international perspective namely whether in the eye
of small firms consolidation involving a foreign bank is better or worse than
pure intranational active consolidation.
How could these two types differ in a non-trivial way32?
One potential difference might come in the form of a home country spe-
cific bank heterogeneity in research efficiency. As stated in the basic setup,
the research efficiency on hard information should intuitively be rather in-
dependent of length of relationship between bank and large firm, due to
the standardization of research on hard information. But one factor of how
good managers inside a bank do research on hard information should be the
amount of times they have done that which means the population of large
firms the manager has dealt with. This is simply the idea of ”‘learning by
doing”’(e.g. Krugman (1987)[89]. As the globalization of financial services is
a rather new phenomenon the size of the home country large firm population
should therefore have a positive effect on the respective banks’ research effi-
ciency concerning hard information33. One possible functional form, similar
to the one used for learning in an international environment by Krugman
(1987)[89], for research efficiency of bank i is
θi = min(α
P∑
T=1
[Xi,T + δXj,T ] ; 1) (5.21)
with 0 < α < 1;X ≥ 0;0 < δ < 1
32Of course intranational M&A, besides changing the organizational structure of banks,
also reduces the number of banks in the market whereas international M&A only changes
the structure of one local bank, leaving the number of banks operating in the market
constant. Let us abstract from this simple difference.
33One could of course also argue, that the difference between national and foreign banks
might also depend on the efficiency σ of generating soft information. As Berger and
Udell (2002)[19] put it ”‘Cross-border consolidation may create additional problems for
relationship lending because a foreign-owned bank may come from a very different market
environment, with a different language, culture,....”’.
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where Xi,T denotes the size of the large firm population in the bank’s
home country at time T, Xj,T is the former in all other countries, δ gives the
level of learning by international spillovers and P is the period of interest.
At the maximum the manager always learns about the actual state of
large firm credit projects, so learning is bounded at maximum 1.
If bank research efficiency on hard information depends on the size of
the population of large firms in their respective home country, banks from
”‘larger”’ countries will have higher research efficiency on hard information
than banks from ”‘small”’ countries, as long as θ 6= 1 in all the respective
countries, as ∂ thetai
∂Xi,T
> 0 in that case.
What follows from this for the analysis on bank sector consolidation?
If a country is small in the above sense, all else equal, national banks will
have a rather small degree of research efficiency on hard information θmedium.
A foreign bank from an even smaller country would show even smaller θlow
. In contrast a foreign bank stemming from a larger country would feature
a large θhigh . Now assume that any of these banks take over or merge with
another domestic bank, with hard information research efficiency equal to
the maximum of these efficiencies of both merging banks.
Remember, that in the best case from the point of view of small firms
this bank will only lend to small firms if
t > t1 =
ln σ
ln
[
θ(1 + 1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1))
] (5.22)
It can easily be shown for bank i that ∂t1
∂Xi
> 0 for θi < 1
34.
So even if a higher θ, induced in the consolidated institution by a merger
with a foreign bank from a large country, does not lead to the bank not
providing loans to any small client firm anymore, no matter the lengths
of relationships at hand, it does increase the minimum relationship lengths
required to keep up financing of small enterprise customers.
Summarized, the higher the research efficiency of the consolidated bank
the less likely the bank keeps serving its existing small firm client base.
Proposition 7
Result 1: Bank sector consolidation should have worse effects on small
firm credit supply, the larger the respective country’s large firm population is.
34 ∂t1
∂Xi
= ∂t1∂θ ×
∂θ
∂X1
.
It is easy to show that ∂t1∂θ =
ln σ
−θ(ln θ)2 > 0.
As ∂θ∂ X1 > 0 it follows that
∂t1
∂Xi
> 0.
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Result 2: Consolidation through M&A involving foreign banks is more
harmful to small firms than pure national consolidation, if the foreign ac-
quiring/merging bank stems from a country ”‘larger”’ than the host country,
whereas national consolidation is more harmful if the foreign banks come from
a ”‘smaller”’ country.
5.6 The Empirics of Small Business Lending
and Consequences of Bank M&A
What does existing literature have to say about the characteristics of bank
lending to SMEs and consequences of M&A activity in the banking sector?
5.6.1 Characteristics of Small Business Lending
As is assumed in the setup of the model, one very important feature of
small business lending is that it is quite substantially relationship-based.
Numerous studies employing a variety of methods to measure relationship
strength between bank and borrower (e.g. length of relationship, exclusivity
of credit relationship, service scope of relationship) find, that strength of
relationships has positive implications for the respective borrower, in that the
latter for example pay lower interest rates (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995)[17])
and are more likely to get funded by a respective bank (e.g. Scott and
Dunkelberg (1999)[119]).
5.6.2 Consequences of (Cross-border) Consolidation on
Small Business Lending: The Existing Literature
What does the existing literature have to say about the consequences of
(cross-border) M&A in the banking sector on small firms?
For in-market M&A, leading to increased market concentration, loan in-
terest rates and service fees might increase due to the increased market power
of banks in this market. Theoretically, small firms might be most affected by
this development, due to the fact that they are found to be rather immobile
concerning their source of funding (Kwast et al.(1997)[90].
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Indeed, studies (e.g. Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997)[2]) find that
in-market M&As, substantially increasing market concentration, empower
banks in this market to charge higher prices.
In terms of cross-border consolidation, this is typically not a kind of in-
market M&A from the perspective of small firms, even though it might be for
large wholesale customers in investment banking, so it seems that national
M&A in this respect is more likely to be harmful to small firms.
Besides the market power implications, M&As also change three charac-
teristics of the involved banks, which, after reviewing the literature, might
affect small business credit supply (see Berger et al.(2000)[12], where the
second and third characteristics are the one the proposed model deals with:
• Increase in consolidated bank scale (and scope)
• Increase in consolidated bank organizational complexity
• External effects on the lending behaviour of other banks in the market
In general an increase in bank size might lead banks to shift their strategic
focus from small business loans to wholesale services such as underwriting and
other investment banking activities. An explanation could be, that capital
market services can only be provided by large banks due to e.g. a critical
mass of depositors. If banks face an upward sloping supply curve of capital
this possible new market, now feasible to be served, would reduce the capital
of this bank allocated to small business financing.
For bank scope effects, as Berger et al.(2000)[12] mention Williamson-
type organizational diseconomies of scale, large banks might be ill-equipped
to conduct relationship-based lending.
Empirical studies concerning the U.S., like Berger and Udell (1996)[18]
and Berger et al.(1998)[16], indeed find a negative relationship between a
bank’s size and the proportion of its assets employed in providing small
business credit.35
Raising the topic of large banks’ relationship lending-capabilities, Cole,
Goldberg and White (1999)[38] and Berger et al.(2002)[15] find, that large
banks tendencially engage transaction-based lending to small firms, whereas
relationships play a much larger role in lending between small banks and
their respective small business clients.
However, whereas ex ante bank scale seems to be a negative indicator on
whether small firms receive credit from the respective bank at all, quite a
35The latter study observed, that small banks (below $100 million assets) use 9% of
assets on small business lending, very large banks (above $10 billion assets) only 2%.
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few studies show evidence, that large banks seem to be safe havens for the
small firms they after all serve in times of financial distress. Hancock and
Wilson (1998)[75] for the U.S. find that financial distress reduced small firm
credit in large banks way less than in small banks. DeHaas and van Lelyveld
(2002)[46] come up with the same results for Eastern Europe for large foreign
banks compared to relatively smaller national banks. For the latter it is quite
unclear whether this in an effect of bank scale or rather (geographic) scope.
Houston et al.(1997)[79] for the U.S. find that loan growth of banks in U.S.,
who are part of a Bank Holding Company (BHC) was less depending on
those banks own than on the holding’s financial health, cementing the idea
that these holdings serve as internal capital markets.
The effect of an increase in organizational complexity on small business
credit is theoretically analyzed in my model. Numerous studies investigate
this relation also looking on the difference between pure national and multi-
national banks.
For example out-of-state ownership of a bank in the U.S. predominantly
had a negative effect on small business credit in the respective banks (e.g.
Berger et al.(1998)[16]. Being part of a bank holding had an effect in the
same direction (e.g. Berger and Udell (1996)[18].
In order to understand the effect of consolidation on the market level, one
has to analyze how other banks react to M&As in their market in respect to
small business lending.
The empirical literature gives mixed results. Berger et al.(1998)[16] point
to indication, that other banks more than offset the negative effect on small
business lending in a consolidated institution by expanding their business in
this field. However, contrary to this point, Berger et al.(1999)[11] find a ne-
glectable external effect of M&A on other banks’ small business lending, with
only mature small banks being affected positively in their lending activity in
this segment.
Furthermore, Berger et al.(1999)[11] discover a positive effect of consoli-
dation on market entry in the banking industry. Combined with the generally
found empirical results, that de novo banks tend to have the highest share
of assets invested in small business loans36, this induced (additional) entry
might help offset bank-level negative effects of consolidation on the credit
availability for small and medium sized enterprises.
In a recent contribution, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007)[52] study
the effect of bank mergers and acquisitions on credit supply to Italian firms,
36This has been found by several studies e.g. Goldberg and White (1998)[91], Berger,
Bonime, Goldberg and White (1999)[11] and DeYoung, Goldberg and White (1999)[115].
148
with the firm dataset including mainly small and medium sized enterprises.
Supporting the above model’s propositions the authors find, that these firms
are at least in the short-run negatively affected by such change in the market.
To be precise, such reorganization within the banking sector leads to a drop
in credit of 9%. However, not captured by our model, they find that credit
levels for these firms revert to old volume after three years.
5.6.3 Bank sector consolidation and relationship man-
agement strategies of small businesses
One indirect result of the model is, that for the single small company the
threat of bank sector consolidation, and therefore the fear of loosing its credit
partner, should give an incentive to have lending relationships with multiple
banks. Even though such multi-sourcing is theoretically expensive (even
more so than for transparent firm) as soft information has to be transferred
a number of times 37, the empirical literature does support the idea that firms
use multiple banks as sources of finance (e.g. Detragiache et al.(2000)[49].
Berger et al.(2001)[14] argue more or less exactly to my point, that ”‘in-
formationally opaque firms are more likely to have multiple lenders......This
is because after being cut off by the primary bank, opaque firms are likely
to encounter more difficulty in finding additional lenders and/or have less
favourable loan terms until their new relationships mature.”’
This is very close to the theoretical story suggested above, as the major
problem of small businesses in finding new credit partners is here, that the
former do not have an existing relationship with the latter.
5.7 Findings and Shortcomings
In this paper I have developed a model taking up concerns about the effect
of consolidation in the banking sector through M&A on credit availability
for small firms, combining the notion that banks differ in their lending strat-
egy because of different organizational setup with the idea that relationship
lending plays a large role in small business lending. I come up with the result
that consolidation via M&A indeed reduces the availability of small business
37Costs could come in the form of simple transaction costs, duplicated effort and free-
rider problems. Also, firms might be reluctant to share confidential information to multiple
banks who also have relationships with their competitors (e.g. Chiesa et al.(1995)[21].
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lending in the economy. A reasoning on why firms might want to keep up
lending relationships with several banks can be derived in consequence.
Unfortunately a discussion on welfare effects of such changes can not
be made, as the loss in potential loan provision for SMEs is the gain in
potential loan provision for large informationally non-opaque firms in this
model. Welfare discussion would therefore need a further assumption on
which type of firm should be the favoured main recipient of bank finance. As
it is often argued, that small, new firms are the backbone of technological
development, whereas large firms tend to operate in saturated markets, it
might be true form an economy-perspective that loan provision to SMEs
should be the priority. This would then tentatively suggest that welfare is
reduced by such a shift in loan supply from small to large firms.
The model probably gives a good first formal market-level insight into
the topic, but might fail to fully explain the reality because of a few short-
comings38.
One might be, that consolidated banks might often organize in a decen-
tralized way, for example by having each unit perform like a financial center,
which would not lead to the evolution of an internal capital market. This
in turn would keep the manager’s specialisation decision in the old incen-
tive surroundings of a small bank. Also banks might organize in a way to
completely disentangle large and small firm credits personnel-wise.
So it looks like their might be scope for organizational strategy reducing
the hazardous effect of consolidation on small firm lending. It seems like
the main point of bank organization in the view of small firms would be
decentralized financing negating the effect of the existence of internal capital
markets on lending strategy.
Also, I implicitly employ the idea, that soft, relationship information is
rather bank-specific than manager-specific. If, realistically the information
is with the manager, the manager of a merged bank might simply leave the
consolidated bank taking his relationships with him and starting up a new
small bank. Whether they do so would then depend on their expected utility
in the new bank compared to the consolidated institution.
Sticking with the manager’s objectives, one though vague argument might
also be a misspecification of manager’s preferences. Managers might have
38Of course, the result that there simply will be no more provision of loans to some
SMEs in some circumstances has to be seen as rather qualitative. Realistically small firms
might not be completely excluded from loans, but rather would have to pay higher interest
rates than without consolidation. Still the result that consolidation in the way discussed
in my model is harmful to SMEs would hold.
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a really strong preference to keep up existing relationships due to person-
nel friendships with small firm clients’ management, social standing in the
community, etc. offsetting potential empire-building tendencies. Changing
preferences that way would lead to the conclusion that small business lend-
ing might actually be of larger volume than efficient, as even non-performing
loans in expectations could be handed out due to these kind of preferences.
Another point to notice is that I implicitly assume that both types of
banks, small and large, are ex ante capable of supplying both loans to large
firms and small firms. However due to risk-regulation and the possibly dif-
fering nature of bank relationships with small and large firms this might not
be the case39.
For all of the above reasoning, a large variety of possible avenues for fur-
ther theoretical research exists. Also, discussing entry motives of multina-
tional banks or motives for intranational M&A and how they are intertwined
with consequences of such actions should be very interesting, because motives
should shape strategies which should determine the effects of such actions.
Concerning empirics, the literature on the effects of in-market consolidation
or foreign bank entry via M&A on SME loan supply still needs further work,
as results seem ambiguous on quite a lot of questions about the topic. One
important point is an international comparison of effects of M&A on small
business lending. At the moment most of the research is based on U.S. data,
so there is not much leeway to understand whether and how the underlying
processes differ between countries.
One final important line of research to us would also be how the Basel II
rules change the picture on small firm lending. On the one hand, Basel II is
not in accordance with relationship lending threatening small firms relying
on this type of credit. On the other hand with the clear knowledge about
information requirements through the communication of Basel II small firms
will be pushed to increase their level of hard information, which should enable
them to be more competitive with large firms in the market for loans.
Within this thesis one final point that can be made is that, stemming
from the above analysis, one would expect foreign bank entry via Greenfield
Investment to be the optimal entry mode from the perspective of small and
medium-sized enterprises, because this mode of entry, contrary to entry via
acquisition, does not directly lead to one small bank in the market becoming
integrated in a large bank structure, therefore the negative effect of such firms
39For example a large firm might need multiple services from one bank such as wholesale
banking. Small banks might simply not have the scale to compete in these lines of business
thereby loosing businesses like credit procurement from large firms as well.
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set free by the new organizational structure and not finding a new bank for
loan provision, does not apply to entry via Greenfield Investment.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
The expected net payoff of investor financing a small bank with K units
of capital is respectively
• EP (1) = g(1)
2
+ b(1)
2
• EP (2) = g(1) + b(1)
• EP (3) = 3g(1)
2
+ b(1)
2
+ b(2)
2
Overall, a financing volume K is feasible if EP (K) > 0 (outside option)
For g(1)+b(1) > 0, which is fulfilled by assumption 4, banks are therefore
able to obtain two units of capital.
For b(2) < 2b(1) expected net payoff of investing three units of capital is
negative:
To show:
3g(1)
2
+ b(1)
2
+ b(2)
2
< 0 → b(2) < −b(1)− 3g(1)
for g(1) + b(1) > 0 follows
−b(1)− 3g(1) < 2b(1)
by assumption 3 b(2) < 2b(1) therefore
b(2) < −b(1)− 3g(1) → EP (3) < 0
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
The small bank loan manager will strongly prefer specialisation on small
firm loans over specialisation on large firm loans iff
EU(S) > EU(L)
or
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σ1/t ×
[
3g(1)
2
+ b(1)
2
]
+ (1− σ1/t)× [g(1) + b(1)] + 2
>
θ ×
[
3g(1)
2
+ b(1)
2
]
+ (1− θ)× [g(1) + b(1)] + 2
Rearranging yields
σ1/t > θ
and, using the log
t > lnσ
lnθ
Therefore the minimum relationship length inducing the manager to again
lend to small firms in the period of interest is
t > lnσ
lnθ
Appendix 3: Proof of difference in SME loan supply small
banks/large banks
I want to show t < t1
Inserting yields
t = ln σ
ln θ
< t1 =
ln σ
ln[θ(1+ 1+g(1)g(1)−b(1) )]
which can be simplified to
1+g(1)
g(1)−b(1) > 0
which is fulfilled as by the assumption necessary for bank operations to
be funded g(1)− b(1) > 0/g(1) > 0.
Appendix 4: Third banks behaviour formerly specialised on
large firms
I proof by contradiction that banks formerly specialised on large firms
will not supply a positive expected loan volume to the analyzed firm set free
by a consolidated institution.
Define θ−1 as the hard information research efficiency in the former period
and θ0 as the parameter in the period of analysis, with by assumption θ−1 <
θ0.
A bank will only supply positive expected loan volume to a firm with it
has relationship lengths t = 1 in the period of interest iff
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σ > θ0
The bank specialises on large firms in the earlier period iff
σ < θ−1
So a bank specialised on large firms will provide positive expected loan
volume to the small firm in the analyzed period iff
θ0 < σ < θ−1
which is a contradiction to
θ0 > θ−1
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Outlook
The ongoing globalization of the banking industry has raised a number of
questions on the entry motives and strategies of banks going abroad, as well
as the impact of the change of market structures in the banking industry,
that has accompanied this process.
This thesis has started out with giving an overview about what existing
economic literature has to say about a large array of questions arising in
the discussion about multinational banks and then has offered an insightful
practitioners’ view on strategic decisions within multinational banks via the
case study of Bank Austria Creditanstalt in Central and Eastern Europe.
In the following this body of work has focused on, directly and indirectly,
shedding new light on three specific issues that have arisen in the analysis of
multinational bank behaviour and the consequences of associated changes in
banking markets’ structure.
Chapter 2, after giving an overview about the existing literature on multi-
national banking, yielded the following main insights via the case study con-
ducted on the Austrian market leader in one of the core regions of multina-
tional bank expansion world-wide, Central and Eastern Europe. In general,
a highly complex relationship between a bank’s core business strategy and its
home market, its mode and timing for entry into foreign markets, its strat-
egy in building business in these markets as well as the geographic pattern
of a banks geographic expansion, was found. Retail-oriented and wholesale-
oriented banks seem to differ significantly in their timing and choice of entry
mode into foreign markets, with wholesale-oriented institutions seeming far
more inclined to grow foreign business organically via Greenfield Investment,
whereas successful retail banking in foreign markets seems to require non-
mobile assets only available via the acquisition of local incumbents. Addi-
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tionally, having a sufficiently large commercial client customer base to follow
abroad seems to enable wholesale-oriented banks to enter markets at earlier
stages of economic development, as entry into such a market can be profitable
almost from the beginning with such sources of revenue at hand. Concerning
empirical identification strategies of factors underlying the location decision
of multinational banks, it is concluded from the findings, that, at least for
regions economically integrating and with similar law and bank regulation,
focusing on single host country characteristics might be inefficient, as location
strategies might a broader regional, not country-specific, type1.
Chapter 3 theoretically discussed the choice of entry mode of multina-
tional institutions into foreign markets in general, not restricted to the bank-
ing industry. Whereas the existing literature discusses the choice of com-
panies whether to enter a foreign market via the setup of a completely new
structure (Greenfield Investment) or via the acquisition of an incumbent
company in the host market in a completely static way, my proposed model
incorporates a more ”‘dynamic”’ view. In a market that is entered sequen-
tially by foreign companies the choice of entry mode of the early mover
affects the entry decision of potential subsequent entrants, where early entry
via Greenfield Investment has the strategic advantage compared to entry via
acquisition, that profit-reducing sequential entry via Greenfield Investment
becomes less likely. The basic model thus yields a reasoning, why Greenfield
Investment makes up such a substantial share of foreign direct investment
in general, especially concerning the number of occurrences, whereas recent
theoretical literature has focused on adding further explanations for entry
via M&A, especially focusing on the analysis of asset-complementarity of ac-
quirer and target. It is also found, that a perverse effect of limited takeover
possibilities in markets to be entered further increases the attractiveness of
Greenfield Investment for early market entrants. Whereas such a basic model
can explain why Greenfield Investment should be an important entry path
for e.g. the wholesale banking industry, an extension is additionally pro-
posed that yields the tentative prediction, that entry via M&A should be
a favoured entry mode into foreign markets in the retail banking industry.
Incorporating the notion of market-specific learning by doing effects we find
M&A to be the early entry mode deterring harmful sequential entry, if the
respective industry is characterized by a low degree product differentiation
between firms in the market. Due to generally assumed low ex ante product
differentiation and heterogeneous regulation across countries, we deem this
1A variety of further results, new or confirming existing literature, can be found in the
conclusion of the case study.
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extension to be a good fit for the analysis of the retail banking industry.
The theory proposed in Chapter 4 offered new insights into a type of
banking foreign direct investment, that has not received sufficient formal
treatment in the existing literature though being heavily discussed both in
general business literature as well as empirically, namely banks going abroad
to provide services locally to its existing multinational firm customer base.
In my model, which bases on a recent theoretical contribution by Marin
and Schnitzer (2006)[97], a bank’s decision whether to follow its customer
abroad or not for loan provision is discussed. The model yields that this
location decision of banks is shaped by an interaction of client-specific and
host country-specific characteristics. Tendentially2 banks will follow their
customers abroad if their multinational customer enters what might be called
a non-fully developed country characterized by a low endowment in human
capital. The argument runs along the line of collateral, where it is derived,
that governments’ of such countries might be more inclined to block outflow
of valuable asset-embedded human capital, creating the need for banks to
sell such assets of a non-performing loan project locally in the host country.
Doing so efficiently however requires a physical presence abroad to be able
to identify potential local asset-takers. This line of argument is close to
concerns of practitioners that mentioned, that issues arising about the cross-
border liquidation of collateral are an important reason for banks to follow
customers abroad3.
Chapter 5 again did not primarily focus on multinational banking per se,
but uses a theoretical model to analyze the effect of general re-organization of
the banking industry on loan supply for small and medium-sized enterprises
characterized by their informational opacity. To be precise the effect of M&A
in the banking sector on the former is analyzed theoretically, where the gen-
eral process applies to in-market consolidation as well as foreign bank entry
via M&A. It is shown, that the likelihood of loan provision to small firms is
reduced by M&A activity in the banking sector due to two modelled reasons.
For one, a small firm is likely to loose its loan relationship with its small
bank when this bank integrates into a large bank structure via either being
a target or an acquirer in an M&A deal, due to loan managers incentives
for specialising on large firm loans being larger in large, hierarchical banking
institutions. Incorporating the notion of relationship-based banking for the
SME sector, such that soft, non-verifiable, information becomes better the
2As the following argument holds true for two out of three types of clients discussed.
3I’d like to thank Jana Schwarze (Commercial Clients, Stadtsparkasse Muenchen) and
Christoph Schropp (formerly Dresdner Bank AG) for pointing out this issue to me.
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longer the respective bank-client relationship, I find that these firms set free
by the consolidated institution are unlikely to attain loans from other small
banks in the market due to a missing relationship with these institutions.
Concerning the general focus of this thesis, it can tentatively be concluded,
that foreign bank entry via Greenfield Investment should not have an adverse
effect on the availability of loan financing for SMEs, whereas entry via M&A
should be harmful to this client group.
Numerous unanswered questions concerning future developments in the
multinationalization of the banking industry persist.
For one, the basic business strategies of banks are undergoing a major
change. Banks increasingly focus on off-balance sheet activity, abandoning
their role as risk-takers in their financing business by passing on securitized
debt to other financial market participants such as hedge funds. Increas-
ingly leaving such financial services of the balance sheet banks do not act
as financial intermediaries in the classic sense anymore, rather acting as in-
formation brokers and sales channels for other financial market participants.
As a result of this development, banks are in less need of long-term refinanc-
ing via deposits, shifting their retail strategies to act as a sales channel for
higher-margin investment products such as certificates and investment funds.
Instead of refinancing via deposits banks therefore increasingly refinance via
the capital market as well as more short-term the interbanking market. As
the classic intermediation role between depositor and borrower therefore be-
comes less important, and services such as asset management and investment
banking services such as bond underwriting seem to require sufficient scale,
an arising specialisation of banks on subsegments of the value chain is proba-
bly just in its beginning. Such specialisation is already found in Central and
Eastern Europe in a recent study by Dinger and von Hagen (2007)[55], who
find that old established banks in the region use their large existing branch
network to focus on raising deposits and subsequently transfer these assets to
new (mostly foreign) banks via the interbanking market, whereas the latter
new banks focus on the provision of loans, backed by refinancing through
the interbanking market. How such changing business strategies of banks
will influence the further globalization of the banking industry remains to be
seen.
At the same time new political discussions about restricting entry (espe-
cially via the acquisition of incumbent national firms) in key industries have
gained momentum, with examples being the prevented takeover of Span-
ish energy national champion Endesa by German E.ON or recent discussion
about prohibiting majority stakes of foreign investment funds in core in-
dustries in Germany. With the banking industry still perceived to be of
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strategic importance for the economy, further globalization of the industry
might be made infeasible by political interventionism4. Even without such
political barriers, according to the economic literature (e.g. see Berger et
al.(2000)[12]) the globalization of the banking industry might be restricted
to an incomplete level compare to other industries, as informal barriers to
entry in the commercial SME and retail banking sector coupled with a multi-
national banks’ potential partial inability to successfully integrate acquired
smaller local incumbents, might leave at least some banking services markets
in the hands of smaller local players.
Finally, the internationalisation of the banking industry might also come
under scrutiny by typical home countries of such multinational banks, as the
international exposure of home banks might be cause for concern of home
country governments. The latest development in the sub-prime mortgage
loan crisis in the U.S. has left numerous foreign financial institutions5 in
bad condition. As a result of this exposure of foreign banks to U.S. market
risks, indication has pointed to these institutions also restricting loan business
in their home countries. Such development might lead to political claims
towards domestic institutions to decrease their scope of business in (risky)
foreign markets.
4Which, at least for the case of foreign bank entry via M&A, could possibly be ratio-
nalized by the findings in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
5Banks that have publicly been heavily discussed to be severely affected by this crisis
are British Northern Rock and German Banks IKB and Sachsen LB.
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